Lorne Joseph Goldstein

The Crown applied to have the offender declared a Dangerous Offender following his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon against five female strangers.

The offender had struck the women in the head with a hammer or hard object from behind.

The court found that the offender met the criteria for a Dangerous Offender designation under s. 753 of the Criminal Code.

However, relying on psychiatric evidence that the offender's risk could eventually be managed in the community, the court declined to impose an indeterminate sentence.

Instead, the court imposed a determinate sentence of 12 years' imprisonment, less enhanced pre-sentence custody credit, followed by a 10-year Long Term Supervision Order.

The offender was convicted after trial of three bank robberies while disguised, multiple car thefts and attempted car thefts, possession of instruments for breaking into cars, dangerous driving, and flight from police.

The Crown sought a 12-year global sentence consecutive to the offender's existing sentence, with parole eligibility restrictions under section 743.6, forfeiture of $1,350, a 15-year driving prohibition, DNA order, and lifetime weapons prohibition.

The defence sought 7-9 years consecutive.

The court imposed a global sentence of 10 years, comprising 8.5 years for robbery offences, 1 year concurrent on vehicle-related offences (consecutive to robbery sentence), and 6 months concurrent on dangerous driving and flight offences (consecutive to prior sentences).

Parole eligibility was restricted to 50% of the 8.5-year robbery sentence (4 years 3 months).

The court also imposed the requested ancillary orders including a 13-year driving prohibition and 22 years to pay the victim fine surcharge.

The defendants brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking to stay proceedings on the grounds that their right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The total delay from arrest to anticipated trial conclusion was 21 months and 6 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling by 3 months and 6 days.

The Crown conceded there was no defence delay, waiver, or discrete event.

The court found the case was not particularly complex and that the Crown's decision to join multiple defendants together late in the proceedings, and subsequent partial severance, created unnecessary delay.

The court granted the application and stayed the proceedings.

On a dangerous offender application following convictions for multiple sexual offences against children, the court held that the offender's conduct formed part of a repetitive pattern demonstrating a failure to control sexual impulses and a likelihood of causing severe psychological harm in the future.

The court relied on the offender's history of prior child sexual offences, reoffending while subject to probation and treatment, and persistent denial of the extent of his pedophilia, which the court found materially impaired treatment prospects.

Although expert actuarial evidence placed the risk near the 50% range, the court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory likelihood threshold under s. 753(1) was met.

The court further found there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure, including a long-term supervision order, would adequately protect the public.

A dangerous offender designation and an indeterminate sentence were imposed.

This Charter application, brought on behalf of an unrepresented accused, challenged the lawfulness of a warrantless police entry into the accused's residence to effect an arrest and the subsequent admissibility of evidence.

The court found that exigent circumstances, including the presence of firearms, the accused's agitated state, and the impracticality of waiting for a warrant in a remote location, justified the warrantless entry.

Consequently, the initial entry and the subsequent search incident to arrest were deemed lawful, and the application to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter was dismissed.

The three accused, Ashton Larmond, Carlos Larmond, and Suliman Mohamed, pleaded guilty to various terrorism-related offences and other charges.

Ashton Larmond pleaded guilty to knowingly instructing persons to enhance terrorist activity, Carlos Larmond to attempting to leave Canada for terrorist activity, and Suliman Mohamed to conspiring to enhance a terrorist group's ability.

The Larmond brothers also pleaded guilty to offences committed in custody, including threats to correctional officers and inmates, and unlawful communication.

The court accepted joint sentencing submissions, emphasizing the gravity of "home grown" terrorism and the importance of denunciation and deterrence.

Sebastien Bouchard was found guilty of second-degree murder after a jury re-trial.

This ruling determined the period of parole ineligibility, which is a mandatory component of the life sentence.

The Crown sought 15 years, while the defence sought 10 years.

The court considered the character of the offender, the nature and circumstances of the offence, and jury recommendations, as mandated by section 745.4 of the Criminal Code.

The court also considered the impact of new evidence and the offender's rehabilitation efforts since the first trial.

Ultimately, the court maintained the previous determination of 15 years parole ineligibility, finding that the new facts were not sufficient to derogate from the original reasoning.

The accused brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging unreasonable delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The accused was charged with numerous counts related to firearms use and two counts of attempted murder arising from a drive-by shooting incident on July 23, 2014.

The delay from charge to trial was approximately 23.5 months.

The court rejected the application, finding that while the Crown was responsible for approximately one month of delay in disclosing a sealed Information to Obtain a search warrant, the majority of the delay was attributable to inherent time requirements of the complex case, actions of the accused (including multiple changes of counsel), and institutional scheduling constraints.

The court found the accused had implicitly waived his right to a speedy trial through his conduct and tactical choices.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision determining whether there is sufficient evidence to commit seven accused persons to stand trial on charges of attempted murder, aggravated assault, unlawful confinement, and unlawful entry arising from a brutal attack on the victim in the early morning hours of November 17, 2013.

The Crown's theory is that the attack was undertaken in retaliation for an assault on the brother of one of the accused the previous day.

The court applies the prima facie case standard, examining whether there is evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on each element of each charge.

The decision addresses complex issues regarding the mens rea of attempted murder, the admissibility of hearsay statements, the evaluation of circumstantial identification evidence, and the requirements for party liability.

In a second-degree murder prosecution, the court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of two police interviews with the accused.

The defence conceded voluntariness of the first statement but argued its prejudicial effect outweighed probative value, while challenging the voluntariness of the second statement based on inducements and oppressive interrogation tactics.

Applying the confessions rule and the principles in Oickle and Singh, the court found that the accused’s will was never overborne despite repeated assertions of the right to silence and persistent police questioning.

Both statements were therefore voluntary.

However, the court held that significant portions of the first interview containing police commentary, opinion, and criticism of the accused’s exercise of the right to silence must be edited before being admitted, and the second statement was intended primarily for potential use in cross‑examination rather than for its contents.

The Crown brought a section 540(7) application seeking to admit witness statements as evidence at a preliminary inquiry without requiring the witnesses to testify.

The application involved four key witnesses: Jessica Walker, Samantha Daoust, Mark Sudiacal, and Jason Klein.

The Crown sought to admit their statements under the Criminal Code provision that permits justices to receive evidence that would not otherwise be admissible if the justice considers it credible or trustworthy.

The court admitted the statements of Daoust, Sudiacal, and Klein, as well as the videotaped statements of Walker, but excluded Walker's off-camera statement recorded in police notes.

The decision provides comprehensive guidance on the interpretation and application of section 540(7).

The Crown sought reconsideration of a preliminary inquiry judge's ruling denying a section 540(7) application to file transcripts of witness statements.

The initial judge had rejected the application as inadequately presented and lacking sufficient grounding.

The Crown subsequently renewed the application with a fuller record.

The presiding judge ruled that reconsideration was permissible, finding that the initial ruling was not a final determination on the merits of section 540(7) admissibility but rather a rejection of the application as presented.

The judge held that interlocutory evidentiary rulings can be reconsidered where there is no prejudice to the defence and where the interests of justice support reconsideration, particularly in preliminary inquiries where evidentiary errors cannot be appealed.

The offender was sentenced after a jury convicted him of criminal negligence causing death, impaired driving causing death, and refusing to provide a breath sample following a fatal collision.

The offender had driven the wrong way down a downtown street after consuming alcohol and struck and killed a pedestrian.

The court considered mitigating factors including the offender’s lack of criminal record, strong employment history, remorse, and positive character references, but emphasized aggravating factors such as the fatal consequences of impaired driving, the dangerous manner of driving, and the refusal to provide a breath sample after learning of the death.

The court highlighted appellate authority indicating a rising range of custodial sentences for impaired driving causing death, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence.

A global custodial sentence was imposed along with a lengthy driving prohibition and a DNA order.

During a criminal trial for trafficking in a substance represented as crack cocaine, the court ruled on two voir dires concerning evidentiary admissibility.

First, the Crown sought to admit police Booking Summary Reports and associated mug shots as business records under s.30(1) of the Canada Evidence Act without calling the identification officer who created them.

The court held that the records were administrative in nature and not caught by the investigative-record exclusion in s.30(10), making the mug shots admissible as reliable business records.

Second, the Crown sought to introduce non‑expert recognition evidence from a police officer who claimed to recognize one accused from surveillance photographs based on a brief prior interaction.

Applying the “prior acquaintance/better position” test from appellate authority, the court concluded the officer lacked sufficient familiarity to provide a reliable basis for recognition and excluded that evidence.

The accused applied to exclude statements refusing to provide a breath sample following a fatal collision, arguing that his Charter rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) were breached.

He contended that once the victim died, the legal jeopardy associated with refusal to provide a breath sample increased to life imprisonment and he should have been informed and given a further opportunity to consult counsel.

The Crown argued that the accused had already been advised of his right to counsel, had consulted a lawyer, and that the jeopardy had not meaningfully changed because he was already facing charges carrying life imprisonment.

The court held that the accused understood the general jeopardy he faced and that no discrete change in the investigation triggered a renewed right to counsel.

The application to exclude the refusal evidence was dismissed.

The accused brought a pre-trial application seeking to declare s. 255(3.2) of the Criminal Code unconstitutional under ss. 7, 8, and 11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The issue before the court was whether the constitutional challenge should be decided before the commencement of the jury trial or deferred until after trial.

The court held that constitutional issues should not be determined in a factual vacuum and should only be decided if necessary to resolve the matter.

Because the accused might not ultimately be convicted of the impugned offence, the court concluded that a full factual record following trial was required.

The application to determine the constitutional issue before trial was therefore denied.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder in the death of his wife, who died from severe burn injuries and had suffered extensive prior abuse.

During pre-trial motions, the court ruled on the admissibility of two statements the accused made to police and the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct evidence.

The court found both the December 6 and December 11 statements were voluntary and that the accused's Charter rights were not violated.

The court also ruled that evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct, including evidence that he had shot the victim with a pellet gun 29 times, was highly probative of his animus, motive, and state of mind, and its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The accused brought a motion seeking a change of venue from Pembroke to Ottawa for a jury trial on multiple sexual assault-related charges.

The accused argued that local media coverage in the Pembroke/Petawawa area created a risk that an impartial jury could not be selected and that daily transportation from a distant detention facility would cause hardship and impair trial fairness.

The court held that the media coverage cited by the accused was routine reporting that did not demonstrate prejudicial publicity sufficient to prevent the selection of an impartial jury, particularly given the availability of challenge for cause during jury selection.

With respect to the transportation hardship, the court found that although the conditions described were difficult, they reflected systemic logistical issues and could potentially be mitigated through judicial orders addressing detention conditions during trial.

The accused failed to meet the burden of showing that a change of venue was necessary in the interests of justice.

The accused applied under s. 591(3)(a) of the Criminal Code to sever counts in an indictment relating to two alleged sexual assaults occurring two days apart at the same military base.

The defence argued that trying the counts together would cause reasoning prejudice and interfere with the accused’s intention to testify on one incident but not the other.

The court considered factors including prejudice, factual nexus, complexity of the evidence, multiplicity of proceedings, delay, and the possible admissibility of similar fact evidence.

Although some risk of reasoning prejudice existed, the court held that appropriate jury instructions could mitigate it and that the interests of justice favoured a single trial.

The accused failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that severance was required.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order following a bail hearing where he had been denied release on secondary grounds.

He faced numerous drug trafficking, weapons, and assault-related charges arising from a police investigation into alleged gang-related drug trafficking and a separate violent assault.

The applicant argued there had been a material change in circumstances due to the availability of an additional surety, increased financial pledges, and further evidence regarding a proposed surety’s supervision abilities.

The court held that these factors did not constitute a material change in circumstances capable of reopening the detention decision.

Even if they did, the court found continued detention remained justified due to the substantial likelihood the applicant would reoffend or interfere with the administration of justice.