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Conviction and sentence appeal dismissed; no error in jury charge regarding post-offence conduct or expert evidence.
The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury charge regarding post-offence conduct and expert evidence concerning a drug associated with amnesia.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the trial was brief, the factual scenario was easy to understand, and defence counsel's failure to object to the charge was significant.
The court found no merit in the other grounds raised and denied leave to appeal the sentence.
Conditional sentence varied to strike forced apology condition and amend curfew to permit employment.
The appellant appealed two conditions of his 15-month conditional sentence for sexual assault.
The Court of Appeal struck the condition requiring him to write a letter of apology to the victim.
The court held that a court-mandated expression of remorse is subjective, fruitless, and diminishes the mitigating effect of genuine remorse.
The court also varied a curfew condition on consent to allow the appellant to work and earn a livelihood.
The appeal was allowed and the conditions were varied accordingly.
Appeal dismissed; curative proviso applied as similar fact evidence did not affect the trial outcome.
The appellant was convicted of indecent assault and buggery.
The trial judge admitted similar fact evidence but found each count proved beyond a reasonable doubt before analyzing that evidence.
The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, applying the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding that a properly instructed jury could not reasonably have come to a different conclusion if the similar fact evidence had not been admitted.
Supreme Court upholds rape conviction, finding the jury's acceptance of the complainant's repressed memory evidence was not unreasonable.
The appellant was convicted of raping a 13-year-old girl.
The complainant's testimony contained inconsistencies regarding the number of assaults and her sexual history, which she explained as resulting from repressed memory.
The appellant did not testify.
The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant argued the jury drew an improper inference from his failure to testify and that the verdict was unreasonable.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury was entitled to accept the complainant's explanations for the inconsistencies and that the verdict was one a properly instructed jury could reasonably render.
Appeal dismissed from the bench; no error found in the Court of Appeal's decision.
The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that set aside his acquittal and ordered a new trial.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, finding no error in the disposition by the Court of Appeal.
Appeal dismissed; language comprehension relates to the weight of a confession, not its admissibility.
The appellants were acquitted at trial on a directed verdict of robbery and using a firearm.
The Ontario Court of Appeal quashed the acquittal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in ruling confessions inadmissible based on language comprehension, which goes to weight rather than admissibility.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, substantially agreeing with the reasons of the Court of Appeal.
Mistaken belief instruction requires an evidentiary foundation.
The Crown appealed an order granting a new trial after a sexual assault conviction.
The court held that an instruction on honest but mistaken belief in consent is not mandatory in every sexual assault case; it is only required where there is sufficient evidence giving that issue an air of reality under s. 244(4) of the Criminal Code.
On the record, the accused's theory of consent or mistaken belief lacked an evidentiary foundation.
The court also held that evidence from the complainant's roommate about a prior sexual proposition was admissible because its probative value outweighed its minimal prejudicial effect, and in any event any error would have been cured by the proviso.