Malcolm Lindsay

The defendant brought a motion requesting the presiding judge recuse himself because the judge, prior to his appointment, had briefly represented the defendant's counsel and had also represented the local police service in a matter involving the same counsel.

The Criminal Lawyers' Association intervened, arguing for an automatic disqualification rule when a judge's former client appears as counsel.

The court rejected the automatic disqualification argument, applying the standard test for reasonable apprehension of bias.

Finding that the prior retainers were over 20 years old and did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias, the court dismissed the recusal motion.

Following a judge-alone trial on a 45-count indictment, the court found that the accused engaged in a sustained pattern of drugging women with GHB or Ketamine and sexually assaulting them while they were unconscious or otherwise incapable of consenting.

The court applied the law of conscious consent, incapacity, and administering a stupefying substance under s. 246(b) of the Criminal Code, and admitted count-to-count similar fact evidence to assess intent, absence of consent, and the lack of any air of reality to mistaken belief in consent.

The court also relied on expert evidence concerning the pharmacological effects of GHB and Ketamine and on disturbing cellphone images and videos created by the accused.

Convictions were entered on most assault, sexual assault, stupefying substance, and drug trafficking counts, with acquittals on a limited number of counts where the evidence left a reasonable doubt.

Because of the publication ban, this summary avoids identifying protected persons.

The applicant, charged with drug offences, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized from his condominium unit.

Prior to obtaining a search warrant, police officers entered the common areas and storage locker area of the applicant's condominium building without permission to gather information.

The court found that the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas and storage units, and that the warrantless police entry constituted an unreasonable search under s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the police acted in bad faith by ignoring the Trespass to Property Act, and that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The evidence was excluded.