James K. Stewart

The deceased died from a brain injury after being assaulted twice in quick succession by two different individuals.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge discharged the first assailant on a murder charge, finding insufficient evidence that his assault caused the death.

The judge also discharged the second assailant on manslaughter and assault charges, finding insufficient identification evidence.

The Crown sought judicial review.

The reviewing judge quashed the first assailant's discharge but upheld the second assailant's discharge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error in both instances by exceeding his limited weighing function under the Criminal Code and failing to consider the entirety of the evidence.

The first assailant's committal for murder was upheld, and the second assailant's matter was remitted for committal on assault and reconsideration of manslaughter.

The appellant, a long-time member of the criminal underworld, appealed his sentence for refusing to testify at a murder trial.

He had been sentenced to three years' imprisonment, with one year of credit for other incarceration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the justice system depends on witnesses testifying as required.

The court held that significant jail terms must be imposed on those who choose to remain aligned with criminal cohorts rather than fulfill their civic duties, affirming that the sentence was entirely fit.

The appellant, a young offender, appealed a 90-day sentence for assault causing bodily harm.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to credit 101 days of pre-trial custody served for separate robbery charges that were later withdrawn.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge erred in law by not considering the pre-trial custody.

The 90-day sentence was set aside, as the pre-trial custody credit would have fully absorbed it.

The Crown brought a motion for directions regarding an appeal where the unrepresented appellant intended to allege ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant had been denied legal aid and sought time to retain counsel upon his release from custody.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the matter to allow the appellant time to retain counsel and directed the Crown to obtain specific transcripts and produce the appeal book in the interim.

The appellant, a dual status offender under the authority of the Ontario Review Board, was convicted of manslaughter for killing a fellow inmate.

The Crown applied to have him declared a dangerous offender.

The sentencing judge found the statutory criteria met and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

On appeal, the appellant argued procedural flaws regarding notice and the Attorney General's consent, and that the judge erred in not exercising residual discretion given the Review Board's concurrent jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the procedural requirements were met and the appellant's high risk of violent recidivism justified the dangerous offender designation.

The appellant appealed from a decision of the Superior Court dismissing his application for judicial review of a Justice of the Peace's refusal to issue process under s. 507.1 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant requested an adjournment on the basis of illness and to retain counsel, which the Court of Appeal refused, noting a history of adjournments and insufficient evidence of illness.

The Court found no error in the Superior Court judge's refusal to grant a further adjournment or in his dismissal of the judicial review application on the merits.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a commercial landlord, appealed his convictions for theft and mischief arising from his actions in changing the locks on a tenant's store and damaging/removing her property.

He argued he had a colour of right under the Commercial Tenancies Act, that the trial judge was in a conflict of interest, and that the charges were duplicative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no conflict of interest, that the Criminal Code applied, and that the trial judge reasonably rejected the colour of right defence based on the appellant's conduct and statements.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud, unauthorized use of credit card data, and possession of stolen traveler's cheques, arguing he was denied a trial in French, his guilty pleas were invalid due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial judge failed to properly inquire into the pleas.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant had not requested a French trial, failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the trial judge's inquiry into the negotiated guilty pleas was sufficient.

The appellant was convicted of incest against his developmentally challenged daughter.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in handling the issue of the complainant's motive to fabricate and that Crown counsel engaged in misconduct.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown improperly cross-examined witnesses on the complainant's motive to fabricate, made inflammatory comments in closing, and improperly injected personal opinion.

The trial judge failed to provide necessary corrective instructions.

The cumulative effect of these errors undermined the fairness of the trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing a miscarriage of justice occurred due to ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming he was not advised of the potential consequences of pleading guilty to breaching his conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this ground, finding the appellant fully appreciated the risk of a custodial sentence.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the conviction for possession of property obtained by crime as the facts did not support the charge.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellants pleaded guilty to manslaughter following a home invasion robbery and were sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge failed to give adequate weight to their guilty pleas and remorse, and imposed an unfit sentence outside the usual 8 to 12 year range for brutal manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the mitigating factors and was justified in departing from the range due to serious aggravating factors, including the appellants' lengthy records for violent crimes, the fact they were on parole, and the gratuitous violence inflicted on a vulnerable victim.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a street altercation where he stabbed the deceased.

At trial, the judge declined to leave the defence of provocation with the jury, finding no air of reality to the defence because the appellant disavowed anger as the trigger for his actions.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred.

Despite the appellant's testimony that he acted out of fear, there was evidence from which a properly instructed jury could infer that he acted in the heat of passion or sudden loss of self-control due to the deceased's insults and actions.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of offences relating to the theft and sale of firearms.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in applying the W. (D.) framework to the accused's testimony, improperly treated a lack of memory as an undisclosed alibi, and failed to exercise sufficient caution when accepting the evidence of an unsavoury witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof, appropriately cautioned himself regarding the unsavoury witness, and provided adequate reasons in accordance with R. v. R.E.M.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery and related offences following two trials.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that his s. 11(b) Charter rights were violated by a 56-month delay, that the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence and refusing to sever the charges, and that bad character evidence was improperly admitted.

He also appealed his sentence of life imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the delay was largely attributable to the appellant's own conduct and that the trial judge made no reversible errors in his evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court holding that a life sentence was fit given the appellant's extensive violent criminal record, incorrigibility, and the need to protect the public.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board that maintained his status in a minimum secure setting, deleted a condition permitting community living, and denied his request for an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence supporting the Board's conclusion that the appellant continued to pose a significant risk to the community, noting his recent elopement, failure to take medication, and lack of insight.

The court held that the Board did not err in rejecting the options of an absolute or conditional discharge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of breaching a term of his recognizance requiring him to remain 50 metres from an embassy.

He testified he believed the distance was 15 metres and had not read the document.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal court judge convicted him on the basis of wilful blindness for failing to read the terms.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, holding that both lower courts erred in law.

Wilful blindness requires a subjective, deliberate decision to remain ignorant of a suspected state of affairs, not merely a negligent failure to make reasonable inquiries.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in allowing a bank employee to testify to facts referred to in a 1994 letter and that the jury charge contained errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary ruling based on past recollection recorded or refreshing memory.

Furthermore, the hearsay concerns were moot because defence counsel had agreed to admit the evidence for its truth for tactical reasons.

The court also found the jury charge to be balanced and fair.

The appellant, who had a substantial criminal record including a previous ten-year sentence for bank robberies, appealed his effective sentence of thirteen years imprisonment for seven bank robberies and one attempted bank robbery.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit, noting the gravity of the offences and the expert evidence indicating a risk of re-offending.

The court held that the sentence did not offend the principles of proportionality and totality, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, a senior manager, was convicted of fraud and attempted fraud for engaging his girlfriend to provide recruitment services to his company without authorization.

He appealed his convictions and his sentence of 90 days' intermittent incarceration and a $20,000 fine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence of a dishonest act and deprivation, and rejecting the defence of authorization.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting the sentence was merciful given the appellant's breach of trust.

The accused, a young Black man, was stopped by police and charged with driving over 80.

At trial, the defence applied to exclude evidence under s. 9 of the Charter, alleging the stop was an arbitrary detention based on racial profiling.

The trial judge dismissed the application and convicted the accused.

The summary conviction appeal court set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge's conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's interventions during submissions and inappropriate remarks during sentencing demonstrated an antipathy and resistance to the application that would lead a reasonable observer to conclude he lacked an open and dispassionate mind.