Christina Anik Morrow

The applicants, arrested in a large-scale police investigation, brought an abuse of process motion seeking a stay of proceedings due to systemic delays in holding their special bail hearings.

They argued that their section 11(e) Charter rights were violated, similar to the applicants in a previous case where a stay was granted.

The court found that while the applicants' rights were violated by the delays, the systemic problem in the jurisdiction had been largely rectified following the previous decision.

As the ongoing systemic delay had been addressed, a stay of proceedings was no longer necessary to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The application was dismissed, though the court noted the Charter violations could warrant a sentence reduction if the applicants are convicted.

The accused pled guilty to attempted murder after shooting the victim in the leg and head, leaving the victim with permanent brain damage.

The Crown sought 18 years' imprisonment, while the accused sought 12 years.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, sentencing the accused to 16 years' imprisonment.

The court granted enhanced pre-sentence custody credit at a 1.5:1 ratio, plus an additional 133 days for harsh conditions due to lockdowns and protective custody, resulting in a net sentence of 13 years and 5 months.

The United States of America sought the extradition of the respondent to face charges of conspiracy to possess and distribute marijuana and MDMA.

The Attorney General of Canada applied for an order committing the respondent into custody to await the Minister's decision on surrender.

The court found that the respondent was the person sought and that the Record of the Case contained sufficient admissible evidence of conduct that, had it occurred in Canada, would justify committal for trial on the corresponding Canadian offence of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The committal order was granted.

The applicant sought an order for the committal of the respondent into custody to await the Minister's decision on extradition to the United Kingdom.

The respondent had been convicted in the UK of conspiracy to evade duty on imported tobacco products and of absconding during his trial.

The court found that the conduct underlying the UK convictions corresponded to Canadian offences, specifically evading duty under the Excise Act, and that the evidence provided by the UK was sufficient to justify committal for trial had the conduct occurred in Canada.

A warrant for committal was issued.

The accused pleaded guilty to breaching a long-term supervision order by consuming cocaine on June 2, 2016.

The Crown sought a 12-month sentence, while defence counsel sought six months with immediate release given time served.

The court imposed a sentence of seven months incarceration with a 1.3:1 credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in one day's custody remaining.

The decision emphasizes the principles established in R. v. Ipeelee regarding sentencing for breaches of long-term supervision orders, with particular attention to Gladue factors and the offender's Aboriginal background.

The court found that while the breach was serious given the offender's history of violence linked to cocaine use, the context of the relapse, his significant rehabilitation progress over eight years, strong community support, and diminished moral culpability warranted a substantially lower sentence than the Crown sought.

The Crown applied to have the respondent declared a dangerous offender following his convictions for two counts of attempted murder with a firearm, discharging a firearm with intent to wound, and failing to comply with a prohibition order.

The court reviewed the respondent's extensive criminal record, institutional misconduct, gang affiliation, and psychiatric assessments.

Finding that the respondent met the criteria for a dangerous offender due to a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour and a substantial degree of indifference to the consequences of his actions, the court declared him a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The Crown applied under s. 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code for a 60-day remand of the respondent for a psychological assessment at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The respondent had been found guilty of two counts of robbery and two counts of conspiracy to commit robbery, which are designated serious personal injury offences.

The Crown sought the assessment on the grounds that there were reasonable grounds to believe the respondent might be found to be a dangerous or long-term offender, citing a pattern of repetitive behaviour based on his extensive criminal record, including prior robberies and a home invasion.

The court found that the threshold of "reasonable possibility" was met, given the respondent's history of criminal activity and the similarities in his past and current offences, which involved planning, co-accused, and threats of violence.

The application for the assessment was granted.

The offenders pleaded guilty to manslaughter and indecent interference with human remains following a joint submission.

Originally charged with first-degree murder, the Crown accepted lesser pleas due to evidentiary frailties.

The court accepted the joint submission, imposing a 10-year sentence for manslaughter and 3 years concurrent for indecent interference, with credit for pre-trial custody and Gladue factors for Aboriginal offenders.

The applicant, who was convicted of attempted murder and other firearm offences, challenged the constitutionality of the dangerous offender provisions in sections 753(1) and 753.01 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued that the 2008 amendments impermissibly curtailed judicial discretion and were overbroad, violating section 7 of the Charter.

The court reviewed the legislative history and jurisprudence, concluding that the provisions operate as part of a carefully calibrated scheme to protect the public while maintaining judicial discretion at the penalty phase.

The court found that the provisions are not overbroad and do not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application following the offender's convictions for sexual assault, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm.

The offender had an extensive criminal record, including two prior convictions for sexual assault.

The court heard competing expert evidence on the offender's risk of re-offending.

The court found that while the offender had a pattern of repetitive behaviour, the Crown failed to prove beyond a balance of probabilities that there was a likelihood of the offender causing death, injury, or severe psychological damage in the future.

The court also declined to designate the offender as a long-term offender.

The court imposed a global sentence of 10.5 years, reduced to 2 years less a day after credit for pre-sentence custody, followed by 3 years of probation with strict conditions.

The accused applied for a change of venue under s. 599(1)(a) of the Criminal Code in relation to charges of first-degree murder and offering an indignity to human remains.

They argued that extensive pre‑trial publicity, community hostility, and alleged inadequacies in the Sault Ste.

Marie courthouse facilities created a reasonable likelihood of juror prejudice and an unfair trial.

The court reviewed the governing jurisprudence on venue changes and the safeguards inherent in the jury selection and trial process.

It concluded that the applicants failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that community bias or prejudice could not be mitigated through those safeguards.

The court also found that the courthouse facilities were capable of accommodating the trial and that logistical concerns did not justify relocation.

The accused brought a motion to challenge prospective jurors for cause under s. 638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code on the basis of potential racial bias and pretrial publicity.

The defence proposed multiple-choice versions of the traditional Parks question and an additional question regarding stereotypes about Black men.

The court reviewed the jurisprudence on challenges for cause, including the requirement to demonstrate a realistic potential for juror partiality.

The court declined to permit the multiple-choice format and rejected the stereotype question due to insufficient evidentiary basis.

Instead, the court approved modified questions addressing racial bias and exposure to publicity, requiring jurors to answer in their own words.

The applicants sought certiorari to quash their committal to stand trial for first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.

They argued there was no evidence that the victim was killed while being forcibly confined or regarding the role each applicant played in the killing.

They also argued they were denied natural justice because the preliminary inquiry judge relied on post-offence conduct and specific medical evidence without giving them an opportunity to make submissions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the applications, finding that the applicants were permitted to address the evidence and were not denied natural justice.

The court further held that even if there was a breach, the applicants suffered no prejudice because a committal was inevitable based on the pre-offence and post-offence circumstantial evidence, which was sufficient to permit a jury to infer a common intention and that each applicant played a substantial and integral role in the killing.

The applicant appealed a proposal by the Registrar under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002 to refuse its registration.

The parties reached a settlement and sought a consent order disposing of the proceeding without a hearing pursuant to section 4.1 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal issued the consent order, incorporating the agreed terms and conditions, which included strict limitations on the involvement of a specific individual in the dealership's operations.

The accused applied for disclosure of contact information for several civilian witnesses who had been interviewed during a homicide investigation but whom the Crown did not intend to call at the preliminary inquiry.

The defence argued that the information was necessary to conduct its own investigation and to prepare full answer and defence under the principles established in Stinchcombe.

The Crown refused disclosure citing specific safety concerns and evidence of intimidation, gang affiliation, and repeated breaches of non‑communication orders by the accused while in custody.

The court held that while witness contact information is generally relevant and normally disclosed, the Crown had established specific and credible security risks justifying withholding the information in this case.

Instead, the court adopted a structured procedure allowing defence counsel to interview willing witnesses at the courthouse while protecting witness safety and confidentiality.

The appellant appealed a dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the predicate offence constituted a serious personal injury offence likely to inflict severe psychological damage.

The court upheld the finding that there was no basis for a long-term offender designation and that a dangerous offender designation was necessary.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

At trial, the Crown relied on the testimony of a witness whose memory of seeing the appellant near the crime scene was refreshed through hypnosis, as well as similar fact evidence from a former girlfriend.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that post-hypnosis evidence is presumptively inadmissible because it does not meet the reliability requirements for novel scientific evidence.

The Court also found that the similar fact evidence lacked sufficient probative value to outweigh its prejudicial effect, and the curative proviso could not be applied.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder after the elderly victims were stabbed in their sleep.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's motive, opportunity, blood on his track pants, and a confession to an undercover officer.

The trial judge admitted expert evidence from a police officer regarding crime scene reconstruction and criminal profiling.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of the expert evidence, demeanour evidence, and the conduct of Crown counsel.

The Court of Appeal held that while the criminal profiling evidence was inadmissible, the crime scene reconstruction evidence was properly admitted.

The court applied the curative proviso to the profiling evidence, finding the case against the appellant overwhelming, and dismissed the appeal.