Solomon Chaim Friedman

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking, brought a second application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The net delay of 37.5 months exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The court applied the transitional exception and the Morin framework to assess whether the delay was justified.

Weighing the serious nature of the charges against the prejudice suffered by the applicant, the court found the delay was justified and dismissed the application.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault with a weapon and unlawful confinement following a trial before a judge sitting without a jury.

The trial judge stayed convictions for sexual assault and assault with a weapon, applying the principles in Kienapple v. The Queen.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: misapprehension of evidence, excessive judicial intervention depriving him of a fair trial, and uneven scrutiny of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, no deprivation of a fair trial despite judicial interventions, and no uneven standard of scrutiny applied to the evidence.

The Crown brought an application under s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code to preserve a prior ruling dismissing the accused's s. 11(b) Charter application.

The original judge had recused himself due to a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from his post-decision comments regarding a factual error he made in the ruling.

The court held that s. 653.1 applies purposively to pre-trial rulings even if no formal mistrial was declared.

However, the court found that it was in the interests of justice to allow the accused to relitigate the prejudice aspect of the s. 11(b) application with fresh evidence, while preserving the original judge's findings on the allocation of delay.

The applicants were found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to murder and first-degree murder.

Prior to sentencing, they applied for a stay of the conspiracy count, arguing that entering convictions for both offences would violate the rule against multiple convictions for the same delict.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the offences lacked both the factual and legal nexus required to engage the rule.

The conspiracy was complete weeks before the murder, and the legal elements of the offences protect different societal interests.

The appellant, John Morrison, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm on two grounds: reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and misapprehension of evidence.

The appeal court reviewed the trial judge's interventions during cross-examination of a vulnerable witness and her comment about 'setting up an appeal,' concluding that an informed person would not find a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Regarding the misapprehension of evidence concerning a defence witness's criminal record, the court found it was a factual error that did not impact the substantive issues or result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a leading expert in animal brucellosis employed by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), pleaded guilty to one count of breach of trust and ten regulatory offences.

The breach of trust involved his commercialization of brucellosis diagnostic test kits using intellectual property owned by the CFIA through a company established in China from 2006 to 2010.

The regulatory offences arose from his arrest on October 24, 2012, when he was found attempting to board a flight to China with 17 vials of brucella bacteria improperly packaged in his carry-on luggage.

The court imposed a two-year custodial sentence, rejecting the defence's request for a conditional sentence despite the accused's exemplary background, advanced age, serious medical conditions, and low risk of recidivism.

The court found that general deterrence and denunciation were the predominant sentencing principles required by the legislative objectives of the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act and the Export and Import Permits Act.

The Applicant, Awso Peshdary, facing terrorism-related charges, sought production of materials from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) as a third-party records holder.

The request pertained to two main areas: (1) reliability assessments and financial arrangements of Abdullah Milton, a paid CSIS asset and later police agent whose credibility was a material issue, and (2) materials related to a CSIS warrant obtained against Peshdary, used to support a subsequent RCMP judicial authorization.

The court applied the two-stage O'Connor test for third-party disclosure.

It found that materials related to Milton's reliability and financial arrangements met the "likely relevance" test for trial issues and ordered their disclosure to the court for review.

However, for the CSIS warrant materials, the court distinguished between facial and sub-facial challenges to judicial authorizations, applying the narrower Garofoli test as clarified by World Bank Group v. Wallace.

It concluded that the applicant had not met the test for likely relevance for the CSIS warrant materials, as the purpose was to challenge the admissibility of evidence rather than directly bear on guilt or innocence.

The court also ordered disclosure of any notes Milton took of his interactions with Peshdary.

The appellant, a taxi driver, appealed his conviction and 30-day sentence for sexual assault of a passenger.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons regarding the complainant's reliability and improperly considered his race and religion during sentencing.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and clearly addressed the reliability of the complainant's evidence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, as the trial judge's repeated references to the appellant's ethnicity and religion breached his Charter right to equal treatment.

The sentence was vacated and a new sentencing hearing was ordered.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that had overturned the accused's conviction for having care or control of a vehicle while impaired.

The Court of Appeal found that the SCAC impermissibly substituted its own factual findings for those of the trial judge regarding whether the accused posed a realistic risk of danger.

The Court of Appeal also held that the SCAC erred by deciding the appeal on the unargued ground of insufficient reasons.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving causing bodily harm, arguing the trial judge's finding was unreasonable and misapprehended evidence regarding his refusal to provide a breath sample.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the conviction was reasonably supported by evidence of alcohol consumption, an unexplained accident, obstructive behaviour, and the statutory inference from refusing a breath sample.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting statements he made to police at the scene, claiming they were statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act or made while detained without access to counsel.

He also argued the breathalyzer results should have been excluded because the arresting officer forgot to make a breath demand at the scene, and the demand was instead made later by a breath technician at the station.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the roadside statements were voluntary and made before detention crystallized.

The Court also held that the breath technician's demand satisfied the requirements of s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code, as it was made as soon as practicable after the technician formed his own reasonable grounds.

Malcolm Valade, charged with serious Criminal Code offences including attempted murder and firearm offenses, applied for a bail review after being detained by a Justice of the Peace.

He sought release based on a material change in circumstances, presenting a new release plan that included his spouse Christine Valade as an additional surety, independent employment outside the family business (which was the source of the dispute), and a more intensive mental health treatment program.

The court found that the new plan constituted a material and relevant change in circumstances, addressing the deficiencies identified in the initial bail hearing.

The court concluded that detention was no longer necessary on any of the three grounds under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code, and granted Valade's release on specific terms and conditions.

The Crown appealed an order granting the respondent state-funded counsel of choice (a Fisher order) for his first-degree murder trial.

The application judge had conditionally stayed the charge until the state negotiated compensation with the respondent's chosen counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent failed to produce sufficient evidence to meet the narrow exceptions established in Peterman for state-funded counsel of choice.

The order was set aside, though the Crown had agreed to fund the chosen counsel regardless of the appeal's outcome.

The accused, charged with sexual offences against two complainants, brought an application under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code to introduce evidence that one of the complainants had sexually assaulted a younger child.

The accused argued this evidence was relevant to the complainant's credibility and motive to fabricate.

The court dismissed the application, finding the evidence had no probative value, engaged the prohibited inferences under s. 276(1), and would cause undue prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

The applicant, charged with sexual offences against his two stepdaughters, sought a stay of proceedings or the exclusion of their evidence under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

He argued his fair trial rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) were breached because the complainants discussed their evidence and contravened an exclusion order during a previous trial that ended in a mistrial.

The court dismissed the application, finding the complainants' conduct did not amount to deliberate collusion or an abuse of process, and that any issues regarding their discussions could be addressed through cross-examination and the assessment of weight at the new trial.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death, operation of a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in blood causing death, and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death, arising from a fatal head-on collision on Highway 17.

The Crown sought to admit expert evidence from three Ontario Provincial Police collision reconstruction officers: Constable Kelly (Level 3 Technical Traffic Collision Investigator), Constable Hewitt (Level 4 Accident Reconstructionist), and Constable Kern (Level 4 Accident Reconstructionist and regional lead).

The defence objected on grounds of bias, lack of independence, partiality, and lack of competence.

The court conducted an extensive voir dire on the admissibility of expert evidence, examining the independence, objectivity, and qualifications of each officer.

The accused was charged with two counts of discharging a firearm and seven other firearms offences in relation to the shooting of a victim in July 2012.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the testimony of an unsavoury witness, a career criminal with a lengthy record who claimed to have been present at the shooting.

The victim testified that he did not see his shooter and could not identify the accused.

The court found the unsavoury witness's testimony unreliable due to his criminal history, his admission of perjury, contradictions with physical evidence, and direct contradiction with the victim's testimony.

The court acquitted the accused of all charges, finding insufficient evidence to meet the Crown's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant tavern appealed a License Appeal Tribunal decision finding it breached several provisions of the Liquor Licence Act and its Regulations, resulting in a 10-day licence suspension.

The charges arose after a group of patrons consumed a massive amount of alcohol in a short period, leading to intoxication, a violent altercation with staff, and a subsequent investigation.

The Divisional Court applied a correctness standard of review.

The court upheld findings that the appellant sold liquor to intoxicated persons, permitted drunkenness, permitted violent conduct, and failed to facilitate an inspection.

However, the court quashed findings that the appellant permitted practices encouraging immoderate consumption, committed a second violation of permitting drunkenness, and obstructed an investigation, finding errors of law in the tribunal's reasoning on those points.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The Receiver of Atlas Block Co. Limited moved for approval of the distribution of net sales proceeds from certain assets between two secured creditors, RBC and BDC, and for approval of its allocation of fees and costs.

BDC objected to the distribution, arguing the purchase price allocation in the approved Asset Purchase Agreements undervalued the real property compared to historic appraisals.

The court rejected BDC's objection, noting BDC had not opposed the sale approval motion and the appraisals were dated and less reliable than the market-tested sale price.

The court also approved the Receiver's pro rata allocation of shared costs, finding it prima facie reasonable and noting BDC's delayed objection.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision that ordered a new hearing regarding a firearms prohibition and forfeiture order under s. 117.05 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal judge had found that the hearing judge reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the Crown failed to raise a question of law of public importance or demonstrate a clear error of law requiring leave for the due administration of justice.