Laney J. Paddock

The appellants, a motor vehicle dealer and its principal, appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision revoking their registrations for breaching conditions and ungovernability.

A single judge of the Divisional Court dismissed their motion for a stay pending appeal.

The appellants brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside that order.

The Divisional Court panel dismissed the motion, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the motion judge's application of the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay.

The appellants, a motor vehicle dealer and its sole director, moved for a stay of a Licence Appeal Tribunal order revoking their registrations pending appeal.

The Tribunal had found the appellants breached multiple conditions of a prior consent order, including failing to disclose material facts to consumers and trading without required education.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding the appellants failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay given the public interest in consumer protection.

The appellants, a motor vehicle salesperson and a motor vehicle dealer, appealed a Tribunal decision directing the revocation of their registrations to the Divisional Court.

They brought a motion before the Tribunal for a stay of the revocation decision pending the outcome of their appeal.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the Tribunal found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the appellants failed to establish irreparable harm, as their anticipated financial losses and business closure could be quantified in monetary terms.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience favoured denying the stay, as the public interest in consumer protection outweighed the appellants' private commercial interests, given their history of non-compliance with registration conditions.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellants, a motor vehicle dealer and its principal, appealed a Notice of Proposal to revoke their registrations under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002.

The appellants brought a preliminary motion seeking a stay of proceedings due to the Registrar's late disclosure of documents, which the Tribunal dismissed, finding that an adjournment cured any procedural unfairness.

On the merits, the Tribunal found that the appellants breached multiple conditions of their registrations, including trading in motor vehicles before completing a required certification course and failing to disclose material facts about a vehicle's pre-existing engine defect to a purchaser.

The Tribunal concluded that the appellants' past conduct afforded reasonable grounds for belief that they would not carry on business in accordance with law, integrity, and honesty.

Finding that the appellants had a history of non-compliance and could not be relied upon to adhere to conditions, the Tribunal directed the Registrar to carry out its proposal to revoke the registrations.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action as a SLAPP suit under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court applied the presumption under section 137.1(7) that the defendants are entitled to full indemnity costs.

Finding the requested amount reasonable for a complex motion, the court awarded the defendants costs of $63,572.84 on a full indemnity basis.

The respondent, KingSett Mortgage Corporation, moved to quash an appeal brought by 30 Roe Investments Corp. from an order appointing a receiver over nine condominium units. 30 Roe argued it had an appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and alternatively sought leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, confirming that no appeal as of right exists from a receivership order under s. 193(c).

The Court also dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal lacked merit, did not raise an issue of general importance, and would unduly hinder the receivership proceedings.

The appellants appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision directing the Registrar to revoke their motor vehicle dealer registrations.

The tribunal found the appellants engaged in a pattern of dishonest conduct, including falsifying bills of sale and failing to disclose accident damage, and knowingly provided a false statement on a renewal application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the liability findings and concluding that the penalty of revocation was not clearly unfit given the pattern of manipulating unsophisticated consumers.

The Registrar brought a motion to lift a stay of the Tribunal's order revoking the appellants' registrations as motor vehicle dealers and salespersons, alleging non-compliance with disclosure conditions.

Prior to the resumption of the motion, the parties agreed to terms to continue the stay.

The Tribunal issued a consent order continuing the stay subject to modified, detailed conditions regarding the disclosure of transaction documents to the Registrar.

The appellant appealed a Notice of Proposal by the Registrar to refuse his application for registration as a motor vehicle salesperson.

After three days of hearing, the parties reached an agreement to grant the registration subject to conditions, including a five-year prohibition on being a partner or director of a dealer, and a requirement to repay $37,000 to the Motor Vehicle Dealers Compensation Fund.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal issued a consent order reflecting the agreement and disposing of the appeal without further hearing.

This appeal addressed the Small Claims Court's jurisdiction to appoint a representative defendant for an unincorporated association, specifically a trade union, in a wrongful termination claim.

The appellants argued that the Small Claims Court Rules contained an "omission" regarding such orders, precluding reference to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court's decision, holding that the Small Claims Court Rules themselves provided the necessary authority for such orders, and that reference to the Rules of Civil Procedure was discretionary but not essential.

The court found no legislative intent to exclude unincorporated associations from the Small Claims Court's jurisdiction, emphasizing the court's role in facilitating access to justice.

The appellant, a registered motor vehicle dealer, brought a motion for a stay of the Tribunal's Order revoking his registration pending his appeal to the Divisional Court.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the Tribunal found that the appeal raised a serious issue and that the appellant would suffer irreparable harm, as the loss of his sole source of income would likely result in the permanent closure of his dealership.

The Tribunal concluded that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay, provided strict conditions were imposed to protect the public interest.

The stay was granted for seven months, subject to conditions including that the appellant operate as a wholesaler only and expeditiously perfect the appeal.

The appellants, a motor vehicle dealer and its principal, brought a motion to stay the Tribunal's order revoking their registrations pending an appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Tribunal applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that the appeal raised a serious issue, the appellants would suffer irreparable harm without a stay as the dealership was their sole source of income, and the balance of convenience favoured a stay provided conditions were imposed to protect the public.

The stay was granted subject to conditions including posting security and maintaining specific transaction records.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, brought a motion for directions to compel the Integrity Commissioner to file the entire record of proceedings, including confidential evidence, for her pending judicial review application.

The applicant argued that the Commissioner's report waived the statutory duty of secrecy and that procedural fairness required full disclosure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, holding that the Commissioner's statutory duty to preserve secrecy under s. 223.5 of the Municipal Act prevails and is not overridden by the general principles of open court proceedings or the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The appellant appealed a Provincial Officer's Order requiring a written report identifying motor vehicles with non-compliant emission control systems.

The parties reached a settlement agreement where the appellant agreed to comply with the order within 60 days of withdrawing the appeal.

The Environmental Review Tribunal accepted the settlement, finding it consistent with the Environmental Protection Act and in the public interest, and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion seeking various relief, including the appointment of the Office of the Children's Lawyer, an urgent case conference, and orders restraining the respondent father's communication and filming of exchanges.

The court addressed preliminary objections regarding jurisdiction and procedural fairness, finding it had jurisdiction to vary a final order on an interim basis in urgent cases.

The court found a strong prima facie case for a change in parenting arrangements due to high conflict and harm to the children, particularly the eldest.

The court suspended the existing shared parenting schedule, granted the mother primary residency and final decision-making authority on a temporary basis, and ordered the father to pay costs for delayed pleadings.

This case involves three appeals arising from matrimonial proceedings.

The Court of Appeal addressed the validity of a stay of execution obtained by a third-party creditor (the husband's father) against the matrimonial home, the striking of the husband's pleadings for non-compliance with court orders, and the interpretation of a domestic contract concerning the wife's interest in the matrimonial home and equalization payments.

The court found that the stay of execution was justified under the Courts of Justice Act, despite not meeting the Family Law Act criteria, as the creditor's objective was to defeat the wife's claims.

The decision to strike the husband's pleadings was upheld due to his wilful non-compliance and history of defaults.

The trial judge's interpretation of the domestic contract, granting the wife a one-half interest in the matrimonial home, and the valuation of the husband's debt to his father at zero for equalization purposes were affirmed.

However, the costs award from the lower court was varied to credit the husband for interim payments already made.

Appeals from determinations made by an application judge regarding the will of the late Peter Trezzi.

The deceased operated a successful construction business through two corporations: Across Canada Construction Ltd. (ACC) and Trezzi Construction Ltd. (Trezzi Construction).

Peter was the sole shareholder of Trezzi Construction.

The central disputes concerned whether Peter could effectively bequeath assets held by Trezzi Construction to his son Albert; whether his wife Gina owned 50 per cent of ACC shares; and whether Gina was entitled to an extension of time to file a surviving spouse's election under the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three appeals, upholding the application judge's determinations on each issue.

The applicants sought to quash an order of the Small Claims Court that amended the defendants to include a representative of a trade union.

The applicants argued the Small Claims Court lacked jurisdiction to make a representation order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Small Claims Court Rules contain a gap regarding representation orders, which the Deputy Judge properly filled by relying on Rule 1.03(2) to apply Rule 12.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The respondent appealed a motion judge's order dismissing his motion to compel the moving party to answer discovery questions regarding a pattern of commercially unreasonable conduct.

The respondent had pleaded that the moving party's conduct toward his company was part of a broader pattern of conduct toward multiple borrowers.

The motion judge held the questions were not relevant because the respondent failed to demonstrate sufficient similarities.

The Court of Appeal held the order was interlocutory and the appeal was brought to the wrong court, as appeals of interlocutory orders lie to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appeal was quashed and costs were awarded to the moving party.

Alfrida Gina Trezzi sought a declaration that she was a 50% owner of Across Canada Construction Ltd. (ACC) shares.

Albert Trezzi opposed, arguing her claim was statute-barred and that she was not a shareholder.

The court dismissed the limitation period argument.

However, the court found no evidence that ACC ever issued shares to Gina, despite unexecuted organizational documents suggesting a 50/50 split with Peter Trezzi.

The court rejected the application of statutory presumptions under the Business Corporations Act and Securities Transfer Act, concluding Gina failed to prove her ownership claim.

Albert's cross-application for a declaration that Peter's estate owned all shares was also declined as the hearing only addressed Gina's alleged ownership.