Steven Skurka

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt on two counts of indecent act.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly reversed the burden of proof by failing to require the Crown to disprove the alibi beyond a reasonable doubt, and improperly drew an adverse inference from the rejected alibi.

The appeal judge found no error regarding the burden of proof, but held that the trial judge erred by treating disbelief of the alibi as evidence of guilt without proof of deliberate fabrication.

Because the counts were factually intertwined and the adverse inference undermined the assessment of credibility, the error tainted both verdicts.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of refusing to comply with a roadside demand for a breath sample.

At trial, she testified that a panic attack prevented her from providing a sample.

The trial judge rejected her evidence, relying on her failure to mention the panic attack to the officer at the roadside and on inconsistent statements she made before being advised of her right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred by using pre-counsel roadside statements to impeach the appellant's credibility and by using her pre-trial silence to draw adverse inferences against her.

The appellants, members of the Hells Angels, were convicted of extortion and extortion in association with a criminal organization after threatening a victim over an alleged debt while wearing club colours.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the criminal organization provisions of the Criminal Code are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the terms 'facilitation' and 'in association with' are well-understood and not impermissibly vague or overbroad.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellants deliberately invoked their membership in the organization to inspire fear, and affirmed the sentence imposed.

The accused, a young Black man, was stopped by police and charged with driving over 80.

At trial, the defence applied to exclude evidence under s. 9 of the Charter, alleging the stop was an arbitrary detention based on racial profiling.

The trial judge dismissed the application and convicted the accused.

The summary conviction appeal court set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge's conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's interventions during submissions and inappropriate remarks during sentencing demonstrated an antipathy and resistance to the application that would lead a reasonable observer to conclude he lacked an open and dispassionate mind.