Darren J. Smith

The applicants brought an application seeking a declaration that an Option Agreement affecting their real estate was invalid.

They argued the respondent breached the agreement by failing to pay a proportionate share of property taxes for over two years, and that the agreement violated the subdivision control provisions of the Planning Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding no breach of the tax provision because the respondent had maintained a credit balance through estimated lump-sum payments.

While the court agreed the Option Agreement technically violated section 50(3)(b) of the Planning Act by allowing the grantor to retain a fee in abutting lands, it held the agreement was saved by section 50(21) because it contained an express condition making it subject to Planning Act compliance.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment and constructive trust related to unpaid construction work.

The court found that a contract existed between the parties and that the Construction Lien Act provided a comprehensive statutory scheme, both constituting juristic reasons for the alleged enrichment.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that a "quasi-domestic relationship" between the parties negated these juristic reasons.

Consequently, the plaintiff's action was dismissed.

This decision concerns the costs of a motion for particulars where success was divided.

The defendants sought particulars of allegations in the statement of claim, and the court ordered some particulars while dismissing others.

The court declined to accept further costs submissions, emphasizing the need for an expeditious process.

Finding that success was more or less evenly divided and that both parties contributed to the issues, the court concluded that no order for costs was fair and reasonable.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 25.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking particulars of numerous allegations in the plaintiff's statement of claim, particularly those alleging fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of trust.

The court found the statement of claim generally sufficient but ordered the plaintiff to provide specific particulars regarding allegedly improper payments, including personal expenses, loans, liabilities, and consulting fees, as identified in paragraph 60 of the statement of claim.

Other requested particulars, especially concerning the distribution of sale proceeds and general allegations, were dismissed as either sufficiently pleaded or matters for oral discovery.

The appellant franchisor appealed a declaration that a clause in its franchise agreements requiring a general release as a condition of assignment was void and unenforceable under s. 11 of the Arthur Wishart Act.

The Court of Appeal held that while the clause was not void ab initio, it was unenforceable because it required a release of statutory claims.

The Court declined to apply notional severance to read down the clause to apply only to non-statutory claims, finding that doing so would subvert the protective purpose of the Act and invite franchisors to draft overly broad releases.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to issue certificates of pending litigation (CPLs) against two Toronto properties, asserting a constructive trust based on alleged unjust enrichment after paying mortgages and expenses on behalf of the defendants.

The defendants argued that rents collected by the plaintiff exceeded the payments made and that no unjust enrichment occurred.

The court held that there was a triable issue regarding whether the plaintiff had been fully reimbursed and whether a constructive trust could be imposed.

However, the court declined to grant a CPL on one property because it had been sold and the proceeds would not satisfy the mortgage.

Leave to issue a CPL was granted only with respect to the Carlaw Avenue property.

The moving parties sought summary judgment dismissing claims alleging that the plaintiffs were defrauded when their share in a real estate syndicate held through a trust was misappropriated and transferred to the moving parties.

The motion argued the claims were statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 because the plaintiffs discovered the claim by 2005 but did not join the moving parties until 2008.

The court held that if the Limitations Act, 2002 applied, the claim would be out of time; however, uncertainty remained whether the Real Property Limitations Act governed claims seeking equitable interests in land.

Because it was unclear which statutory regime applied, a genuine issue requiring a trial existed regarding the applicable limitation period.

Summary judgment was therefore inappropriate.

The applicant sought recognition and enforcement in Ontario of a Kansas default judgment obtained against the respondent for breach of contract, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and sales losses.

The respondent resisted enforcement on the grounds that the foreign judgment was obtained by fraud and in breach of natural justice.

The court held that a real and substantial connection existed between Kansas and both the dispute and the respondent.

The alleged non‑disclosure of insurance proceeds did not constitute fraud and arguments regarding the validity of damages improperly attempted to relitigate the merits.

The Kansas procedures, including shorter response timelines and different default judgment rules, nonetheless satisfied principles of natural justice.

The appellant bank appealed an order enforcing a settlement under Rule 49.09.

The motion judge had concluded that the parties agreed to a reduced mortgage payout of $357,000 based on two letters between counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge made a reversible error by failing to read the correspondence in the context of the entire negotiation history.

An objective reading of the full correspondence demonstrated there was no meeting of the minds on the essential term of the mortgage payout amount, and therefore no settlement was reached.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision, arguing that the motion judge exceeded her authority under the former Rule 20 by making findings of fact and credibility determinations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that motion judges had a limited power to make such findings when determining whether there was a genuine issue for trial.

The court awarded costs of $15,000 to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment order, arguing the bargain struck by the parties should be set aside due to duress.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial based on the record and the appellants' own admissions.

Costs were awarded to the respondents in the amount of $6,500.

The appellant commenced an action to enforce Minutes of Settlement regarding the termination of his employment.

He then commenced a second action against his employer and its principal based on the underlying conduct.

The motion judge dismissed the second action as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the Minutes of Settlement and final release governed the parties' relationship and the underlying conduct was no longer relevant.