Paul F. Lalonde

In a criminal prosecution involving multiple sexual offence allegations against a teacher, the defence sought to admit the accused’s out-of-court statements to police as evidence of his reaction to the accusations pursuant to the exception recognized in R. v. Edgar.

The court considered whether the statements qualified as spontaneous prior consistent statements capable of admission for credibility purposes.

Applying appellate authority, the court held that the spontaneity requirement was not met where the accused had significant time to reflect, consult others, receive legal advice, and prepare a written account before speaking to police.

Because the statements were not made upon first confrontation with the allegation and were preceded by hours of deliberation, they could not be admitted under the Edgar exception.

The Crown brought a similar fact application in a criminal trial involving allegations that an elementary school teacher sexually touched several young students.

The Crown sought to have the testimony of certain complainants admitted as circumstantial evidence supporting the allegations of other complainants.

Applying the framework from R. v. Handy, the court considered whether the proposed evidence had sufficient probative value to outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The court found that many of the alleged incidents were only generically similar and therefore did not meet the threshold for admissibility.

However, evidence of three specific incidents involving classroom demonstrations and physical manipulation of students was sufficiently similar and reliable to be admitted as similar fact evidence.

The accused applied for a Rowbotham order seeking state-funded counsel after Legal Aid funding and subsequent appeals were denied.

The charges included more than 75 offences involving drug trafficking, weapons, and proceeds of crime, and the Crown anticipated a lengthy and complex trial.

While the court accepted that the charges were serious and complex and that Legal Aid had been refused, it found the accused failed to establish financial indigence.

The accused had not exhausted available avenues to obtain counsel, including applying for the release of seized assets under s. 462.34(4) of the Criminal Code, and failed to provide full disclosure regarding substantial precious metals purchases exceeding $134,000.

The court concluded that the accused had not demonstrated inability to fund counsel privately and dismissed the Rowbotham application.

Les demandeurs alléguaient que les défendeurs avaient empiété sur leur terrain et détruit des arbres et arbustes lors du creusage d’un fossé de drainage, réclamant des dommages-intérêts pour remplacement des arbres, perte de revenus d’érablière et dommages punitifs.

Le tribunal a conclu qu’un consentement oral avait été donné aux défendeurs pour nettoyer le fossé et semer sur une bande de terrain, mais que les défendeurs avaient agi avec négligence en élargissant excessivement le fossé et en arrachant inutilement de la végétation.

Les demandes pour empiétement, dommages punitifs et perte de revenus de sirop d’érable ont été rejetées.

Le tribunal a accordé des dommages limités pour la perte d’arbres et les coûts de replantation.

Les experts arboriculteurs présentés par les parties ont été jugés peu utiles pour établir précisément la valeur des dommages.

During a criminal trial for robbery, the court conducted a blended voir dire to determine whether statements made by the accused during a police video interview were voluntary and admissible.

The defence argued that the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of Charter rights under ss. 7, 10(a), and 10(b), including the right to remain silent and the right to counsel.

The court found that the accused had been informed of the charges, had consulted counsel, and confirmed satisfaction with that advice before the interview.

The court concluded that the accused spoke with a free and operating mind and that the police conduct did not amount to improper persistence or coercion.

The statements were ruled voluntary and admitted into evidence.

The accused was charged with attempted robbery of a bus pass and robbery of money arising from a school incident in which two younger students were led into a bathroom by a group of older students and intimidated.

The Crown alleged the accused was a party to the offences under s. 21 of the Criminal Code by aiding and abetting the principal offender.

The court considered witness testimony, surveillance stills, and the accused’s voluntary police interview admitting participation and sharing in the proceeds.

The court rejected the accused’s explanation that he was merely present and found that he knowingly participated in a coordinated intimidation designed to obtain money.

The accused was found guilty of both attempted theft and robbery as a party to the offences.

Following a successful application declaring a contingency fee agreement void and ordering repayment of funds, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful party sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $22,000.

The court held that costs awards must reflect a fair and reasonable contribution rather than an exact reimbursement of actual legal fees and considered the expectations of the unsuccessful party under r. 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finding the claimed hourly rate, allocation of discovery time, and counsel fee for a half‑day motion excessive, the court reduced the award and fixed costs at $10,000 plus HST.

Two equal shareholder brothers in a family construction group became deadlocked after one withdrew from active management due to illness and sought to realize the value of his shares.

The court found a fundamental and irreparable deadlock in the management of the corporations under the oppression and winding‑up provisions of corporate statutes.

Competing valuation reports were rejected in part, with the court determining fair value by adjusting one report and rejecting assumptions that the operating company lacked viability.

The court ordered a forced buy‑out requiring the remaining shareholder to purchase the other’s shares at a court‑determined fair value.

Payment terms were structured to balance the retiring shareholder’s need for compensation with the company’s operational viability.

Following convictions for drug trafficking, criminal organization offences, possession of proceeds of crime, and related offences, the Crown applied under s. 462.37 of the Criminal Code for forfeiture of assets and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The court applied the reverse onus provisions for criminal organization offences and accepted forensic accounting evidence showing substantial unexplained wealth.

Certain assets were found to be proceeds of crime or partly derived from such proceeds, including cash seized from a residence, equity from a property sale, a vehicle, and unexplained deposits.

The court exempted a condominium claimed by a third party where evidence established it had been purchased using inherited funds.

Significant fines in lieu of forfeiture were imposed where assets were no longer available.

Following a forfeiture hearing, defence counsel requested the release of additional funds from seized assets to pay legal fees.

The court had previously authorized the release of $80,000 from the seized funds.

In a supplementary order correcting an inadvertent omission in the earlier decision, the court refused the request for additional funds.

The court cited the accused’s lack of cooperation and the costs associated with the prosecution as reasons not to release further assets.

The father brought a motion seeking an order compelling the Attorney General to provide state-funded counsel for a child custody trial arising in the context of child protection proceedings.

Applying the test from New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), the court considered whether a refusal of counsel would infringe the applicant’s section 7 Charter rights, whether counsel was necessary for a fair hearing, whether legal aid had been refused after exhaustion of appeals, and whether the applicant lacked the financial means to retain counsel.

The court found the applicant failed to demonstrate complexity requiring counsel, had previously lost his legal aid certificate due to nondisclosure of assets, and had not provided credible evidence of financial hardship.

The court further found the applicant capable of representing himself and not an indigent litigant.

The request for state-funded counsel was dismissed.

The applicant sought a declaration that a contingency fee agreement with her former lawyer was unenforceable because it permitted the lawyer to charge a percentage on costs recovered through settlement.

The agreement calculated the lawyer’s contingency fee on the entire settlement amount, including costs and disbursements, without obtaining prior judicial approval as required by s. 28.1(8) of the Solicitors Act.

The court held that including costs in a contingency fee agreement without judicial approval constitutes a fundamental breach of the statutory scheme.

Because the agreement contravened s. 28.1(8) and was not approved as required by s. 28.1(9), it was unenforceable.

The lawyer was ordered to repay the portion of the fee calculated on costs, while the broader question of fee reasonableness was left to the trial judge in the related tort action.

The accused applied to exclude statements refusing to provide a breath sample following a fatal collision, arguing that his Charter rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) were breached.

He contended that once the victim died, the legal jeopardy associated with refusal to provide a breath sample increased to life imprisonment and he should have been informed and given a further opportunity to consult counsel.

The Crown argued that the accused had already been advised of his right to counsel, had consulted a lawyer, and that the jeopardy had not meaningfully changed because he was already facing charges carrying life imprisonment.

The court held that the accused understood the general jeopardy he faced and that no discrete change in the investigation triggered a renewed right to counsel.

The application to exclude the refusal evidence was dismissed.

The accused brought a pre-trial application seeking to declare s. 255(3.2) of the Criminal Code unconstitutional under ss. 7, 8, and 11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The issue before the court was whether the constitutional challenge should be decided before the commencement of the jury trial or deferred until after trial.

The court held that constitutional issues should not be determined in a factual vacuum and should only be decided if necessary to resolve the matter.

Because the accused might not ultimately be convicted of the impugned offence, the court concluded that a full factual record following trial was required.

The application to determine the constitutional issue before trial was therefore denied.

The accused faced a 60-count indictment following 'Project A-Wire', an RCMP investigation into drug trafficking, weapons, proceeds of crime, extortion, and criminal interest rates.

The Crown relied heavily on intercepted communications, surveillance, and physical evidence seized from multiple locations, including a stash apartment, a bar, and the accused's residence.

The court found the accused guilty of conspiring to traffic in cocaine, marijuana, and hashish, and of leading a criminal organization.

The accused was also convicted of possessing prohibited and restricted firearms, possessing proceeds of crime, extortion, and entering into agreements to receive interest at a criminal rate.

The accused was acquitted of receiving payments at a criminal interest rate and one count of extortion.

The applicant, charged with drug offences, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized from his condominium unit.

Prior to obtaining a search warrant, police officers entered the common areas and storage locker area of the applicant's condominium building without permission to gather information.

The court found that the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas and storage units, and that the warrantless police entry constituted an unreasonable search under s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the police acted in bad faith by ignoring the Trespass to Property Act, and that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The evidence was excluded.

The court determined costs following civil proceedings between the parties.

On consent, the plaintiffs were ordered to pay the defendant $107,998.61 in legal fees inclusive of GST and HST.

The court also ordered payment of disbursements in accordance with the defendant’s Bill of Costs, subject to reductions required under Tariff A of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Hotel expenses were reduced to conform with Tariff A s. 21(3), and witnesses’ travel and parking expenses were ordered recalculated under Tariff A s. 21(2)(c), with all other disbursements approved.

Former shareholders of a technology company sought payment of earn‑out amounts under a Share Purchase Agreement following the purchaser’s acquisition of their company.

They argued that profits from a large engineering project should have been included in the calculation of EBIAT for purposes of triggering the earn‑out thresholds and that revenue had been improperly deferred.

The court held that the project did not meet the contractual requirements for inclusion because the earnings were not attributable exclusively to design services using the acquired company’s unique intellectual property and the project had not been awarded specifically due to that IP.

The court also preferred the defendant’s accounting evidence and found no improper revenue deferral affecting the threshold calculations.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs failed to establish entitlement to the earn‑out payment.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion alleging breaches of s. 8 of the Charter arising from a warrantless search of his iPhone by CBSA officers at an airport upon re‑entry into Canada.

The defence sought exclusion of the phone contents, subsequent wiretap authorizations, and evidence obtained through search warrants, arguing the border search was a pretext for a police investigation and that the authorizations lacked investigative necessity.

The court held that a cell phone constitutes “goods” under the Customs Act and that CBSA officers are authorized to conduct routine border searches of such goods without prior grounds.

The search was characterized as a first‑category routine border search under R. v. Simmons and therefore reasonable.

Even if a breach had occurred, exclusion under s. 24(2) was not warranted because the state conduct was not serious and the evidence was central to the prosecution.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death after turning left across the path of an oncoming motorcycle at a controlled intersection, resulting in the motorcyclist’s death.

The Crown argued that the accused’s failure to enter the designated left-turn lane, failure to signal, and unsafe left turn constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The defence conceded the actus reus but argued that the evidence did not establish the fault element required for criminal liability and that the incident reflected, at most, momentary negligence.

The court applied the modified objective test for penal negligence as articulated in leading Supreme Court jurisprudence.

Finding insufficient evidence regarding the motorcycle’s speed, position, braking, and the accused’s awareness of risk, the court concluded the Crown had not proven a marked departure beyond a reasonable doubt.