M. Boyce

The accused was convicted after trial of multiple firearm-related offences including possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of a handgun and ammunition for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, knowingly occupying a motor vehicle containing a restricted firearm, uttering a threat to cause death, and breaches of a section 109 firearms prohibition order and probation order.

The court imposed a global sentence of 1825 days, with 1305 days remaining to be served after crediting pre-sentence custody at an enhanced rate of 1.5:1.

The court rejected arguments for a time-served sentence and emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for firearm offences.

The accused, a leading expert in animal brucellosis employed by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), pleaded guilty to one count of breach of trust and ten regulatory offences.

The breach of trust involved his commercialization of brucellosis diagnostic test kits using intellectual property owned by the CFIA through a company established in China from 2006 to 2010.

The regulatory offences arose from his arrest on October 24, 2012, when he was found attempting to board a flight to China with 17 vials of brucella bacteria improperly packaged in his carry-on luggage.

The court imposed a two-year custodial sentence, rejecting the defence's request for a conditional sentence despite the accused's exemplary background, advanced age, serious medical conditions, and low risk of recidivism.

The court found that general deterrence and denunciation were the predominant sentencing principles required by the legislative objectives of the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act and the Export and Import Permits Act.

The offender was sentenced for failing to provide the necessaries of life and assault with a weapon against her 11-year-old son.

While her husband committed horrific acts of torture and abuse against the child, the offender was convicted for her failure to protect the child and intervene over a six-month period.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, sentencing her to 3 years' imprisonment, less 19 months of pre-trial custody credit, resulting in 17 months left to serve.

The accused brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of his right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 32.5 months, marginally exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in *R. v. Jordan*.

The court deducted one month for defence delay (accused being a fugitive), resulting in a net delay of 31 months.

The Crown invoked the "transitional exceptional circumstances" exception, arguing reasonable reliance on pre-*Jordan* case law (*R. v. Morin* guidelines) and existing scheduling practices in Ottawa.

The court found that counsel and the court had reasonably relied on the previous regime for calculating s. 11(b) delay, and that staying a second-degree murder charge under these circumstances, where the *Jordan* ceiling was only moderately exceeded, would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application was dismissed.

A young person was convicted of robbery committed during a home invasion on June 13, 2015.

The defendant, who was 15 at the time of the offence, was among a group that invaded a residence, held the complainant against her will, and ransacked the home stealing property valued at $5,348.23.

The defendant participated by searching for items to steal while the complainant was being held.

At sentencing, the Crown sought a deferred custody order of three months followed by probation, while defence counsel argued that probation alone would be sufficient.

The court found that the statutory conditions for imposing custody were not met, as the offence did not cause serious bodily harm and did not create a substantial likelihood of bodily harm.

The court imposed a 12-month probation order with conditions including restitution, community service, counselling, and a weapons prohibition.

The accused pleaded guilty to breaching a long-term supervision order by consuming cocaine on June 2, 2016.

The Crown sought a 12-month sentence, while defence counsel sought six months with immediate release given time served.

The court imposed a sentence of seven months incarceration with a 1.3:1 credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in one day's custody remaining.

The decision emphasizes the principles established in R. v. Ipeelee regarding sentencing for breaches of long-term supervision orders, with particular attention to Gladue factors and the offender's Aboriginal background.

The court found that while the breach was serious given the offender's history of violence linked to cocaine use, the context of the relapse, his significant rehabilitation progress over eight years, strong community support, and diminished moral culpability warranted a substantially lower sentence than the Crown sought.

The accused parents were charged with multiple offences relating to the severe abuse, starvation, and confinement of their 11-year-old child.

The father claimed he was not criminally responsible due to post-traumatic stress disorder, arguing he was in a dissociative state.

The court rejected this defence, finding the father guilty of aggravated assault, sexual assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, failing to provide the necessaries of life, and firearms offences.

The stepmother was found guilty of failing to provide the necessaries of life and assault with a weapon, but was acquitted of the joint charges of aggravated assault and confinement, as the court found her failure to intervene was not proven to be for the purpose of aiding the father.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging that his right to be tried without unreasonable delay was violated.

The charge of impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code was laid on September 8, 2011.

The prosecution involved two trials and an appeal, spanning over four years.

The court conducted a detailed analysis of the delay attributable to the Crown versus delay caused by the defence and inherent in the case.

The court found that while the total delay was substantial at 15.75 months of Crown-caused and institutional delay, it fell within the acceptable range for a retrial (14-18 months).

The court also found that the defence had not acted with sufficient diligence, including late disclosure of trial complexity, last-minute tactical changes, and a late section 11(b) application.

The court found no meaningful prejudice to the accused and dismissed the application.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than the legal limit of alcohol in his blood.

The Crown presented evidence of breath test results showing a blood alcohol content of 100 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the evidence on multiple grounds, including Charter violations relating to the loss or failure to preserve relevant evidence.

Specifically, the accused sought disclosure of Cobra data, simulator certification documents, and calibration and maintenance records relating to the Intoxilyzer 8000C machine used to obtain his breath samples.

The court found that certain information had been lost and that this constituted a non-disclosure breach of the accused's Charter rights.

However, the court determined that no remedy was warranted because the accused suffered no material prejudice, as the Crown presented compelling evidence that the test results were reliable regardless of the lost evidence.

The breath analysis evidence was admitted at trial.

The accused was charged with wilfully obstructing a peace officer in the execution of his duties contrary to section 129(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial proceeded in an unusual fashion, with the accused initially refusing to identify himself at arraignment and subsequently absconding during trial, requiring the trial to proceed in absentia.

The court found the accused guilty based on his refusal to exit his vehicle when commanded to do so and his attempt to roll up the window to prevent the officer's entry during the lawful execution of an arrest.

The court rejected the obstruction charge based on the accused's initial refusal to identify himself, finding that the Highway Traffic Act provided an alternative enforcement mechanism that should have been used.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether Mie-Tha Lah, a conditionally accredited Karen interpreter, was competent to provide interpretation services for the accused in a trial for impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(a) and operating a motor vehicle with more than the legal limit of alcohol in blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused's counsel objected to the interpreter's qualifications.

The court found the interpreter competent to provide interpretation services meeting constitutional standards under section 14 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, applying the test established in R. v. Tran.

The accused subsequently pleaded guilty to the section 253(1)(b) charge and was sentenced.