Court File and Parties
Ontario Court of Justice
Her Majesty the Queen
v.
Clint Bittle
Before: The Honourable Justice V. Clifford
Appearances
R. Thomson – Counsel for the Provincial Crown
L. Goldstein – Counsel for Clint Bittle
Reasons for Sentence
CLIFFORD, J.: (Orally)
On November 28th, 2017 the Court released its Reasons for Judgments in the matter of R. v Bittle, 2018 CanLII 53402 (ON CJ). Mr. Clint Bittle was found guilty after trial of committing three bank robberies while disguised. The counts relating to these offences are as follows: counts 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 13 and 14.
Mr. Bittle was also found guilty after changing his plea of not guilty to guilty mid-trial, having elected to testify on charges of car thefts, one attempted car theft and possessing instruments for the purpose of breaking into cars. The counts related to these offences are counts 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29 and 32.
Mr. Bittle was also found guilty, after changing his plea of not guilty to guilty, of dangerous driving and flight from the police. Counts 25 and 26 on the information are related to these specific offences.
On January 25th, 2018 counsel made their submissions on sentence. These are my reasons for sentence.
Overview of the Crown's Position
Crown counsel argues that a 12-year global sentence is appropriate when taking into account the circumstances of the case and the principle of totality. Crown counsel submits that this 12-year sentence ought to be served consecutive to any sentence that Mr. Bittle is presently completing.
Crown counsel further submits that Mr. Bittle's parole eligibility should be restricted pursuant to Section 743.6 of the Criminal Code of Canada. The Crown also seeks forfeiture of $1,350 of cash currency located inside Mr. Bittle's premises at the Ste. Anne's Halfway House.
The Crown also seeks a driving prohibition pursuant to Section 259(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada for a period of 15 years. And the Crown further seeks a DNA order pursuant to Section 487.04 and a weapons prohibition for life pursuant to Section 109 of the Criminal Code of Canada.
Overview of the Defence Position
The defence argues that in light of the fact that Mr. Bittle, who is now 39 years old and has a warrant expiry date for his previous sentences of September 12, 2018, that an appropriate sentence for the Court to impose would be in the range of seven to nine years consecutive to any sentence he is presently serving.
The defence did not advance a position with respect to the Crown's application pursuant to Section 743.6 of the Criminal Code of Canada. And when I say did not advance a position, did not strenuously oppose the application but more or less left it in the Court's hands.
There was no real opposition advanced by the defence as well with respect to the other corollary orders suggested by Crown counsel.
Principles of Sentencing
I turn now to the principles of sentencing.
The fundamental purpose of sentencing is set out in Section 718 of the Criminal Code of Canada. It is to protect society and to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing sanctions that have one or more of the six following objectives:
(a) To denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or the community that was caused by the unlawful conduct;
(b) To deter the offender and others from committing offences;
(c) To separate offenders from society where necessary;
(d) To assist in the rehabilitation of offenders;
(e) To provide reparations for harm done to the victims or the community; and,
(f) To promote a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims or the community.
Any sentence that is imposed must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. And a sentence must also be similar to those imposed on similar offenders who have committed similar offences. A sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances related to the offence or the offender.
As I have indicated, when looking at the sentencing principles in the Criminal Code I am bound to take into consideration both the aggravating and the mitigating factors. In looking at the factors that are present, I must consider the impact that an offence had on a victim, considering how it might have impacted them emotionally. I also have to consider whether an offence is committed while an accused is on a conditional sentence or a statutory release.
When looking at the mitigating factors, in other words, the mitigating factors as related to the offence or the offender, I need to look essentially at the life story of the accused person. What is there that can assist the Court in understanding what drives the accused, what underlying issues might exist with respect to the accused's background and what is the accused doing or what is the accused capable of doing in order to address these issues?
When looking at the mitigating factors I take into consideration the submissions of counsel as well as the materials that were filed by Crown counsel which give some background information to the Court that will contextualize Mr. Bittle's background going back to about 1995. I also take into consideration when looking at mitigating factors whether there is genuine remorse, acceptance of responsibility for what has occurred on the part of the offender.
The Totality Principle
With respect to the totality principle in sentencing, which is an issue that figures into the context of this sentencing hearing, I rely on the case of R. v. Johnson, 2012 ONCA 339 , 2012 O.J. No. 2255 ONCA.
The Court of Appeal in Johnson at paragraphs 15 through 25 expands on the principle of totality. In explaining the totality principle, I could do no better than to quote paragraphs 15 through 25, and I quote them as follows:
A foundational principle of Canadian sentencing regime is the principle of proportionality: "[a] sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender: Criminal Code, Section 718.1. This principle is based upon the fundamental notion that the punishment must fit the crime and that the degree of punishment must reflect the gravity of the offence and the moral blameworthiness of the offender. Otherwise, society will have no confidence in the law or the fairness and rationality of the legal systems: see R. v. B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at p. 533.
An important component of the principle of proportionality is the principle of totality, which is embedded in Section 718.2 (c) of the Criminal Code [which reads as follows]:
A court that imposes a sentence will take into consideration the following principles:
(c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh.
In R. v. M.(C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 42, Chief Justice Lamer explained the rationale underlying the totality principles and its nexus with proportionality:
And I quote:
In the context of consecutive sentences, this general principle of proportionality expresses itself through the more particular form of the "totality principle". The totality principle, in short, requires a sentencing judge who orders an offender to serve consecutive sentences for multiple offences to ensure that the cumulative sentence does not exceed the overall culpability of the offender. As D.A. Thomas describes the principle in Principles of Sentencing (2nd ed. 1979), at page 56:
The effect of the totality principle is to require a sentencer who has passed a series of sentences, each properly calculated in relation to the offence for which it is imposed and each properly made consecutive in accordance with the principles governing consecutive sentences, to review the aggregate sentence and consider whether the aggregate sentence is "just and appropriate".
Clayton Ruby articulates the principle in the following terms in his treatise, Sentencing, [4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994)], at pp. 44-45:
The purpose is to ensure that a series of sentences, each properly imposed in relation to the offence to which it relates, is aggregate "just and appropriate". A cumulative sentence may offend the totality principle if the aggregate sentence is substantially above the normal level of a sentence for the most serious of the individual offences involved, or if its effect is to impose on the offender "a crushing sentence" not in keeping with his record and prospects.
In short, a combined sentence must not be unduly long or harsh in the sense that its impact simply exceeds the gravity of the offences in question or the overall culpability of the offender. The overall length of the custodial period imposed must still relate to and reflect the variety of sentencing goals, including denunciation, deterrence (specific and general), rehabilitation, [and] the need to separate offenders from society where necessary, and the general imperative of promoting respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society. In this regard, the authorities recognize that where the ultimate effect of the combined sentence is the deprive the offender of any hope of release or rehabilitation, the functional value of these sentencing principles meets the point of diminishing returns. See R. v. C. (J.A.) (1995), 26 O.R. (3d) 462 (C.A.).
This point was reinforced by Lamer C.J. in M.(C.A.), at paragraph 74.
There are at least two types of situation where the principle of totality in the context of consecutive sentences may arise. The first is where a single judge must deal with a series of offences, some of which require the imposition of the consecutive sentences having regard to the criteria for such sentences. A second - which is the case here - concerns a situation where a sentencing judge must impose a fit sentence on an offender convicted of one or more offences where that offender is at the same time serving the remainder of a sentence for a previous conviction or convictions.
Section 718.2 (c) of the Criminal Code draws no distinction between these two types of scenario, and this Court and others have recognized that the totality principle applies where the offender is serving the remainder of a previous sentence. R. v. Cathcart, [1976] O.J. No. 1225 (C.A.); R. v. Gorham (1987), 22 O.A.C. 237; R. v. Bond, [2005] O.J. No. 108 (C.A.); R. v. Reid, [2003] O.J. No. 3255 (C.A.); R. v. Evans (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2nd) 91 (C.A.); R. v. Bueger (1994), 48 B.C.A.C. 266; R. v. Saran (1996), 113 Man. R. (2nd) 205 (C.A.); R. v. Parry, 2012 ONCA 171, 2012 O.J. No. 1209.
Although they are codified, the principles of proportionality and totality are common law concepts and the approach outline above is consistent with the premises underlying those concepts, as expressed in M.(C.A.). If sentences are unduly harsh and excessive, confidence in the fairness and rationality of the sentencing process is lost. See Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, at page 533 - and where consecutive sentences are unduly harsh and excessive, the overall length of incarceration may work against the attainment of the various goals of sentencing. This is particularly so where, as here, the combined effect of the sentences threatens to encroach upon - or exceed - the offender's reasonable life expectancy.
And, again, this is coming from the case of R. v. Johnson.
Chief Justice Lamer underlined this rationale, at paragraph 74 of M.(CA):
However, in the process of determining a just and appropriate fixed-term sentence of imprisonment, the sentencing judge should be mindful of the age of the offender in applying the relevant principles of sentencing. After a certain point, the utilitarian and normative goals of sentencing will eventually begin to exhaust themselves once a contemplated sentence starts to surpass any reasonable estimation of the offender's remaining natural life span. Accordingly, in exercising his or her specialized discretion under the Code, a sentencing judge should generally refrain from imposing a fixed-term sentence which so greatly exceeds an offender's expected remaining lifespan that the traditional goals of sentencing, even general deterrence and denunciation, have all but depleted their functional value. With that consideration in mind, the governing principle remains the same: Canadian courts enjoy a broad discretion in imposing numerical sentences for single or multiple offences, subject only to the broad statutory parameters of the Code and the fundamental principle of our criminal law that global sentences [should] be "just and appropriate".
The potential for unduly harsh sentences to frustrate the goals of the process exists whether the offender is incarcerated for an excessive period of time because of one sentence or a series of sentences imposed by the same judge, on the one hand, or because of the combined effect of a new sentence imposed by a subsequent judge and the remainder of an existing sentence.
At the same time, there is an additional level of concern that comes into play where a subsequent sentence is imposed on top of a remainder of an existing one, and, as a result, the totality principle has a somewhat tempered effect in such circumstances, in my view. The underlying rationale of the sentencing regime supports this notion, too.
The system must be seen to be fair and rational - both to the offender and the community - and its integrity must be preserved. Just as a sentence cannot be unduly harsh and excessive, neither can it be overly lenient or unresponsive to other purposes and principles that underpin the sentencing regime - denunciation, deterrence, the promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgement of harm done to victims and the community, and the protection of the public: Criminal Code, Section 718.
In this sense, an offender such as the appellant ought not to be seen as reaping [the] benefits from his previous criminal misconduct. As the Court observed in Gorham:
It was argued that, in its totality, the sentence was too severe and crushing. In our view the principle of totality must have a substantially reduced effect upon a sentence where part of the total term is based on a remanet. Neither one who is unlawfully at large nor one who is at liberty on mandatory supervision should be entitled to benefit from the remanet which must be served if a new offence is committed.
I read this not as an indication that the principle of totality has only minimal application in situations where the offender is serving the remainder of an existing sentence. The Court said only that the principle will have "a substantially reduced effect" in such circumstances. I take the Court to be indicating, rather, that there are other considerations regarding the need to protect the integrity of the sentencing process - public "confidence in the fairness and rationality of the system" in the words of Wilson J. in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act – that must be taken into account in such circumstances. This need to protect the integrity of the sentencing process, and the overall purposes and goals of sentencing, are to be balanced against the recognition that there will be situations where, globally speaking, a combined sentence will simply be too harsh and excessive.
In Sentencing: The Practitioner's Guide, the authors suggests that "the court will balance the length of the unexpired term of the offender's sentence against the aggravating effect of the commission of an offence while on parole [or other form of temporary release]": I agree to the extent that, at the end of the day, the subsequent sentencing judge will determine how much weight to give to the existing remaining sentence by assessing whether the length of the proposed sentence plus the existing sentence will result in a "just and appropriate" disposition that reflects as aptly as possible the relevant principles and goals of sentencing in the circumstances.
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
I turn now to the aggravating and mitigating factors that are present.
Aggravating Factors
With respect to the aggravating factors, Mr. Bittle has a lengthy criminal record. It starts in 1995, and it appears that Mr. Bittle has registered Criminal Code convictions in virtually every year since then, except for the times that he has been incarcerated.
In 2010, Mr. Bittle received a sentence of seven years for robbery in disguise with intent and attempted robbery. In 2005, Mr. Bittle received a six-year sentence for robbery in disguise with intent. In 2004, Mr. Bittle received a two-year sentence on four robbery charges.
Indeed, Mr. Bittle was on statutory release when he committed the offences for which he is now before this Court. Moreover, this is not the first time he was a statutory release violator.
Mr. Bittle's criminal record and his Corrections Services of Canada criminal profile report reveal that he has also violated his statutory release conditions in 2003, 2005 and 2009. Mr. Bittle's current warrant expiry date is September 12th of 2018.
When considering the impact of Mr. Bittle's offences and the impact they've had particularly on the victims of his conduct, I refer to the victim impact statements of Mary Awada, Jeannette Brunet, Robert Long, Tanya Northcotte and Costa Stavrianis. With the exception of Mr. Stavrianis, the other above-noted individuals have clearly been emotionally impacted by Mr. Bittle's actions.
Mr. Bittle's Correctional Service of Canada criminal profile report paints a very discouraging picture at the moment. One hopes that that will change in the future. Mr. Bittle's response to supervision within the Federal corrections system has been dismal, to say the least. The picture is one of recidivism and reincarceration. It is unfortunately a picture of a person who is spending their life in jail.
Finally, on the aggravating factors to be considered, Mr. Bittle planned and executed the car thefts and robberies whilst on statutory release from prison, after serving a lengthy sentence for the very same offences.
Mitigating Factors
Turning now to the mitigating factors.
Mr. Bittle, after hearing the Crown's case and having elected to testify, took responsibility for some of the offences that he has been found guilty of. I have taken this into account. Although it is qualified to a certain extent by the overall circumstances of the case and the timing of his decision to accept some responsibility.
I also take into consideration that Mr. Bittle is only 39 years old. Not necessarily young, but neither is Mr. Bittle in the autumn of his life. And one hopes that he can, through self-reflection and modification of his behaviour, find a way to eventually live a crime-free and pro-social existence. One must not give up hope that this objective of sentencing may perhaps one day be met in Mr. Bittle's case.
I also consider Mr. Bittle's comments that he indicated during the sentencing submissions that he was sorry to everyone that was involved and that he understands the harm he had caused and that he is sorry for that. Mr. Bittle maintained his innocence on the robbery and related accounts. The absence of his remorse or acceptance of responsibility on those counts, in light of the overall circumstances, is not seen by the Court as an aggravating factor on sentence.
I also take into consideration the comments that are present in the Corrections of Canada criminal profile report which explain to some degree Mr. Bittle's background, some of the hardships that he has endured and the difficulties that he has had with respect to addiction and some of the motivation behind the crimes that he has committed in the past.
Jurisprudence
Turning now to jurisprudence.
I have considered the cases that were provided by counsel and I carefully considered the helpful submissions of both counsel. This is a scenario where the cases that were provided by Crown counsel were equally relied on by both the defence and the Crown.
The range of sentences on the bank robbery cases in the Crown's book of authorities spans approximately 9 to 16 years. What is viewed as aggravating in each of these cases is the accused's backgrounds and the fact that some of the accused in those cases were on statutory release when they committed their offences.
Conclusion
When applying the principles of sentencing to the circumstances of Mr. Bittle's case, and bearing in mind that whatever sentence is imposed will be consecutive to the remainder of his current sentence, I have concluded that a global sentence of 10 years is appropriate, which of course will be served consecutive to any sentence that he is serving the remainder of at this point.
The breakdown will be as follows, and my intent is to keep it as simple as possible:
With respect to the robbery and the related offences (counts 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 13 and 14), the sentence imposed will be that of 8 and a half years. The rationale here is that Mr. Bittle on his last robbery and related offences received sentences of seven years. Before that, the sentence imposed was six years. On the last two occasions we see an increase of one year, it had little impact apparently on Mr. Bittle. An increased sentence is called for. And when I take into consideration all of the principles of sentencing that were referred to above, I have concluded that a sentence of eight and half years on the robbery and related offences is warranted.
With respect to the vehicle offences (counts 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29 and 32), the possessions, the thefts, tools, et cetera, I consider here that the sentence imposed here on those counts should be consecutive. If I were to impose consecutive sentences on each of the so many of those offences, it would result in an unduly harsh or excessive sentence. There is no doubt about that, there are so many counts that relate to these types of vehicle related offences. In the final analysis, after carefully considering the submissions of counsel, I have determined that a sentence of one year should be imposed on each of those counts, all to be served concurrently with one another, but consecutive to the eight and a half years. So that is one-year consecutive on the eight and a half which puts the total up to nine and a half.
That leaves the remaining vehicle operation offences (counts 25 and 26), and by those offences I mean the dangerous operation and the flight. In my view, a sentence of six months is appropriate on those counts. The six months will be concurrent to one another but consecutive to the nine and a half, which brings us up to a total global sentence of 10 years.
Section 743.6 Application - Parole Eligibility Restriction
With respect to the application pursuant to Section 743.6 of the Criminal Code of Canada, under 743.6(1) under the Criminal Code it reads as follows:
Notwithstanding subsection 120(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act where an offender receives on or after November 1st, 1992 a sentence of imprisonment of two years or more, including a sentence of imprisonment for life imposed otherwise than as a minimum punishment, on a conviction for an offence set out in Schedules 1 and 2 to that Act, that was prosecuted by way of indictment the Court may, if satisfied, having regard to the circumstances of the commission of the offence and the character and the circumstance of the offender, that the expression of society's denunciation of the offence or the objective of specific or general deterrence so requires, order that the portion of the sentence that must be served before the offender may be released on full parole is one half of the sentence or 10 years, whichever is less.
In assessing the Crown's application pursuant to Section 743.6, I am guided by the Supreme Court judgment in R. v. Zinck, 2003 SCC 6 , [2003] 1 S.C.R. 41, and I refer to paragraph 32 and 33 of that decision as follows:
The application of Section 743.6 will probably never be an easy task for judges. Sentencing remains a heavy responsibility for trial and appellate judges throughout Canada. The exercise of the power to delay parole adds to the difficulties of this task. With a proper understanding of the nature of the measure, it is to be hoped that its application will be less problematic.
Paragraph 33:
As mentioned above, courts must perform a double weighing exercise. First, they must evaluate the facts of the case in light of the factors set out in Section 718 of the Code in order to impose an appropriate sentence. Then, they must review the same facts primarily in the perspective of the requirements of deterrence and denunciation, which are given priority at this stage under Section 743.6(2). The decision to delay parole remains out of the ordinary but may and should be taken if after proper weighing of all factors it appears to be required in order to impose a form of punishment which is completely appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The decision may be made, for example, if after due consideration of all the relevant facts, principles and factors at the first stage, it appears at the second stage that the length of the jail term would not satisfy the imperatives of denunciation and deterrence. This two-stage process however does not require a special and distinct hearing. It should be viewed as one sentencing process where the issues of procedural fairness will have to be carefully considered.
Section 120 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act sets out the normal period of parole eligibility which in most circumstances will be one-third of the sentence or seven years, whichever is the lesser.
I am aware that delayed parole is a decision that remains out of the ordinary and must be used in a manner that is fair to Mr. Bittle. Yet, the circumstances of this case, coupled with Mr. Bittle's past conduct, leads me to the conclusion that Mr. Bittle's parole eligibility should be delayed until he has served 50 percent of the eight-and-a-half-year sentence that I have noted above on the robbery charge.
The key factors that drive my decision with respect to the restriction of his parole on 50 percent of the eight-and-a-half-year sentence are of course Mr. Bittle's criminal record and the fact that he has shown a pattern of recommitting while on parole. Looking at this factor in the sentencing, as well as all of the other factors from the perspective of denunciation, deterrence and the need to separate Mr. Bittle from society, I am satisfied that an order should be made restricting his parole eligibility on the robbery charge.
One might ask why is it not being restricted on the totality of the sentence, why is it not being restricted on the 10 years, the reason for that is that I took into consideration the decision in R. v. Smith (2008), 2008 SKCA 20 , 232 C.C.C. (3d) 176 from the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal where in that case the Court held that:
Where all of the offences qualify for an order deferring full parole until half of the sentence has been served, it is permissible to order the parole eligibility be deferred until one-half of the global sentence has been served.
In this case, when I reviewed Section 743 of the Criminal Code of Canada I noted, Mr. Bittle, looking at Section 743.6 and the schedules attached to that, sir, that the only charge or charges that are eligible for consideration under Section 743.6 are the robbery charges. So, bearing that in mind, I don't think it would be a proper sentence if I were to impose a 50 percent restriction on the 10 years. So the parole eligibility will be restricted only on the eight and a half year sentence. So, that would leave you with four years and three months before you would be eligible for parole on the robbery.
Now, Mr. Goldstein made a very valid point in his submissions that, given your past, your parole considerations might not be the same as an individual who is going through the system for the first time. All of which to say, and if I can borrow Mr. Goldstein's words, and I don't mean to misquote you Mr. Goldstein, that much of the analysis I just went through might unfortunately for you, I hope I am wrong, but it might unfortunately for you be academic, Mr. Bittle.
CLINT BITTLE: I'll probably serve about two-thirds...
THE COURT: Yes.
CLINT BITTLE: ...if not the whole sentence.
THE COURT: Yes. So, but those are my reasons on the application. I had to consider it and I wanted to consider it properly.
Ancillary Orders
Now, with respect to the money that is being forfeited, I have considered the overall circumstances, the cash that was located in your premises will be forfeited.
I have considered the considerations with respect to the DNA. I know your DNA has been taken at least once in the past. I will make the order, it is unlikely that they will take it again.
Weapons prohibition for life will be ordered as well pursuant to Section 109.
With respect to the licence prohibition, I have considered the overall circumstances. I have imposed a global sentence of 10 years. It is my view that if you serve two-thirds of that, you are not going to be driving during whatever time you are in custody.
So, if worst case scenario, you were in for another 10 years say, I know that 10 years is on top of what you have got to serve now until September of 2018. So your net sentence from this point, this day going forward is greater than 10 years, it is my view sir that when I look at how much time you may spend in custody that I am not in agreement with the Crown that 15 years is warranted, I think 13 years is warranted for a driving prohibition.
The reason for that is because there is a use of vehicle in the crime that was committed and you had demonstrated a willingness to try to use the vehicle to flee and clearly, others were put at risk, based on the evidence that – that I heard and that was agreed to. That is the restriction on your driving prohibition.
Victim Fine Surcharge
Now, the only other issue that we need to deal with, counsel, are the victim fine surcharge. And, nobody has made any submission on that and I don't have any discretion, Mr. Bittle, on the victim fine surcharge, I have to impose what – so, everything on the information is proceeded by way of indictment, right?
CLERK REGISTRAR: It's $5,600, Your Honour, total.
THE COURT: Submissions on time.
MR. GOLDSTEIN: I – I am tempted to launch into something of a speech on the absurdity and potential harm of Mr. Bittle getting out of custody in potentially 10 years, but certainly no less than – than 7, and then coming out and the first thing he has to do is pay $5,600. And, the reality is that without a trade and without the ability to just bank that, that actually increases the likelihood of recidivism. But I am not going to launch into that. Instead I am just going to ask for 15 years to pay this...
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. GOLDSTEIN: ...and hope that...
THE COURT: I would like to approach it....
MR. GOLDSTEIN: ...the law changes in the middle.
THE COURT: Mr. Bittle, I would like to approach the issue of the victim fine surcharge with some degree of optimism. I have considered it as well in formulating a sentence. I know there is a lot to go through in the next decade, one hopes that you will be released as soon as possible, but pursuant to the sentence that you have to serve and the recalculation and of course any restrictions that are placed on your parole. But you are 39 years old, Mr. Bittle, and when I said in my reasons for sentence that one hopes that through the process of self-reflection, getting a little older, modifying your behaviour, that you can change things.
So, I approached the victim fine surcharge with some degree of optimism that if I give you enough time that you will actually be able to come out, work and pay it. I think if I gave you 20 years, sir, that that might be realistic. It is going to take you maybe a decade to get on your feet and then you will have $5,000 to spread over 10 years. And if you think about working....
CLINT BITTLE: What about retirement? Like, if I'm working when I get out for the next 10 years, that's probably all I'll have left and...
THE COURT: Yes.
CLINT BITTLE: ...and make it work.
THE COURT: Yes.
CLINT BITTLE: And I pay 5,000 how do I save for retirement, you know?
THE COURT: I know it is difficult. You do make a point there Mr. Bittle, I will grant 22 years to pay the victim fine surcharge. That is one of the lengthiest terms that has been likely granted and really couldn't see myself extending you much more time than that. But, please do this Mr. Bittle.
Please approach this from some degree of optimism.
I have not given up on you in any way, shape or form. I read what was written about you in the Corrections Canada profile, I read the bad parts and I read the parts that explained and put things in context for you. Don't give up on yourself, Mr. Bittle, and look at....
CLINT BITTLE: I'll try.
THE COURT: Yes. Please do. And, consider carefully what will happen when you are released.
I have no doubt that if you become pro-social and you can put the past behind you that you will make some money, you will pay your victim fine surcharges and you will enjoy the rest of your life and have some retirement and that is all we all hope for.
CLINT BITTLE: Yeah.
THE COURT: There is a certain commonality between everybody in this room, sir. So, I do hope that you can have those things in your life, and I do wish you well as you serve out your sentence, sir.
CLINT BITTLE: Thanks.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel.
Anything else from either perspective?
MR. THOMSON: No, Your Honour.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
MATTER COMPLETED
Released: February 26, 2018 Clifford, J.