OCA 2010

The appellant was injured in Florida while riding a friend's uninsured dirt bike.

She applied for Statutory Accident Benefits under her standard automobile policy, which covered her own dirt bike.

The insurer denied the claim, and the application judge dismissed her application.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Florida dirt bike was an 'automobile' within the meaning of the policy, as the policy defined 'automobile' to include 'other automobile driven by you' and the appellant's own dirt bike was insured as an automobile.

The appeal was allowed and a declaration of entitlement to benefits was granted.

The appellant filed a complaint under the Police Services Act against two police officers, alleging unlawful arrest and excessive force.

The hearing officer dismissed the complaint, finding the arrest lawful and no excessive force used.

The appellant then brought a civil action against the officers for unlawful arrest, excessive force, arbitrary detention, and malicious prosecution.

The defendants successfully moved to strike these claims based on issue estoppel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the elements of issue estoppel were met and there was no reason to exercise discretion to refuse its application.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

On appeal, he argued that his right to be present at his trial was violated when the trial judge held private, unrecorded conversations with prospective jurors during jury selection.

He also challenged the admission of statements made to undercover officers during a 'Mr. Big' operation.

The Court of Appeal held that while the private conversations were part of the trial and the appellant had a right to hear them, the procedural error caused no prejudice and was cured by the proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code.

The evidentiary ground was also dismissed based on binding precedent.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and trafficking in cocaine following a jury trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the evidence of a police informant and hearsay statements made by an alleged co-conspirator.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the application of the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule, particularly given it was a two-person conspiracy and the Crown sought to rely on statements made after the conspiracy alleged in the indictment.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the jury instructions failed to properly isolate the findings required before hearsay evidence could be used against the appellant.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was ordered to undergo a psychiatric assessment under s. 672.11 of the Criminal Code and was held in a detention centre for 15 days before a hospital bed became available.

She brought a proposed class action alleging Charter violations, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence by the Crown for failing to immediately transfer her to a hospital.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the action, finding that the Criminal Code permits detention in a jail pending transfer to a hospital, the detention was lawful, and the Crown owed no fiduciary duty to the appellant that would override its public interest obligations.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her unjust enrichment claim against her deceased husband's mother.

The appellant and her husband had lived rent-free on the mother's farm and made extensive improvements to it.

After the husband's death, the appellant moved out and the mother sold the farm, keeping the proceeds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the improvements were largely paid for by the husband's company, that the benefits of living rent-free offset the value of the improvements, and that the improvements were made voluntarily and in self-interest, providing a juristic reason for the mother to retain the benefit.

The 16-year-old applicant was charged with second degree murder and attempted murder.

He was initially ordered detained solely on the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant sought a review of the detention order.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by failing to consider releasing the youth to a responsible person under s. 31 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

Additionally, fresh evidence from the preliminary inquiry showed the Crown's case was less compelling than originally presented.

The Court granted the application and ordered the youth released into the care of his grandparents under strict conditions, including house arrest.

The plaintiff and defendant in a construction dispute entered into an agreement capping the plaintiff's damages to whatever the defendant could recover from the third party.

The fourth party appellant discovered the agreement months later and moved to dismiss the third and fourth party claims as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal held that while the agreement was not champertous, the failure to immediately disclose it to the other parties and the court constituted an abuse of process.

The appeal was allowed and the third and fourth party proceedings were stayed.

The appellant commenced an action to enforce Minutes of Settlement regarding the termination of his employment.

He then commenced a second action against his employer and its principal based on the underlying conduct.

The motion judge dismissed the second action as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the Minutes of Settlement and final release governed the parties' relationship and the underlying conduct was no longer relevant.

The appellant appealed a judgment ordering time-limited spousal support.

The trial judge had accepted evidence that the appellant would return to the workforce once the children were in school full-time, noting her significant earning capacity.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle in the trial judge's consideration of the appropriate factors and dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant could seek a variation in the future if circumstances warranted.

The appellant suffered a severe brain injury after being assaulted by an intoxicated patron outside a pub.

He sued the patron and the pub, relying on the civil liability provisions of s. 39 of the Liquor Licence Act.

At trial, the jury found the patron 100% responsible and dismissed the claim against the pub.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misdirected the jury by instructing them that liability under s. 39 requires reasonable foreseeability of harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 39 requires a risk assessment and is breached only if a patron is over-served to the point where it is reasonably foreseeable they might injure another person.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud on the public, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, failed to instruct herself on the dangers of unconfirmed evidence, and rendered inconsistent verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's decision rested on independent evidence establishing the appellant's intent to defraud by inflating revenue figures.

The court also found the verdicts were not inconsistent, as the fraudulent intent was formed after the loans were made but before the public relied on the false financial statements.

The Crown's appeal of the acquittals was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant commenced an application for oppression relief under the Canada Business Corporations Act, supported by an affidavit from an individual who lacked direct knowledge and was unavailable for cross-examination.

When the appellant attempted to substitute the affidavit after the respondents had filed their responding materials, the motions judge struck the application as an abuse of process, with leave to re-introduce it upon payment of costs thrown away.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge was entitled to infer prejudice and properly exercised his discretion.

The applicant, a Canadian citizen, was sought for extradition by the United States on charges of conspiracy to import marijuana and money laundering.

The Minister of Justice issued an Authority to Proceed for the Canadian offences of importing a controlled substance and possession of property obtained by crime.

After the applicant consented to committal, the Minister ordered his surrender on the U.S. conspiracy charges and declined to seek assurances regarding sentencing standards.

The applicant sought judicial review, arguing the surrender order must align with the Canadian offences in the committal order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, applying the Supreme Court's conduct-based approach to double criminality, which does not require alignment between the surrender order and the extradition order.

The appellant commenced a fraudulent conveyance action against the respondent, which was stayed when the respondent filed for bankruptcy.

The appellant later obtained an order under s. 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to bring proceedings in its own name.

The motion judge dismissed the action as statute-barred, finding that the trustee's discoverability date governed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under s. 12(1) of the Limitations Act, 2002, the relevant discoverability date is the earlier of the trustee's or the creditor's.

Since the creditor discovered the claim before the new Limitations Act came into force, no limitation period applied.

An insurance broker unilaterally issued certificates of insurance renewing coverage for its clients after receiving no response from the insurer regarding renewal.

The broker collected premiums but subsequently placed the coverage with another insurer and forwarded the premiums to the new insurer.

The original insurer, having extended coverage for 30 days, counterclaimed for the premiums for that period.

The Court of Appeal held that the broker's ostensible authority created binding contracts of insurance on behalf of the insurer, and under s. 402 of the Insurance Act, the broker held the collected premiums in trust for the original insurer.

The appeal was allowed and the insurer's counterclaim for premiums was granted.

The appellants sought to set aside costs orders made by the Court of Appeal and the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the respondent's lawyers' fees were being paid by the Lawyers' Professional Indemnity Corporation (LawPro).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the request, finding that LawPro's agreement to backstop the fees did not remove the respondent's liability to pay its lawyers, and the courts were entitled to order costs against the losing parties.

The City of Hamilton commenced an action against the architect and general contractor of an arena project for construction defects.

After years of inaction, the action was dismissed for delay by the registrar when the City's counsel inadvertently failed to attend a status hearing.

The City's motion to set aside the dismissal was denied by the motion judge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the 15-year delay was inordinately long, the critical five-and-a-half-year period of inaction was unexplained, and the delay caused actual prejudice to the defendants due to the unavailability and faded memories of key witnesses.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The respondents were awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The League respondents were awarded $15,000, the City of Ottawa was awarded $5,000, and Miles Wolff was awarded $5,000, all inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellants appealed their convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown conceded that the convictions relied on the theory that the appellant Jean purchased the drugs from the appellant Kapend and a co-accused, and was in possession of the entirety of the drugs hidden in a container in a vehicle.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence could not reasonably support the inference that Jean had knowledge of the cocaine secreted in the container.

As the Crown conceded that Kapend's conviction could not stand if Jean's conviction was quashed, both convictions were quashed and acquittals entered.