Martin J. Thompson

The plaintiff, Henry Brent Shelp, brought a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action against GoSecure Inc. The main issues were the period of common law reasonable notice and the calculation of income loss, particularly entitlement to sales commissions during the notice period.

The court found the matter suitable for summary judgment and determined that the reasonable notice period was six months.

The court also held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages including base salary, commissions, benefits, and cell phone allowance for the notice period, less mitigation income and amounts already paid.

The total damages awarded were $163,659.92 plus pre-judgment interest.

The defendant brought a motion for particulars regarding the third party defence in an action for constructive dismissal.

The defendant sought details of communications alleged by the third party in his defence, arguing they were necessary to plead a reply.

The third party argued the request was an attempt to discover evidence prematurely.

The court granted the motion, finding that the particulars were not within the defendant's knowledge and were necessary for the defendant to frame its reply to the third party defence.

The moving defendants brought a motion to strike an expert report served late by the co-defendant, and to prevent the expert from testifying at the upcoming trial.

The responding party argued the motion should be deferred to the trial judge under Rule 53.03(3).

The court held that while deferring to the trial judge is the general rule, a motion judge can rule in advance in rare cases to prevent prejudice and loss of trial time.

The court struck the report, finding it failed the Mohan criteria for admissibility because it relied on an irrelevant statutory framework (the Occupational Health and Safety Act) and assessed an ordinary standard of care that did not require specialized knowledge.

Following a motion and cross-motion concerning amendments to a statement of claim, the court determined costs.

The moving party sought substantial indemnity costs relying on a Rule 49 offer to settle and alleging improper litigation conduct by opposing counsel.

The court found the motion unnecessary and concluded that counsel for the responding party engaged in improper conduct, including impugning opposing counsel’s integrity and taking procedural steps that lengthened the proceedings.

Applying s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rules 57.01, 57.03, and 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs after the offer date.

Costs of $7,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST were ordered payable within 30 days.

The moving party sought leave to amend a statement of claim in a defamation action after documentary discovery revealed additional allegedly defamatory emails authored by the responding party.

The responding party opposed the amendment on the basis that the communications were unrelated, privileged, and statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and the Libel and Slander Act.

The court applied Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing the presumption in favour of permitting amendments absent non-compensable prejudice.

It found the amendments merely provided further particulars of an existing defamation claim rather than advancing a new cause of action, and that any prejudice could be addressed through procedural steps.

The motion to amend was granted and the responding party’s cross‑motion to compel answers to undertakings was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing his action for delay under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and awarding costs to the defendant.

The underlying claim alleged constructive dismissal arising from a family business arrangement relating to the development and operation of a golf club.

The appellant argued that his delay in prosecuting the action was explained by depression and anxiety that prevented him from instructing counsel and advancing the litigation.

The court held that the Master correctly applied the two-part test requiring both a satisfactory explanation for delay and absence of prejudice to the defendants.

Given the prolonged inactivity and the death of a key defence witness during the delay, the Master committed no error in dismissing the action and awarding costs.