Paul F. Lalonde

Following convictions for drug trafficking, criminal organization offences, possession of proceeds of crime, and related offences, the Crown applied under s. 462.37 of the Criminal Code for forfeiture of assets and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The court applied the reverse onus provisions for criminal organization offences and accepted forensic accounting evidence showing substantial unexplained wealth.

Certain assets were found to be proceeds of crime or partly derived from such proceeds, including cash seized from a residence, equity from a property sale, a vehicle, and unexplained deposits.

The court exempted a condominium claimed by a third party where evidence established it had been purchased using inherited funds.

Significant fines in lieu of forfeiture were imposed where assets were no longer available.

Following a forfeiture hearing, defence counsel requested the release of additional funds from seized assets to pay legal fees.

The court had previously authorized the release of $80,000 from the seized funds.

In a supplementary order correcting an inadvertent omission in the earlier decision, the court refused the request for additional funds.

The court cited the accused’s lack of cooperation and the costs associated with the prosecution as reasons not to release further assets.

The father brought a motion seeking an order compelling the Attorney General to provide state-funded counsel for a child custody trial arising in the context of child protection proceedings.

Applying the test from New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), the court considered whether a refusal of counsel would infringe the applicant’s section 7 Charter rights, whether counsel was necessary for a fair hearing, whether legal aid had been refused after exhaustion of appeals, and whether the applicant lacked the financial means to retain counsel.

The court found the applicant failed to demonstrate complexity requiring counsel, had previously lost his legal aid certificate due to nondisclosure of assets, and had not provided credible evidence of financial hardship.

The court further found the applicant capable of representing himself and not an indigent litigant.

The request for state-funded counsel was dismissed.

The applicant sought a declaration that a contingency fee agreement with her former lawyer was unenforceable because it permitted the lawyer to charge a percentage on costs recovered through settlement.

The agreement calculated the lawyer’s contingency fee on the entire settlement amount, including costs and disbursements, without obtaining prior judicial approval as required by s. 28.1(8) of the Solicitors Act.

The court held that including costs in a contingency fee agreement without judicial approval constitutes a fundamental breach of the statutory scheme.

Because the agreement contravened s. 28.1(8) and was not approved as required by s. 28.1(9), it was unenforceable.

The lawyer was ordered to repay the portion of the fee calculated on costs, while the broader question of fee reasonableness was left to the trial judge in the related tort action.

The accused applied to exclude statements refusing to provide a breath sample following a fatal collision, arguing that his Charter rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) were breached.

He contended that once the victim died, the legal jeopardy associated with refusal to provide a breath sample increased to life imprisonment and he should have been informed and given a further opportunity to consult counsel.

The Crown argued that the accused had already been advised of his right to counsel, had consulted a lawyer, and that the jeopardy had not meaningfully changed because he was already facing charges carrying life imprisonment.

The court held that the accused understood the general jeopardy he faced and that no discrete change in the investigation triggered a renewed right to counsel.

The application to exclude the refusal evidence was dismissed.

The accused brought a pre-trial application seeking to declare s. 255(3.2) of the Criminal Code unconstitutional under ss. 7, 8, and 11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The issue before the court was whether the constitutional challenge should be decided before the commencement of the jury trial or deferred until after trial.

The court held that constitutional issues should not be determined in a factual vacuum and should only be decided if necessary to resolve the matter.

Because the accused might not ultimately be convicted of the impugned offence, the court concluded that a full factual record following trial was required.

The application to determine the constitutional issue before trial was therefore denied.

The applicant, charged with drug offences, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized from his condominium unit.

Prior to obtaining a search warrant, police officers entered the common areas and storage locker area of the applicant's condominium building without permission to gather information.

The court found that the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas and storage units, and that the warrantless police entry constituted an unreasonable search under s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the police acted in bad faith by ignoring the Trespass to Property Act, and that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The evidence was excluded.

The accused faced a 60-count indictment following 'Project A-Wire', an RCMP investigation into drug trafficking, weapons, proceeds of crime, extortion, and criminal interest rates.

The Crown relied heavily on intercepted communications, surveillance, and physical evidence seized from multiple locations, including a stash apartment, a bar, and the accused's residence.

The court found the accused guilty of conspiring to traffic in cocaine, marijuana, and hashish, and of leading a criminal organization.

The accused was also convicted of possessing prohibited and restricted firearms, possessing proceeds of crime, extortion, and entering into agreements to receive interest at a criminal rate.

The accused was acquitted of receiving payments at a criminal interest rate and one count of extortion.

The court determined costs following civil proceedings between the parties.

On consent, the plaintiffs were ordered to pay the defendant $107,998.61 in legal fees inclusive of GST and HST.

The court also ordered payment of disbursements in accordance with the defendant’s Bill of Costs, subject to reductions required under Tariff A of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Hotel expenses were reduced to conform with Tariff A s. 21(3), and witnesses’ travel and parking expenses were ordered recalculated under Tariff A s. 21(2)(c), with all other disbursements approved.

Former shareholders of a technology company sought payment of earn‑out amounts under a Share Purchase Agreement following the purchaser’s acquisition of their company.

They argued that profits from a large engineering project should have been included in the calculation of EBIAT for purposes of triggering the earn‑out thresholds and that revenue had been improperly deferred.

The court held that the project did not meet the contractual requirements for inclusion because the earnings were not attributable exclusively to design services using the acquired company’s unique intellectual property and the project had not been awarded specifically due to that IP.

The court also preferred the defendant’s accounting evidence and found no improper revenue deferral affecting the threshold calculations.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs failed to establish entitlement to the earn‑out payment.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion alleging breaches of s. 8 of the Charter arising from a warrantless search of his iPhone by CBSA officers at an airport upon re‑entry into Canada.

The defence sought exclusion of the phone contents, subsequent wiretap authorizations, and evidence obtained through search warrants, arguing the border search was a pretext for a police investigation and that the authorizations lacked investigative necessity.

The court held that a cell phone constitutes “goods” under the Customs Act and that CBSA officers are authorized to conduct routine border searches of such goods without prior grounds.

The search was characterized as a first‑category routine border search under R. v. Simmons and therefore reasonable.

Even if a breach had occurred, exclusion under s. 24(2) was not warranted because the state conduct was not serious and the evidence was central to the prosecution.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death after turning left across the path of an oncoming motorcycle at a controlled intersection, resulting in the motorcyclist’s death.

The Crown argued that the accused’s failure to enter the designated left-turn lane, failure to signal, and unsafe left turn constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The defence conceded the actus reus but argued that the evidence did not establish the fault element required for criminal liability and that the incident reflected, at most, momentary negligence.

The court applied the modified objective test for penal negligence as articulated in leading Supreme Court jurisprudence.

Finding insufficient evidence regarding the motorcycle’s speed, position, braking, and the accused’s awareness of risk, the court concluded the Crown had not proven a marked departure beyond a reasonable doubt.

A motion and cross‑motion addressed whether a parent must contribute child support for an adult child pursuing post‑secondary education.

The respondent argued the adult child had withdrawn from parental control and squandered prior educational opportunities, while also asserting inability to pay.

The court found the adult child had not withdrawn from parental control and was enrolled in a serious course of studies.

Applying principles from the Family Law Act and the Child Support Guidelines, the court ordered ongoing support based on the respondent’s income together with contributions from the applicant and the child.

Conditions were imposed requiring proof of attendance, disclosure of income and educational progress.

The applicant sought a declaration to dissolve a partnership with the respondent and an accounting of assets, primarily an Ottawa taxi plate.

The parties had a five-year partnership agreement that expired, but the respondent continued to use the taxi plate exclusively.

The court found it just and equitable to dissolve the partnership under the Partnership Act and directed a reference to a Master to supervise the sale of the taxi plate and conduct an accounting.

The Crown appealed an order staying criminal proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay.

The lower court had found that the elapsed time between charge and trial violated the accused’s right to be tried within a reasonable time.

Applying the framework from Morin and related jurisprudence, the appeal judge reassessed the allocation of delay, finding that certain periods—including intake procedures and delay following a mistrial—were neutral and not attributable to the Crown.

After deducting these neutral periods, the institutional delay fell within acceptable guidelines.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

In a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, all parties agreed the children remained in need of protection due to parental incapacity and sought a permanent care plan under s. 57.1.

Competing plans proposed placement with maternal grandparents, with the paternal grandmother, or maintenance of split placements.

After reviewing extensive evidence on caregiving capacity, family conflict, cultural and religious issues, and the children’s best interests, the court ordered shared legal custody between the maternal grandparents and the paternal grandmother on an alternating weekly schedule.

The court also set terms for religious holidays, birthday exchanges, and transition arrangements.