CITATION: R v. D.J.P., 2026 ONSC 256

COURT FILE NO.: CR-23-0022

DATE: 2026 01 20

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

Ayoub Ansari, for the Crown

Crown

• and -

D.J.P.

Hilary Dudding and Robert Nanni, for the Defence

Defence

HEARD: November 24-28 and December 2, 2025

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RESTRICTION ON PUBLICATION

Pursuant to an order of this court, issued under s.486.4(1) of the Criminal Code, no information that could serve to identify the complainant in this prosecution shall be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

This decision has been anonymized so that it complies with this direction.

LEMAY J

1The accused, D.J.P., was in a relationship with H.P. They started living together in 2013, were married in 2014 and separated in February of 2021. H.P. had two children from a previous relationship, V.P., a woman, and K.P., a man. At the time of separation, V.P. was seventeen or eighteen and K.P was fifteen or sixteen.

2H.P. and D.J.P. also had a child of their own, A.P., who was born in 2017. Immediately after separation, A.P. lived five days a week with D.J.P. and spent Saturday mornings to Monday mornings with K.P. In April of 2021, H.P. contacted the local Children’s Aid Society (“CAS”) to express concerns about the care of A.P. After conducting an investigation, including interviewing V.P. and K.P., the CAS concluded that H.P.’s concerns were not verified and closed their file.

3The same parenting time schedule for A.P. continued until mid-May 2021. At that point, H.P. overheld A.P. after a parenting time visit. D.J.P. had his lawyer attempt to contact H.P. to have A.P. returned. These contacts were ignored by H.P. and there was no parenting time with A.P. for D.J.P.

4In July, approximately five months after separation, D.J.P. sent the police to check on A.P. When they arrived at the apartment where A.P. was living with his two half-siblings, H.P., and H.P.’s mother, H.P. had both V.P. and K.P. go out into the hallway outside the apartment and report allegations of abuse at the hands of D.J.P to the police. V.P. also reported allegations of sexual abuse at the hands of D.J.P. In September of 2021, D.J.P was charged with a series of counts in respect of assault, assault with a weapon, sexual assault and sexual interference.

5Eight of those counts remained to be determined at trial. Originally, D.J.P elected trial by jury. On the morning of November 28^th, 2025, D.J.P.’s counsel and the Crown counsel agreed to proceed by way of a judge-alone trial. The Crown’s case concluded in the afternoon of November 28^th, 2025, and the defence elected to call no evidence.

6For the reasons that follow, I am acquitting the accused of all of the charges against him.

Background

a) The Family Circumstances

7D.J.P and H.P. began a relationship prior to 2013. They began to live together in a house in Brampton with V.P. and K.P. in 2013, and D.J.P and H.P. got married in either November of 2013 or January of 2014. At some point in late 2014, the family unit moved to a home in Caledon. They lived in that home until January of 2021, when V.P., H.P. and K.P. moved out.

8V.P. and K.P. are H.P.’s children from a previous marriage. At the time of trial, V.P. was 22 years old and K.P. was 20 years old. During the course of H.P.’s relationship with D.J.P, K.P. and V.P. had no contact with their biological father. However, at the time of trial, they had both resumed some relationship with him.

9V.P. was in Grade 5 in 2013 and graduated from high school in June of 2020. K.P. was in Grade 3 in 2013 and was in Grade 11 when H.P. and D.J.P separated. I understand from the evidence that both children struggled academically to a certain extent.

10H.P. and D.J.P had one child together, A.P. He was born in March of 2017. He lived with D.J.P after separation, until May of 2021. In May of 2021, H.P. improperly overheld A.P. and prevented D.J.P from seeing him. In July of 2021, D.J.P was charged with these offences. He has had no meaningful contact with A.P. since that time.

11At the time of trial, H.P. was employed as a nursing attendant. She did not work outside of the home between the time that A.P. was born and the time of separation. D.J.P worked outside of the home in the information technology field. His workplace was in the north end of Toronto, and that he travelled to and from work on a daily basis.

12K.P. and V.P. had lived with their mother, H.P. prior to moving in with D.J.P The evidence that I heard from both K.P. and V.P. supported the conclusion that they had been physically and emotionally abused by H.P. both before and after they lived with D.J.P At the conclusion of evidence, I asked counsel for both the Crown and the accused as to whether there was any dispute, given the evidence of K.P. and V.P., that H.P. had been engaged in physical and emotional abuse of K.P. and V.P. both before she met D.J.P and after her relationship with D.J.P ended. Both counsel agreed that that was the case, and for the purposes of this case, I find as a fact that H.P. regularly physically abused V.P. and K.P.

13I will also observe that I did not hear any credible evidence from H.P. that would suggest otherwise. Indeed, she acknowledged that some of the incidents where she abused V.P. and K.P. took place. I will outline some of these incidents, as they provide some of the context for my conclusion that H.P. pressured K.P. and V.P. into making allegations about D.J.P. While not explicit, the threat of physical abuse by H.P. was always in the background for her two older children. The pressure imposed on K.P. and V.P by H.P. makes their evidence less reliable, and is one of the reasons why I am acquitting D.J.P on all of the charges. There is a real risk that they would be reporting what H.P. wanted them to report rather than what actually happened.

b) The Events Giving Rise to the Charges

14Both K.P. and V.P. testified that, at the outset, they had a good relationship with D.J.P In fact, they called him “dad” after he and H.P. got married. They were encouraged to do this by H.P. Between 2014 and 2021, however, the relationship between D.J. P. and all of the witnesses deteriorated.

15An example of this deterioration comes from text messages that were sent by H.P. in 2019. Those text messages included the following statement:

Remember your mother told you ones [sic] that I am bad women [sic] who sent her husband to jail. You should be fucking careful I will never hesitate to do so with you if you continue point [sic] at me. I am sick and fucking tired with you.

16The message goes on to suggest that D.J.P should never come home so that H.P. can move on with her life. It ends with the observation that D.J.P does not “deserve” A.P. As V.P. stated in her evidence, by the end of 2020, D.J.P and A.P. were “enemies”.

17Both K.P. and V.P. testified that they were subject to physical abuse at the hands of D.J.P According to their evidence, this abuse would generally happen either when there were problems with their schoolwork, or they had done something that made H.P. upset. These allegations underly four of the counts, and I will return to them below.

18Beyond the allegations giving rise to the charges, there are several incidents that took place during the parties’ relationship that should be reviewed at this stage. First, in December of 2017, there was an incident where V.P. was kicked out of the house and went to a friend’s house. Given my concerns with the credibility and reliability of the evidence given by V.P. and H.P., it is difficult to reach firm conclusions about what precisely happened.

19On both H.P. and V.P.’s evidence, V.P. got into an argument with D.J.P about her report card and her poor marks. There was also some discussion about some missing money that V.P. may have taken. At this point, V.P. was in Grade 9. V.P. was then thrown out of the house into a snowstorm without winter clothes. In her testimony before me, V.P. stated that, after she had been thrown out of the house, she had attempted to jump off a bridge to kill herself. However, that significant detail had not been provided by V.P. in either her police statement or in her preliminary inquiry testimony. I make no conclusions on what actually happened, in part because V.P. also testified that she had wanted to have a sleepover at her friend’s house that night.

20In any event, V.P. went to her friend’s house and spent the night there. V.P. told her friend’s parents that she had been kicked out of her house. As a result, her friend’s parents went with V.P. and her friend to her school Principal’s office the next day. D.J.P and H.P. both arrived at the Principal’s office at about the same time. The Principal was concerned enough with what had gone on that I understand that he reported the incident to the Children’s Aid Society (“CAS”).

21During the course of the interactions with the Principal the next day, it was made clear to V.P. by H.P. (and perhaps D.J.P) that she was expected to make sure that the CAS and the Principal did not hear anything that would cause them to take A.P. away from H.P and D.J.P From the testimony I received about these events, the only firm conclusions that I can reach are that there was some sort of incident, that the incident was reported to the CAS, that V.P. was not truthful with the CAS about what had happened, and that these untruths were told to the CAS with the encouragement of H.P. D.J.P may also have encouraged H.P. to tell these untruths.

22The evidence is clear that V.P. told the principal that she had left her house and gone to her friend’s house because she wanted to have a sleepover. V.P. testified that this was a lie. However, V.P.’s explanation of how she came to tell that lie in the Principal’s office changed over time. Specifically, she told the police that D.J.P and H.P. made up the lie in the principal’s office and she played along with it. She also told the police that D.J.P made the story up and told her to play along with it before they spoke to the Principal. In her testimony before me, she seemed to suggest that she made up the lie to the Principal and D.J.P and H.P. played along with it. These changes make it difficult to reach precise conclusions about what actually happened. They also raise concerns about V.P.’s credibility and reliability.

23Second, there are the incidents of abuse perpetrated by H.P. on K.P. and V.P. Originally, at the preliminary inquiry, H.P. testified that she had never used physical discipline on her children and that it would not be acceptable for anyone to use physical discipline on them. During H.P.’s cross-examination at the preliminary inquiry, she modified her evidence and advised that she only used physical discipline on her children twice. Even that evidence turns out to be untrue.

24I start with the incidents in respect of K.P. He ultimately testified that H.P. regularly physically abused him. One incident in July of 2019 involved H.P. beating K.P. with a broomstick handle. H.P. inflicted significant injuries on K.P. in this attack, which resulted in bruises on his face, legs and buttocks as well as causing a scratched cornea in K.P.’s eye. K.P. acknowledged that this incident took place, and that there were other incidents where H.P. imposed physical discipline on him.

25D.J.P captured pictures of the injuries from the broomstick incident. A further inconsistency in K.P.’s evidence is the fact that, at the preliminary inquiry, he was prepared to acknowledge that D.J.P had stood up for him during this incident. He did not recall that fact at trial.

26This brings me to H.P.’s explanation of the broomstick incident. In her testimony before me, H.P. was not prepared to acknowledge the extent of the injuries suffered by K.P. until she was specifically shown the pictures. In addition, when H.P. took K.P. to the doctor’s office for treatment, she was the one who told the doctor what had happened. Needless to say, she did not tell the doctor the truth.

27Then, there was an incident with V.P. One evening in 2019, V.P., D.J.P, and H.P. were in the kitchen cleaning up. I do not know if K.P. was there as well. During the course of tidying the kitchen, H.P. became angry with V.P. and swung a metal teapot at V.P. She made contact with V.P. and caused V.P. injuries. In her testimony, V.P. agreed that contact from the teapot hurt.

28V.P. did not report the teapot incident to the CAS at any point. She only acknowledged this incident during cross-examination at the preliminary inquiry. H.P. did not even acknowledge this incident at the preliminary inquiry. It was only on cross-examination before me that she was prepared to admit that this incident happened. However, she still minimized the incident by saying that she didn’t make contact with V.P. and that V.P. just got tea on herself. However, when pressed on cross-examination, H.P.’s evidence was more equivocal. I conclude that H.P. hit V.P. with the teapot and did so hard enough that the contact was painful for V.P.

29V.P. also testified that there were occasions, including this incident with the teapot, when her mother would discipline both her and K.P. and where D.J.P. would try and stand up for them. She also testified that there would be other occasions when D.J.P. would decide that it was best to stay out of H.P.’s way. In addition, as I have noted at paragraph 25, above, K.P. provided inconsistent evidence as to whether D.J.P would intervene or not.

30Four points flow from all of this evidence:

a) H.P. engaged in significant abuse of her children.

b) That pattern of abuse went unreported to third parties until this legal proceeding.

c) H.P. was not truthful about this abuse. As a result, the evidence given by H.P. is not believable. As I will discuss below, there are other reasons for rejecting H.P.’s evidence, and the Crown’s concession at the end of the evidence that H.P.’s evidence should not be believed was justified.

d) Both K.P. and V.P. were inconsistent in their evidence about this abuse as they did not disclose it until they were cross-examined about specifics. That inconsistency raises questions about the credibility of their evidence, especially since V.P. previously testified that she spoke to the CAS and the Police because she wanted to make sure that A.P. was not subject to abuse at the hands of D.J.P. If she was concerned about A.P. being abused by a parent, she would have reported the abuse suffered at the hands of her mother as well.

31Finally, there was an incident in September of 2020, when K.P. and V.P. were kicked out of the house and went to live with their grandmother, H.P.’s mother, in Brampton. The children returned to the home in Caledon in December of 2020. V.P. testified that this incident happened because D.J.P kicked them out of the house. However, V.P. also testified that it was D.J.P who was saying to H.P. that it was “ridiculous” to throw K.P. and V.P. out of the house.

32It is difficult to reconcile these two statements. If D.J.P was the moving force behind the decision to kick V.P. and K.P. out of the house, he would not have been calling it a ridiculous decision. I reject V.P.’s evidence that it was D.J.P who was the moving force behind her and K.P.’s removal from the house. Instead, I conclude that it was H.P. who threw them out of the house.

33Two points flow from this conclusion. First, that V.P. was prepared in her testimony to understate her mother’s involvement in discipline and overstate D.J.P’s involvement in it. Second, H.P.’s role in imposing inappropriate discipline on the children, such as physical abuse and removing them from the house, was understated by H.P., V.P. and K.P. That also raises questions about whether H.P. used her influence over her children to have them report unsubstantiated allegations to the CAS and the OPP in order to prevent D.J.P from reclaiming any parenting time with A.P.

c) The Separation and Subsequent Events

34By 2019, the relationship between H.P. and D.J.P had become toxic. V.P. also acknowledged that, when she returned to the home in December of 2020, D.J.P and H.P. were “enemies”. However, H.P. and D.J.P continued on living together until February of 2021. At that point, they separated. The incident giving rise to the separation was the subject of testimony before me.

35On H.P.’s evidence, she came downstairs one evening and sat on D.J.P’s lap. H.P. testified before me that D.J.P told her that she needed to get off of his lap, because “your mommy’s coming”. H.P. also testified that D.J.P had mistaken her for V.P. H.P. testified that she became very concerned and upset that D.J.P was sexually abusing V.P. H.P. testified that, shortly after this incident, she took the older two children, left the home in Caledon, and moved to her mother’s home in Brampton.

36I reject H.P.’s evidence on this point for three reasons:

a) H.P. and D.J.P were, in the words of V.P., “enemies” at this point. It is unlikely that they would have had an intimate moment such as the one that H.P. described.

b) H.P. provided inconsistent testimony about this incident. At the time that H.P. gave her statement to the police, all she claimed that D.J.P had said was “your mommy’s coming”. In her testimony before me, H.P. added the claim that D.J.P said “[V], your mommy’s coming”. This was an important change, as the cross-examination revealed that H.P.’s mother was, in fact, present in the house in early 2021.

c) The fact that H.P. had an interview with the CAS in April of 2021 and did not disclose these allegations raises concerns. Indeed, in this interview, H.P. stated that she had never seen D.J.P. become physically aggressive with either V.P. or K.P. Given that she was being asked about the relationship between V.P. and D.J.P., it is not unreasonable to infer that, had this incident on D.J.P.’s lap actually occurred, H.P. would have mentioned it to the CAS in April of 2021.

37Given all of the inconsistencies in H.P.’s evidence on this point, I reject it and conclude that this incident where H.P. allegedly sat in D.J.P.’s lap never happened.

38At the time that H.P. moved out with V.P. and K.P., D.J.P told her that A.P. would remain with him. While H.P. was not happy with this arrangement, the parties settled into a routine of A.P. spending the weekdays with D.J.P. He would go to see H.P. on Saturday mornings and return to D.J.P. on Monday mornings. All of the witnesses agreed that H.P. was not happy with this arrangement.

39In April of 2021, there was an interaction between D.J.P. and H.P. when H.P. was picking A.P. up from D.J.P.’s home. This interaction was partly in English and partly in Hindi. It was recorded by D.J.P.’s relatives, and a transcript was provided. H.P. acknowledged that the transcript of this interaction was accurate, and I accept it as so.

40During the course of this interaction, there were some difficulties in getting A.P. to transition from his father’s care to his mother’s care. At one point, H.P. asked A.P., who was four at the time, whether he wanted to come with her that day or whether he wanted to stay with D.J.P “forever”. H.P. seemed to make this a binary choice. H.P. also stated that she would be sending the Children’s Aid Society people to pick up A.P. later in the evening if he did not come with her.

41Within a couple of days of this interaction, H.P. contacted the CAS and reported concerns of abuse to them. She testified that she reported concerns to the CAS because of the fact that there had been a bruise on A.P. H.P. also reported to the CAS that K.P. had mentioned to her the weekend prior to this reporting that D.J.P used to hit K.P. and V.P. with a hangar wire.

42V.P. and K.P. were both interviewed by the CAS. Neither of them reported any concerns of actual physical abuse to the CAS at this point. In K.P.’s case, he reported that D.J.P used to threaten him and V.P. with a tv cable wire, but never actually hit them with it. This was inconsistent with H.P.’s reporting to the CAS, as she stated that K.P. had been hit with the cable. The CAS closed their investigation and did not note any child protection issues in respect of A.P. I should note that I had a heavily redacted version of the CAS notes and did not have the complete picture of what was reported (and not reported) to the CAS.

43V.P. testified that H.P. was not happy with the arrangement of having A.P. spend five days with D.J.P and two days with her. As a result, in May of 2021, H.P. simply refused to return A.P. to D.J.P’s care after a visit. There were a number of letters from D.J.P’s lawyer to H.P. in this time period.

44Towards the latter part of June, it became clear to H.P. that her decision to overhold A.P. had been reported to the police. She continued to avoid both D.J.P and his lawyer, and to deny D.J.P. any parenting time with A.P. As a result, D.J.P contacted the police and asked them to perform a wellness check.

d) The Reporting to Police and the Charges

45In July of 2021, the police were contacted by D.J.P and conducted a wellness check on A.P. During the course of this wellness check, H.P. had both children report abuse at the hands of D.J.P to the police. These reports were originally made in the hallway outside of the apartment where H.P. was living with her mother and the children. Subsequently all three witnesses gave statements to the police.

46V.P. and K.P., with the encouragement of H.P., reported these allegations to the CAS. As I have noted at paragraph 42, I had a redacted version of the CAS notes. Even with significant redactions, there were clear inconsistencies between the testimony of both V.P. and K.P. and what they told the CAS. I will address some of those inconsistencies as I consider each charge.

47In September of 2021, the O.P.P. charged D.J.P with various offences in respect of both K.P. and V.P. He has not seen A.P. in any meaningful way since those charges were laid.

48Finally, a preliminary inquiry was held in this matter in 2023 and K.P., V.P. and H.P. all testified at that hearing. As will be seen, there are also significant inconsistencies between the evidence that each of them gave at the preliminary inquiry and the evidence that they provided under oath before me. This brings me to the question of credibility and reliability.

Evidence, Credibility and Reliability

49I heard testimony from V.P., K.P. and H.P. in this case. I also received several exhibits and have considered all of the evidence in reaching my conclusions.

50My determination in this case depends on whether I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Crown has proven the charges against the accused. Those charges are based on the evidence that was provided by the three Crown witnesses. I have already set out some of my conclusions on credibility and reliability in my summation of the facts. I have made all of those conclusions within the framework of the legal principles set out below.

a) General Principles of Credibility and Reliability

51Credibility and reliability are two different, but related, concepts. Credibility deals with the honesty, or veracity, of a witness. Reliability has to do with the accuracy of a witness’s testimony: R. v. Sanichar, 2012 ONCA 117 at para. 69. The reliability of a witness’s testimony depends on their ability to observe, recall and recount the events at issue: R. v. H.C., 2009 ONCA 56 at para. 41. A credible witness can be unreliable, as they can be trying to tell the truth but simply not be a very good historian.

52It must also be remembered that the credibility and reliability of witness testimony is an individualized exercise. The determination of innocence or guilt cannot devolve into a credibility contest between the complainant and the accused: R. v. L.H., [2007] O.J. No. 1588 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 85-86.

53In addition to these general principles of credibility and reliability, it is also important to consider some of the specific principles in respect of the evidence in this case. First, there are a number of sexual assault allegations in this case. As a result, I must consider some of the principles that apply more specifically. Two are relevant in this case:

a) A delay in reporting a sexual assault, standing alone, will never give rise to an adverse inference against a Complainant’s credibility: R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43, [2000[ 2 S.C.R. 275 at para. 65. In this case, as will be seen, the fact that V.P. did not report this allegation to the CAS the first time they interviewed her does not stand alone.

b) The law on delayed disclosure can also be applied to piecemeal disclosure, depending on the facts of the case: R. v. D.P., 2017 ONCA 263 at 29-31. Again, in this case, the piecemeal disclosure is a concern as it takes place against the backdrop of significant inconsistencies in the evidence.

54Second, K.P. and V.P. were both children at the time that at least some of these events took place. As a result, I must be mindful of the principles that apply to the testimony of adults who are testifying about events that took place when they were children. In R. v. A.M., 2014 ONCA 769, (2014) 123 O.R. (3d) 536, the Court of Appeal has explained the approach that should be adopted in analyzing this type of evidence (at paras. 9-11):

9First, every witness, irrespective of age, is an individual whose credibility and evidence should be assessed according to criteria appropriate to his or her mental development, understanding and ability to communicate: R. v. W. (R.), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 122, [1992] S.C.J. No. 56, at p. 134 S.C.R.

10Second, no inflexible rules mandate when a witness' evidence should be evaluated according to "adult" or "child" standards. Indeed, in its provisions regarding testimonial capacity, the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-5 eschews any reference to "adult" or "child", preferring the terms "14 years or older" and "under 14 years of age". An inflexible, category-based system would resurrect stereotypes as rigid and unyielding as those rejected by the recent developments in our approach to children's evidence: W. (R.), at p. 134 S.C.R.

11Third, despite this flexibility, there are some guiding principles. Generally, where an adult testifies about events that occurred when she was a child, her credibility should be assessed according to the criteria applicable to adult witnesses. However, the presence of inconsistencies, especially on peripheral matters such as time and location, should be considered in the context of her age at the time the events about which she is testifying occurred: W. (R.), at p. 134 S.C.R. See, also, R. v. Kendall, [1962] S.C.R. 469, [1962] S.C.J. No. 27.

55The Court goes on to note that, in considering whether there are inconsistencies in the peripheral details such as time and location, the Court should consider V.P. and K.P.’s age at the time that the events allegedly took place. I will apply those principles in my consideration of the evidence.

b) General Observations on Credibility and Reliability in This Case

56I have serious concerns about both the credibility and reliability of all three of the Crown’s witnesses in this case. Simply put, as defence counsel suggested in his closing arguments, it would be dangerous for any trier of fact to convict on the evidence of any of these witnesses.

57In my summation of the underlying facts, I have already set out some significant specific concerns with the credibility and reliability of all three witnesses. In this section, I will take a step back and set out some general observations about motives to fabricate and then provide general observations on each witness’s credibility. I will deal with the specifics of each charge below.

58There is considerable discussion in the case-law about the difference between the absence of a motive to fabricate and the absence of evidence of a motive to fabricate: R. v. Ignacio, 2021 ONCA 69 at paras. 29-36. In this case, the distinction is not particularly relevant as I have concluded that all of the witnesses had a motive to fabricate in respect of their evidence.

59This brings me to the specifics of each witness. I start with H.P. In closing argument, the Crown acknowledged that I should reject her evidence as being neither credible nor reliable. I agree, with limited exceptions. The limited exceptions are that, where her version of events differs from what was proffered by K.P. and V.P., I am prepared to use those differences to consider whether the evidence of K.P. and V.P. is credible and/or reliable.

60The reasons for the Crown’s concessions are obvious from the inconsistencies that I have set out above, but I will set some additional ones out anyway.

61First the evidence I heard made it clear that H.P. has a motive to fabricate evidence, and to encourage others to do so. Specifically, after she separated from D.J.P., she was unhappy with him playing any role in A.P.’s life and was looking for a way to exclude D.J.P. from it. She made this clear in the text message that she sent in 2019. In my view, the allegations were reported to the police by V.P. and K.P. either at H.P.’s direction or her strong suggestion. I reach that conclusion on the basis of the abuse that V.P. and K.P. suffered at H.P.’s hands, which would have made them susceptible to her pressure. I also reach that conclusion because of the shifting of K.P.’s story about the use of the cable wire to align more closely with the information that H.P. had already provided. H.P.’s efforts in this regard were in furtherance of her desire to have sole custody of A.P. This fact alone makes the evidence of H.P. suspect.

62However, that is not the only problem with H.P.’s evidence. As I have noted above, she engaged in significant physical abuse of her two elder children and was not truthful about it under oath until she was confronted with specifics in cross-examination. Even then, she still minimized the events that had taken place. This lack of candour left serious questions about all of H.P.’s evidence.

63Crown Counsel argued that V.P.’s evidence was more believable because she had cut off relations with her mother, H.P., right after the preliminary inquiry. As a result, Crown Counsel argued that there was no longer a motive to fabricate on the part of V.P. I disagree for two reasons. First, in cross-examination, it was pointed out to V.P. that, if she had not told the truth on a previous occasion, she could be guilty of perjury and/or obstruction of justice. It is not unreasonable to assume that it is possible that V.P. would have continued to tell the same story for her own legal protection even if it was not entirely true.

64Second, and more importantly, as will be seen V.P.’s evidence is so riddled with inconsistencies that it is difficult to accept any aspect of it. I have already set out some examples of these inconsistencies above, including the inconsistency in respect of the September 2020 incident (see paragraphs 61-63). While I do not intend to review every inconsistency in these reasons, I will review a few more.

65A further example of some of the internal inconsistencies in V.P.’s evidence comes from the preliminary inquiry. On the first day of her testimony, in cross-examination, V.P. stated that she was not happy with the arrangement where A.P. would be with D.J.P five days out of seven. On the next day, V.P. stated that she was “completely neutral” about the amount of time that A.P. was spending with D.J.P In her examination before me, she was not prepared to dismiss the possibility that H.P. had told her that the original answer was wrong, although she did not confirm that this had happened either. Given the abuse that K.P. inflicted on V.P., the 2019 text messages that she sent to D.J.P (see paragraphs 15 and 16), and the fact that V.P.’s testimony on some points changed from day to day, I infer that V.P. was prepared to change her testimony if H.P. encouraged her to do so.

66Finally, in terms of both the evidence of V.P. and K.P., there were inconsistencies in their versions of the same events, which also raised issues of both credibility and reliability. There are numerous examples of these inconsistencies that I will again address as I proceed through the various counts.

67One specific example of an inconsistency between their evidence is in respect of the massage incident, which gave rise to Count 6. On that count, V.P. testified that she was certain the massage followed on an injury that she had suffered while she was working as a lifeguard. K.P., on the other hand, recalled that the incident had involved V.P. being injured while she was out bike riding. Both of them were confident in their recollections.

68The Crown correctly points out that small inconsistencies in the versions of events given by different witnesses are not, in and of themselves, grounds for finding a witness not to be credible. The problem in this case is, however, is twofold. First, the significant differences between K.P. and V.P. about how the incident started suggest that they do not actually have a memory of a particular incident. Second, there are significant inconsistencies in the evidence of all of the witnesses in respect of key elements of the charges and this inconsistency is just one more of them.

69The final set of issues in respect of credibility and reliability arise from K.P.’s evidence. In addition to the inconsistencies I have described above, there are a couple of other general points to note. First, K.P. conceded that he spoke to the CAS after his mother contacted them. He was also prepared to acknowledge the possibility that he only spoke to the CAS because H.P. wanted him to speak to them. That raises the same questions about the reliability of his evidence as I have with V.P.’s evidence.

70Second, when K.P. was confronted with inconsistencies in h is evidence before me as compared to what he had told the police (or the CAS), he testified that he might have been less aware (my paraphrasing) of the need to tell the whole truth to the police. This evidence did not leave me with confidence that K.P.’s evidence was particularly reliable.

71I now turn to the specific charges.

The Specific Charges and Disposition

72Before reviewing the specific charges, I should make some observations about the offences generally. As I have previously stated, it would be dangerous to rely on the testimony of any of the Crown’s witnesses to convict.

73I also note that I cannot use a determination of guilt or innocence on one count to infer that the accused is guilty, or not guilty, of a different count. However, counsel acknowledge that I can use my credibility findings either on one count or at large to inform my views about credibility of the testimony that was given on a different count: R. v. P.E.C., 2005 SCC 19 at para. 1.

74Given that observation, my general credibility and reliability findings alone are sufficient to dispose of all of these counts. However, there are also specific concerns with the evidence given about each charge, and I will also address that evidence. I do not intend to deal with every credibility issue that was raised by the testimony.

Count 1

75This count reads as follows:

D.J.P. stands charged that between the 1st day of January in the year 2014 and the 1st day of February in the year 2021 at the Town of CALEDON in the said Region, did commit an assault on K.P contrary to Section 266 of the Criminal Code.

76This count encompasses the general allegations of physical abuse on K.P. by D.P. during the course of the marriage. It does not include the allegation of the use of the electronic cable, which arises under Counts 3 and 4.

77Given the significant problems with K.P.’s credibility and reliability that I have already set out, I have concluded that I cannot safely rely upon his evidnce to convict D.J.P. on this count.

78However, there are additional problems with K.P.’s evidence about the abuse that he allegedly suffered at the hands of D.J.P. First, when the CAS interviewed K.P. in April of 2021, he told them that D.J.P would threaten to hit him, but never actually hit him. In cross-examination, K.P. acknowledged that there was no reason to lie to the CAS, but when confronted with the inconsistency, K.P. acknowledged that he might not have told CAS the entire truth. This explanation is not entirely compelling, since K.P. was sixteen and no longer living under D.J.P.’s roof. K.P. also testified that he had told other people, such as his grandmother, about this alleged abuse before speaking to the CAS. As a result, there is no basis to conclude that K.P. was not ready to speak about the alleged abuse. It is also worth noting that, as I have set out at paragraph 69, his evidence shifted to align with the version of events previously provided by H.P.

79The explanation is also concerning when the reasons for K.P. speaking to the CAS are remembered. He spoke to the CAS because his mother, H.P. wanted him to speak to them. These conversations with CAS were in the course of the ongoing dispute between H.P. and D.J.P about parenting time with A.P. K.P.’s alleged reticence to provide the CAS with the whole truth leaves concerns about the credibility of his evidence. It is not a stretch to infer that the additional allegations were advanced by K.P. partly because his mother, H.P., did not get the result she wanted after the first disclosure to the CAS.

80Then, there is an incident in respect of a cut sponge. Again, determining what happened in respect of this allegation with any precision is difficult because of the unreliability of the testimony. However, as I understand it, K.P. recalled an incident where there had been a sponge cut by a knife. When neither K.P. nor V.P. would admit who had cut the sponge, K.P. testified that they were taken to the basement and forced to hit each other. K.P. also testified that, when he finally admitted to having cut the sponge, he was forced to cut his hand with a knife.

81The problem with this testimony is that K.P. never told the police about h being forced to cut himself with the knife. In addition, K.P. was asked direct questions about this incident at the preliminary inquiry and did not mention the knife there either. In his cross-examination before me, K.P. acknowledged that this was an important detail to have left out. While he stated that he would have included it if he had remembered it at the time, he had no real explanation as to why he had not remembered it previously. Given the fact that this significant piece of evidence did not come out until trial, I cannot accept that this event actually took place.

82There were two other incidents where K.P. alleged that D.J.P. forced himself and V.P. to hit each other. I will deal with the inconsistencies in one of the incidents in my analysis of the assault charges against V.P. The other incident involved discipline for a shampoo bottle getting water in it. Briefly, the evidence given before me on this incident was also inconsistent with what was said on previous occasions and it is also, therefore, unreliable.

83Stepping back from the specifics, I have a count of assault that amounts to physical abuse of K.P. by D.J.P. However, K.P.’s testimony is neither credible nor reliable. As a result, I cannot convict D.J.P. on this count, and an acquittal will be entered.

Count 2

84This count reads as follows:

D.J.P. further stands charged on or between the 1st day of January in the year 2014 and the 1st day of February in the year 2021 at the Town of CALEDON in the said Region, did commit an assault on V.P., contrary to Section 266 of the Criminal Code.

85This count encompasses the allegations of physical abuse of V.P. by D.P. during the marriage. Again, this count can be disposed of on the basis of my general credibility findings. However, I will also review one specific incident of claimed abuse that will illustrate the specific problems that I have with the evidence on this count. That is an incident that appears to have involved wasted food (a banana and an apple), although again it is difficult to know precisely what happened because of the inconsistencies in the evidence.

86As I understand it, one evening D.J.P. and H.P. came home and discovered that a banana and an apple from school lunches had been thrown out without being eaten. On K.P.’s evidence, when the children would not admit to who had wasted the food, D.J.P. allegedly took K.P. and V.P. into the basement, made them strip naked and then proceeded to have them perform squats until K.P. finally admitted that the apple and banana were his.

87There are a number of problems with this evidence, as follows:

a) V.P. does not remember that this incident involved the wasted banana and apple. Given that the incident arose as a result of the waste of the banana and apple, it is concerning that she cannot remember such a significant part of the story.

b) V.P. remembers her and K.P. being in the same room while they were both naked and doing squats. K.P. remembers them being in separate rooms. This is a discrepancy over what would have been a significant part of a very humiliating event and the fact that V.P. and K.P. do not remember this the same way raises questions about whether this actually happened.

c) V.P. does not remember being hit with the wire that D.J.P. allegedly used to use on them on this occasion, while K.P. remembers being hit with the wire.

88Given all of these inconsistencies over material parts of the story, I cannot accept that this incident actually occurred. Again, stepping back from this example and considering the evidence in general, I cannot accept that D.J.P. engaged in any physical abuse of V.P. The evidence is clear that H.P. physically abused V.P. and K.P. However, V.P. acknowledged that D.J.P. would sometimes stand up for her when H.P. was abusing her. In addition, V.P.’s evidence in this case is not credible more generally.

89As a result, D.J.P. is acquitted of this count of the indictment.

Counts 3 and 4

90These two counts read as follows:

D.J.P. further stands charged on or between the 1st day of January in the year 2014 and the 1st day of February in the year 2021 at the Town of Caledon in the said Region, did commit an assault, use weapon, to wit: a coaxial cable on K.P. contrary to Section 267(a) of the Criminal Code

D.J.P. further stands charged on or between the 1st day of January in the year 2014 and the 1st day of February in the year 2021 at the Town of Caledon in the said Region, did commit an assault, use weapon, to wit: a coaxial cable on V.P. contrary to Section 267(a) of the Criminal Code

91I will deal with these two counts together as they concern the specific instance or instances where D.J.P. was alleged to have used a coaxial cable on each of V.P. and K.P. In his evidence before me, K.P. described being hit with a wire that was folded in two like a rabbit ear and was knotted on the end.

92Put simply, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the events that were described in respect of this count actually took place. Again, there are a number of inconsistencies in the evidence about this specific count. I have already pointed out the fact that K.P. told the CAS that he was threatened with this wire but was never actually hit with it. That statement should be contrasted with the evidence that he gave before me, which was that D.J.P. hit him often enough with the wire that K.P. hid it and rediscovered it sometime later.

93Then, as discussed in respect of Count 3, there is the difference between the evidence of K.P. and V.P. in terms of whether the wire was used on them during the fruit incident. This was a significant occasion in respect of the alleged use of the wire, and the evidence was inconsistent enough to raise questions about whether this incident had happened at all.

94There is also the fact that, as counsel for D.J.P. pointed out in closing argument, the coaxial cable would likely have left marks. V.P. told the CAS that the abuse from D.J.P. would leave bruises that would eventually fade. However, H.P. testified that she was not aware, when she was living with D.J.P., of him ever using physical discipline on the kids. While this point is less significant than the other issues, the fact that there was no visible evidence of this abuse also raises questions about whether it actually took place.

95The Crown cannot establish these counts because of the general credibility problems and the specific problems relating to the incidents in respect of the coaxial cable. As a result, D.J.P. is acquitted of these counts as well.

Count 5

96This count reads as follows:

D.J.P. further stands charged on or between the 1st day of January in the year 2016 and the 31st day of December in the year 2017 at the Town of CALEDON in the said Region, did commit a sexual assault on V.P., contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code.

97This is a specific allegation of one sexual assault that took place shortly after A.P. was born. It was generally referred to in evidence as the IPad incident. The basic facts are that V.P. ended up coming to her parents’ bedroom. The bedroom was large and had two king-sized beds in it. They were set up perpendicular to each other. D.J.P. was in the bed on the wall by the window and H.P. was on the other bed with A.P., who was still nursing.

98It was late at night and H.P. had been breastfeeding A.P. V.P. testified that she was sitting with her back up against the wall and her legs out in front of her looking at her IPad. She also testified that the only light in the room was from her IPad. She testified that D.J.P. ran his fingers along her thigh and then got his hand under her clothes and inserted one or more of his fingers into her vagina.

99I am not persuaded that this incident happened for a number of reasons. First, V.P.’s evidence about how she came to be in the bedroom with D.J.P. and H.P. was inconsistent. In her testimony before me, V.P. stated that she had asked to come in and sleep in her parents’ room as she was having difficulty getting to sleep. However, in her police statement, V.P. stated that she had been asleep and was called into her parents’ room by D.J.P If this was the only inconsistency, in V.P.’s evidence, it might not be significant. However, it is part of a longer list.

100Second, and more importantly, in her testimony before me, V.P. testified that, as this happened, she was “frozen” and did not know what was going on. However, in her police statement, V.P. testified that she kept slapping D.J.P.’s arm and trying to push him away. Crown counsel correctly points out that there is no “right” way for a victim of a sexual assault to behave. However, that point does not assist the Crown. In this case, V.P. has provided inconsistent statements on her reaction to the incident. It is the inconsistency, and not the reaction itself, that raises concerns about V.P.’s credibility and reliability.

101Third, there are concerns about the feasibility of the alleged assault as described by V.P. She provided inconsistent evidence on whether D.J.P. attempted to insert his hand inside her clothes from above or below. Similarly, she was not able to explain how, given that she was sitting with her back against the wall, D.J.P was able to get his hand underneath her buttocks to insert his fingers into her vagina. Finally, this assault allegedly took place in an environment where it was quite possible that H.P. would wake up and/or turn around and look at D.J.P.

102For these reasons, along with the more general problems with V.P.’s credibility and reliability, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that this incident took place. The accused is acquitted of this charge.

Count 6

103This count reads as follows:

D.J.P. further stands charged on or between the 1st day of January in the year 2019 and the 31st day of December in the year 2019 at the Town of CALEDON in the said Region, did commit a sexual assault on V.P., contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code.

104This is a specific allegation of one sexual assault that took place in V.P.’s bedroom. V.P. testified that she was at work as a lifeguard at a recreation centre in the summer. She slipped on the pool deck and suffered an injury to her back. She came home, and D.J.P. allegedly suggested a massage to her. She accepted the massage, which was done in her room.

105During the course of the massage, D.J.P. allegedly used A535, a topical pain reliever, on the site of the injury. V.P. acknowledged that this ointment heated up the area of her back where it was put and that it had a strong smell.

106According to the testimony that V.P. provided to me, at some point during the course of this massage, D.J.P. inserted his finger into her vagina and scratched the inside of her vagina. V.P. testified that she yelled and jumped away from D.J.P. She also testified that K.P. and A.P. came upstairs because she yelled.

107I reject V.P.’s testimony on this point. I start by observing that there is, as described at paragraph 67, a significant inconsistency between V.P.’s evidence and K.P.’s evidence. They are unable to agree on what led to this incident.

108More importantly, however, there are inconsistencies between V.P.’s testimony before me and what she told the police. Specifically, V.P. did not mention the fact that A.P. and K.P. came upstairs to the room when she allegedly yelled, in spite of the fact that, in her testimony, V.P. specifically stated that D.J.P. was angry with K.P. and yelled at him for coming upstairs and not taking care of A.P.

109This was a significant part of the story in the testimony before me, and it was originally omitted from both V.P. and K.P.’s statements to the police. However, they both remembered it at the trial. K.P.’s evidence about this incident evolved even more than V.P.’s evidence. K.P. originally told the police that he did not remember anything about V.P. yelling or shouting. He then testified at the preliminary inquiry that he went upstairs, but it was only at trial that he testified that he actually saw into the room and saw V.P. on the bed.

110The joint change in this recollection leaves me concerned that this evidence has been, at a minimum, inadvertently tainted by K.P. and V.P. discussing the matter. It is also, on the facts of this case, possible that the evidence has been deliberately shaped by H.P., but it is not necessary for me to reach that conclusion in order to dispose of this matter.

111Further, V.P. acknowledged that D.J.P. would have had A535 on his hands in her testimony before me. She also acknowledged that she had never mentioned that D.J.P had used this gel in her previous statements. She also mentioned that the gel had a strong smell and caused powerful sensations. However, in her previous statements, she never mentioned the existence of this sensation in her vagina even though the gel would have been on D.J.P.’s fingers when he allegedly placed his fingers in V.P.’s vagina. The inconsistencies in this evidence and the lack of memory of any sensations leave me with significant questions about V.P.’s evidence on this incident.

112These inconsistencies do not exist in a vacuum. They exist against the backdrop of serious credibility and reliability problems with other portions of V.P.’s evidence. As a result, I cannot safely rely on V.P.’s evidence in respect of this incident. Having rejected V.P.’s testimony, it follows that the Crown has failed to establish this count beyond a reasonable doubt, and I find the accused not guilty.

Count 7

113This count reads as follows:

D.J.P. further stands charged on or between the 1st day of June in the year 2019 and the 31st day of August in the year 2019 at the Town of CALEDON in the said Region, did commit a sexual assault on V.P., contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code.

114This is a specific allegation of one sexual assault that took place at some point in 2019. On this occasion, V.P. alleges that the family was watching a movie called Parasite. There was an agreed statement of fact that Parasite was first released in Canada in January of 2020. It first premiered at the Cannes film festival in May of 2019. The family watched the movie shortly after it came out.

115In her testimony before me, V.P. stated that she had fallen asleep during the movie. When she woke up, D.J.P. allegedly had his hand on her thigh and was inserting his fingers into her vagina. She did not say anything, and D.J.P. stopped. When he stopped, V.P. testified that she went to the bathroom. When she came out, she testified that D.J.P. whispered to her “you taste good”. She also testified that D.J.P. licked his fingers.

116There are fewer inconsistencies in respect of this incident. However, there are still two troubling aspects. First is the fact that K.P. was present during this movie. He could have looked over at any time and seen this alleged fingering taking place. When confronted by that fact, V.P. testified that she was pretty sure that she had a blanket on her, even though that fact had not been mentioned before.

117Second, there is the fact that it would have been risky for D.J.P to insert his fingers into V.P.’s vagina while she was asleep. It is quite possible that V.P. would have awakened and let out an exclamation that would have led to the discovery of D.J.P.’s alleged conduct.

118Finally, there are problems with both the timing of the incident and whether H.P. was present for the incident. In respect of the timing, there was some suggestion from V.P. that the parties watched a pirated copy of the movie. However, H.P. had no knowledge of the family using any pirated software. If they watched a movie that was legally available in Canada, then the incident could not have taken place in 2019.

119There was also contradictory evidence about whether H.P. was present when the parties were watching the movie. H.P.’s presence would have been important for two reasons. First, the seat on the couches where she usually sat was next to D.J.P.’s usual seat, so if she had been there, then she might have been sitting beside D.J.P. Second, if she had been present, there would have been more risk that D.J.P. would have been caught assaulting V.P.

120Although these three problems are less significant than some of the other inconsistencies that exist in V.P.’s evidence, they are not inconsiderable and raise a reasonable doubt on their own. In addition, I am not convinced of this evidence beyond a reasonable doubt as there are significant credibility and reliability issues with V.P.’s testimony as a whole.

121For these reasons, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that this incident took place. The accused is acquitted of this charge.

Count 8

122This count reads as follows:

D.J.P. further stands charged on or between the 1st day of January in the year 2016 and the 1st day of February in the year 2021 at the Town of CALEDON in the said Region, did commit a sexual assault on V.P., contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code.

123This is the generalized account of groping and other sexual touching. V.P. testified that, on a regular basis, D.J.P would grope her by touching her breasts and her buttocks. She testified that this groping would happen almost every other day. It would happen under her clothing.

124In her evidence before me, V.P. testified that she did not know when this groping started. However, it clicked for her that this conduct was inappropriate after the IPad incident that forms the basis of Count 5. The problem with this testimony is that it was inconsistent with what she told the police. In her interview with the O.P.P., V.P. stated that the first incident of sexual touching was the IPad incident and that things started to happen after that incident.

125Given the frequency, invasive nature and public nature of this sexual touching, one would have expected others in the house to have noticed it, at least on occasion and yet neither H.P. nor K.P. noticed it at any point. It is surprising to me that, on V.P.’s evidence, D.J.P. was groping her under her clothing as frequently as every second day and that neither H.P. nor K.P. would have noticed anything. This inconsistency makes V.P.’s evidence less plausible. In any event, V.P.’s evidence is not sufficiently credible or reliable to found a conviction on this count either.

126For these reasons, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that these incidents took place. The accused is acquitted of this charge.

Reporting to the CAS

127At the conclusion of the evidence, I asked both counsel to consider whether either myself or other participants had an obligation to report the abuse that V.P. and K.P. had suffered at the hands of H.P. to the CAS. Both sides agreed with my view that I had that obligation, and that the Crown and OPP may have the same obligation. However, defence counsel would not necessarily have that obligation as it might interfere with their professional obligations to maintain client confidentiality. I will now set out both why I came to this view and what I intend to do about it.

128Section 125(1) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sch. 1 states, in part, as follows:

125 (1) Despite the provisions of any other Act, if a person, including a person who performs professional or official duties with respect to children, has reasonable grounds to suspect one of the following, the person shall immediately report the suspicion and the information on which it is based to a society:

1. The child has suffered physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s,

i. failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, or

ii. pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child.

2. There is a risk that the child is likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s,

i. failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, or

ii. pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child.

129In this case, the section extends the reporting obligation to cover a person who performs official duties in respect of children. Section 125(6) sets out a non-exhaustive list of the professionals who have a reporting obligation, and includes lawyers. In this respect, I note that Judges regularly make orders in respect of children, including under the CYFSA. As a result, it is clear that I carry out official duties in respect of children and the reporting obligation applies to me: G.(A.) v. E.(T.), 2021 ONSC 4838 at para. 9.

130Then, I must determine whether there is a reasonable basis to suspect that A.P. is in need of protection. H.P. appears to have sole decision-making authority over A.P. She also has a history of abusing her two older children, some of which she herself has acknowledged. This abuse continued while A.P. was also living with H.P., and he would have been exposed to at least some of it. Given these concerns, there are reasonable grounds to suspect that A.P. might be in need of protection as it is possible that H.P. may have abused him as well.

131For clarity, I am not concluding that H.P. engaged in actual abuse of A.P., merely that H.P.’s abuse of her two elder children should be reported to the CAS so that they can consider whether the existence of these allegations, which the CAS was never made aware of previously, causes there to be any concern about H.P.’s parenting of A.P.

132To that end, I am making the following orders:

a) The transcripts of the evidence of V.P. and K.P. are to be provided to the CAS for consideration.

b) A copy of this decision is to be provided to the CAS for consideration.

c) A copy of this decision is to be provided to any judge of either this Court or the Ontario Court of Justice considering a parenting or decision-making authority order in respect of A.P. before such an order is made.

133It should be noted that I have not directed that the transcript of H.P.’s evidence be produced to the CAS. Although I understand from counsel that H.P. took counsel at the preliminary inquiry in terms of her rights under section 13 of the Charter, I want to ensure that she has a further opportunity to be heard. There may be legal reasons why her transcript is protected from disclosure, and I am of the view that she should have the opportunity to make submissions on whether her evidence should be disclosed to the CAS. I retain the jurisdiction to address those submissions and, if necessary, an appointment may be made to speak to me through the Trial Coordinator’s office.

134Finally, these orders are not typically made at the end of a criminal trial. In this case, however, I am of the view that the reporting obligation is binding on me. I am also of the view that the Court’s inherent jurisdiction permits me to require that the parties bring this decision to the attention of anyone making decisions about parenting time or decision-making authority for A.P.

Disposition

135For the foregoing reasons, I find the accused not guilty on all counts on the indictment.

LEMAY J

Released: January 20, 2026.

CITATION: R v. D.J.P., 2026 ONSC 256