28 total
Sentence appeal allowed to correct errors in calculating credit for pre-disposition custody.
The appellant appealed his sentence of 4 years and 3 months for armed robbery, unlawful confinement, and related offences.
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's determination that a 5-year global sentence was appropriate given the significant planning and aggravating factors.
However, the Court found errors in the calculation of pre-disposition custody credit, specifically regarding a 3-week period prior to release and a 13-month period spent in custody on unrelated charges that were ultimately stayed.
The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced by 7 months to 3 years and 8 months.
Crown sentence appeal allowed and sentence increased, but stayed as respondent had served original sentence.
The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.
The trial judge had imposed two consecutive sentences of six months less a day, acknowledging a fit sentence would be 48 months, and gave 17 months credit for 11 months of pre-trial custody.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding a fit sentence would be a further 19 months of incarceration.
However, because the respondent had already served the conditional sentence and the Crown did not seek further incarceration, the sentence was stayed.
Crown appeal allowed; conditional sentence set aside due to prior record and incarceration imposed.
The Crown appealed the conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on the respondent.
The trial judge had determined an appropriate sentence of 39 months, reduced for cooperation and parity.
The Court of Appeal held that a conditional sentence was not available due to the respondent's previous criminal record for a similar offence, applying R. v. Fice.
The appeal was allowed, the conditional sentence was set aside, and a sentence of 21 months of incarceration was imposed after crediting time served and cooperation.
Accused sentenced to 57 months for historical gross indecency against a child relative.
The accused was convicted of historical gross indecency against a child relative, with the abuse spanning ten years.
The Crown sought a five-year sentence, while the defence argued for three to four years.
The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the profound breach of trust and the severe, lasting impact on the victim.
The court imposed a base sentence of 57 months, reduced by 33 months of enhanced pre-sentence custody credit, resulting in a net sentence of two years less a day to be served in a provincial facility, followed by three years of probation.
Additional orders included a DNA order, lifetime registration on the National Sex Offender Registry, and lifetime prohibition orders under sections 161 and 110 of the Criminal Code.
Historical abuse conviction entered on one count; other counts failed on reliability concerns.
In a historical sexual abuse trial involving multiple complainants and allegations spanning several decades, the court applied the W.(D.) framework together with a reliability-focused analysis drawn from recent jurisprudence on historical evidence.
The court held that one gross indecency charge alleged after repeal of the offence had to be quashed, directed acquittals on additional counts that could not be proven, and admitted count-to-count similar fact evidence as between the remaining complainants.
The accused's testimony was rejected as not credible and tailored, but the court distinguished between credibility and reliability in assessing the complainants' evidence.
One complainant's evidence was found credible and reliable and sufficiently corroborated in important respects, resulting in a conviction for gross indecency; the other complainant's evidence was found sincere but unreliable in material respects, resulting in acquittals on those counts.
Count-to-count similar fact evidence admitted in historical sexual assault prosecution.
In a criminal prosecution alleging historical sexual offences against two protected complainants, the Crown brought a mid-trial application to admit each complainant’s evidence as similar fact evidence on a count-to-count basis.
Applying the framework in Handy, the court held the evidence was admissible to demonstrate a situation-specific propensity to sexually abuse young male family members, to negate fabrication, and to assist in assessing credibility and reliability.
The court found extensive contextual and behavioural similarities, no realistic basis for collusion, and a high degree of probative value that outweighed the risk of moral or reasoning prejudice.
The Crown’s application was granted and the evidence was admitted.
Appeal from drug trafficking convictions dismissed; trial judge's reasons adequate and evidence supported findings.
The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.
She argued that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and that he improperly rejected her evidence.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate for appellate review.
The court held that the surveillance evidence corroborated the Crown's evidence, supporting the conclusion that the appellant was selling cocaine from her apartment and possessed the drugs for the purpose of trafficking.
Appeal from convictions dismissed; trial judge's jury selection procedures and challenge for cause instructions upheld.
The appellants, who are Black, were convicted of robbery and related offences.
During jury selection, defence counsel were permitted to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on racial bias.
The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that the trial judge's instructions to the triers on the challenge for cause procedure were inadequate and that the trial judge erred in his rulings regarding peremptory challenges when sworn jurors had to be replaced.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions to the triers were sufficient and that, although the trial judge erred in law by initially granting extra peremptory challenges, the error caused no prejudice to the appellants.