Scott N. Latimer

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol after losing control of her vehicle and striking a pole.

At trial, she brought a Charter application alleging her s. 10(b) right to counsel was violated at the roadside and at the police station.

The court found no breach at the roadside but concluded a breach occurred at the station when the officer failed to correct her mistaken belief that she could only contact local counsel.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court admitted the breath samples, finding the breach was in the low-moderate range of seriousness and society's interest in adjudicating drinking and driving offences favoured admission.

A finding of guilt was entered.

The offender was convicted of sexually touching a 15-year-old boy, a former student and friend of his son, whom he was mentoring.

The offender, a former school vice principal and church youth leader, unbuttoned the victim's pants and touched his penis while telling him this would help him play a video game better.

The offence was opportunistic and occurred during a sleepover.

The court imposed a 10-month jail sentence, emphasizing the breach of trust, the vulnerability of the victim, and the significant psychological harm caused.

The court rejected the Crown's request for one year and the defence request for 14 days, finding the appropriate sentence fell within the established range for sexual interference offences.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a traffic stop at 2:06 a.m.

The court examined three categories of constitutional issues: (1) the lawfulness of the initial detention; (2) compliance with section 254(2) of the Criminal Code regarding the Approved Screening Device demand; and (3) the adequacy of efforts to contact counsel of choice.

The court found multiple Charter violations including a brief section 10(a) violation, a section 254(2) violation due to delay in making the demand, and a section 10(b) violation regarding insufficient attempts to contact counsel of choice.

Despite these violations, the court admitted the breath samples under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that exclusion was not required to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with trafficking carfentanil following the death of a young man from an overdose.

Police obtained the deceased's phone from his father and, without a warrant, examined text messages between the deceased and the accused.

The court found that the accused had standing to challenge the seizure of his sent text messages under section 8 of the Charter, as he retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in those communications post-transmission.

The warrantless search violated section 8.

However, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the seriousness of the violation (minor, given the law at the time), the significant impact on the accused's privacy interests, and society's strong interest in adjudicating a serious drug trafficking charge in the context of a community opioid crisis.

The applicant sought to exclude a post-arrest statement on the basis of a violation of his section 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The applicant had retained counsel prior to arrest and repeatedly requested to speak with his lawyer during a police interview.

Despite these clear requests, the investigating officer continued questioning without facilitating access to counsel.

The court found that the applicant had invoked his right to counsel through multiple explicit requests and that the officer's failure to provide reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel constituted a section 10(b) violation.

The statement was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was convicted of making and possessing written child pornography following a trial.

The defendant engaged in an online dialogue involving "daddy-daughter roleplay and ageplay" with references to actual children, including sharing photographs of his stepdaughters and describing sexual activity with them.

The defendant applied under section 12 of the Charter arguing that the mandatory minimum sentences of six months for making and three months for possessing child pornography constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding that the mandatory minimums were not grossly disproportionate to the offences and circumstances.

The court imposed a sentence of seven months jail for making child pornography and three months concurrent for possession.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, possession of marijuana, and failing to provide a breath sample.

The Crown brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the arrest.

The court found that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused for impaired driving based on observations of slurred speech, glassy red-rimmed eyes, odour of alcohol, and the circumstances of a vehicle collision.

The Charter application was dismissed.

At trial, the accused was acquitted of failing to provide a breath sample because the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure was intentional.

The court found sufficient doubt regarding the accused's mens rea, particularly given his offers to provide alternative forms of testing.

The accused was convicted of possession of marijuana and acquitted of impaired driving.

The offender pleaded guilty to 11 Criminal Code offences involving the sexual abuse of children and the creation and possession of child pornography.

The offences included four counts of making child pornography, four counts of making child pornography available, two counts of invitation to sexual touching, and one count of sexual interference.

The offender abused five identifiable children, including his own biological daughter and his girlfriend's daughters, all under the age of 10.

He also possessed 1,868 images and 95 videos of child pornography across multiple devices, with many depicting severe abuse of very young children.

The court imposed a global sentence of 9 years and 3 months, with ancillary orders including DNA collection, lifetime SOIRA registration, lifetime weapons prohibition, and a 20-year Section 161 order.

The accused pleaded guilty to robbery with a disguise arising from a February 18, 2018 incident at a Petro Canada gas bar.

The accused, in his mid-40s with an extensive criminal history dominated by penitentiary time, entered the gas bar with his hood up and a knife, demanding cash from the clerk.

After obtaining the money, the accused was seen by the clerk who photographed the vehicle.

The accused threatened to kill the clerk.

The accused was arrested that evening, cooperated with police, and demonstrated remorse.

The court imposed a sentence of five years and six months, comprising 48 months for robbery plus 6 months consecutive for the disguise, with 195 days of pretrial custody credited at 1.5 times.

The Crown sought to admit out-of-court statements made by a four-year-old child alleging child abuse.

The statements were hearsay and presumptively inadmissible.

The defence challenged whether threshold reliability had been established, arguing the statements were inconsistent, lacked a promise to tell the truth, and had never been subject to cross-examination.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay and found the statements substantively reliable based on the circumstances in which they were made, the open-ended questioning, the identity of the recipients as trusted individuals, the temporal proximity to the alleged assault, and corroborating physical evidence.

The court admitted all of the child's utterances, including inconsistent statements, for trial.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual interference involving a 12-year-old daughter and her similarly aged friend.

The Crown sought 3 to 3.5 years in penitentiary; the defence sought 15 months in a reformatory.

The court imposed a total sentence of 27 months jail (24 months for the daughter, 3 months consecutive for the friend), finding that denunciation, general deterrence, and separation from society must take precedence over rehabilitation in child sexual abuse cases.

The sentence reflects the serious breach of trust, the nature of the sexual conduct, and the early guilty plea.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter based on alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The applicant was stopped for a traffic violation, subjected to an approved screening device test, arrested for driving over 80, and provided breath samples.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the breath demand based on a faint odour of alcohol from the vehicle, the applicant's admission of earlier drinking, and confirmation of the odour from the applicant's mouth.

The court further found that the officer complied with the informational component of section 10(b) by reading the pre-printed rights, and that the applicant did not exercise his right to counsel until requesting duty counsel at the police station, at which point the police properly implemented that request.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The accused, a full-time facility attendant at a municipal arena, was charged with three counts of sexual exploitation, one count of invitation to sexual touching, and one count of unlawful confinement involving four teenage part-time employees.

The Crown alleged the accused abused his supervisory position by isolating the complainants and inviting them to expose their genitals, offering various pretexts such as sizing for condoms or providing sexual advice.

The trial judge found the accused guilty of invitation to sexual touching with respect to one complainant but acquitted him on the sexual exploitation counts, finding that the Crown failed to establish the essential element of a position of trust or authority in a workplace context where the accused had no managerial authority over the complainants.

The unlawful confinement charge was withdrawn by directed verdict.

The Crown brought an application to admit statements made by the accused to a police officer following breath testing as voluntary.

The court conducted a voluntariness analysis under the confessions rule established in R. v. Oickle.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the statements were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

Key factors included the accused's youth and first arrest, questioning on a detain sheet prior to legal advice, a compelled breath demand with questioning during the procedure, and the absence of a secondary caution.

The court held that the circumstances created a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused understood his right to silence when questioned by the officer.

The accused was charged with assault for allegedly spanking his five-year-old daughter excessively on March 7, 2017, contrary to Section 43 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including medical evidence of severe bruising to the child's buttocks consistent with multiple forceful impacts by an adult hand, and the accused's proximity to the child during a stressful morning.

The defence challenged the Crown's burden of proof and the reliability of the accused's post-arrest statement.

The court found that while the accused was the most likely suspect, the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused's exculpatory statement, corroborated in part by the mother's testimony, created reasonable doubt that could not be dispelled by the circumstantial evidence alone.

The offender pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography, making it available to others, and breaching bail conditions by being in proximity to children.

The offender accessed child pornography online, created a profile on a Russian website facilitating such material, distributed files to an undercover officer on two occasions, and maintained a Dropbox account containing child abuse images.

Forensic examination revealed 3,555 images and 2,155 videos meeting the Criminal Code definition of child pornography, with material classified at the fourth level of the Oliver scale involving penetrative sexual activity between adults and children.

The offender also breached bail by attending a retirement party where children were present.

The court imposed an 18-month custodial sentence, balancing the serious nature of the offences and aggravating factors against the offender's guilty plea, remorse, insight, rehabilitative efforts, and the impact on his elderly wife.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by a Justice of the Peace under section 9.1(1) of the Provincial Offences Act for an unsafe lane change contrary to section 154(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant did not attend trial and was deemed not to dispute the charge.

The appellant argued the certificate of offence was not complete and regular on its face because the officer used the outdated language "unsafe lane change" instead of the updated regulatory language "unsafe move - lane or shoulder" prescribed in Regulation 950.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the certificate provided effective notice of the offence when coupled with the correct section number and set fine, and that the regulatory language was permissive rather than mandatory.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings based on an alleged unreasonable delay to trial in a robbery charge.

The charge was laid on March 13, 2016, with trial scheduled to end on March 9, 2018.

The court applied the presumptive ceiling framework established in R. v. Jordan, which sets an 18-month ceiling for trials in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The key issue was whether delay resulting from the removal of original counsel in December 2016 constituted defence delay.

The court found that the removal of counsel and the resulting adjournment of trial dates constituted defence delay attributable to the defence.

Calculating net delay at approximately 13 months, the court found this fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling and dismissed the application.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug.

The trial involved a Charter application regarding the legality of the detention and the failure to provide rights to counsel without delay upon arrest.

The court found a violation of section 10(b) of the Charter due to an eight-minute delay in providing rights to counsel.

Certain evidence was excluded as a result.

On the merits, despite evidence of drug use and observations consistent with impairment, the court found that the Crown had not proven impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly given the exclusion of certain roadside observations obtained through conscriptive means and the ambiguity of the remaining evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample following a motor vehicle collision on December 14, 2015.

The Crown alleged the accused was impaired by alcohol when operating his vehicle and subsequently refused to provide breath samples at the hospital.

The accused was acquitted of impaired operation but convicted of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The court found insufficient evidence of impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, but determined the accused intentionally failed to provide a sample despite suffering from a fractured sternum.