Christopher S. Collins

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits for optometry services following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent denied the treatment plan because the applicant failed to attend scheduled insurer's examinations (IEs) in Toronto and Brampton, citing the inconvenience of travelling from London.

The Tribunal found that the respondent made reasonable efforts to schedule the IEs at a convenient location, as there were no available specialists in the London area.

Because the applicant failed to attend the IEs without a reasonable excuse, she was barred from proceeding with her claim under s. 55 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The application was dismissed.

The moving defendants, including the estate of a deceased driver, brought a motion for partial summary judgment to cap their liability at their $1 million insurance policy limits.

The estate sought this relief to allow for the distribution of estate assets to beneficiaries, which had been delayed by the ongoing litigation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding liability and damages.

The court also noted that capping the minor plaintiff's potential recovery without a full assessment of damages and liability apportionment would risk undercompensating him and would not be approved under Rule 7.08.

The defendant brought an unopposed motion in writing seeking an order for the simultaneous or sequential trial of the main action, a third-party claim, and a related action arising from the same motor vehicle accident.

The court declined to sign the draft order due to several deficiencies in the motion materials, including the failure to provide all relevant pleadings, the lack of information regarding the mode of trial (jury or non-jury), and the failure to file proper notices of non-opposition from the responding parties.

The court provided directions for the defendant to file supplementary materials to correct these deficiencies.

The respondent brought a motion to dismiss or stay the application because the applicant failed to attend four insurer's examinations (IEs) related to his claim for post-104 income replacement benefits.

The Tribunal denied the motion to dismiss, finding it would be unduly prejudicial to the applicant.

However, the Tribunal granted a 120-day stay to allow the respondent to conduct vocational, kinesiology, and orthopaedic assessments, which were found to be reasonably necessary under s. 44(1) of the Schedule.

The Tribunal found that a requested psychiatric assessment was not reasonably necessary as there was no reasonable nexus to the applicant's injuries.

The plaintiff, an infant who allegedly sustained a brain injury in a motor vehicle accident, brought a motion to compel her mother (the defendant driver) to be present during all of her medical appointments and assessments.

The plaintiff also sought leave under Rule 48.04(1) to bring the motion after the trial record had been passed.

The court granted leave, emphasizing the interests of justice for an infant plaintiff.

However, the court dismissed the plaintiff's request for the mother to be present in the examination room, finding the defence's proposal—that the mother could accompany the plaintiff and be interviewed separately, while another chaperone could be in the room—struck a reasonable balance.

The applicant was injured in a motorcycle accident and sought a medical benefit for physiotherapy services under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The respondent insurer denied the treatment plan, arguing that the applicant had improved and could perform exercises independently.

The Tribunal found that the treatment plan's goals of pain reduction and improved function were reasonable and necessary given the applicant's injuries, which included post-concussion syndrome.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent to pay the $3,003.85 treatment plan and interest on any incurred expenses.

The appellant suffered a severe brain injury after being assaulted by an intoxicated patron outside a pub.

He sued the patron and the pub, relying on the civil liability provisions of s. 39 of the Liquor Licence Act.

At trial, the jury found the patron 100% responsible and dismissed the claim against the pub.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misdirected the jury by instructing them that liability under s. 39 requires reasonable foreseeability of harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 39 requires a risk assessment and is breached only if a patron is over-served to the point where it is reasonably foreseeable they might injure another person.

The insured was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for a catastrophic impairment designation, which was denied by the insurer based on a CAT DAC assessment.

After the two-year limitation period expired, the insured submitted a new application based on an alleged change in condition.

The arbitrator found the limitation period applied but held that a change in condition could permit a reapplication.

On appeal, the Director's Delegate confirmed the arbitrator's finding that there was no factual change in condition, dismissing the insured's appeal.

However, on the insurer's appeal, the Delegate held that the arbitrator erred in law by finding an exception for changed conditions, ruling that under subsection 40(4) of the Schedule, a CAT DAC determination is binding and cannot be circumvented by a reapplication on the same criteria once the limitation period has expired.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for a determination of catastrophic impairment.

The insurer denied the application, and the applicant subsequently submitted two more applications for the same determination more than two years later, arguing that a change in the law permitted re-application.

The insurer argued the arbitration was time-barred under s. 281(5) of the Insurance Act.

The arbitrator held that the two-year limitation period applies to catastrophic impairment determinations and runs from the date of a valid refusal.

Because the applicant's subsequent applications were based on the same criteria and did not demonstrate a change in condition, the limitation period was not reset.

The application for arbitration was dismissed as time-barred.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum and correction to a previous endorsement.

The original endorsement mistakenly stated that the appeal was allowed, when the court intended to dismiss the appeal because the underlying Rule 21 motion involved questions of fact requiring evidence.

The court amended the endorsement to dismiss both the appeal and the motion, with costs reserved to the trial judge.