Alison J. Campbell

This cost decision follows a focused trial on retroactive child support.

The court found the mother, Ms. Sorrenti, to be the most successful party and ordered the father, Mr. Thompson, to pay $18,000 in costs.

The decision details Mr. Thompson’s unreasonable litigation conduct, including failure to provide financial disclosure and forcing unnecessary motions, justifying a substantial indemnity award.

The court also considered Ms. Sorrenti’s conduct but found Mr. Thompson’s actions more blameworthy.

The cost award is deemed child support for enforcement purposes.

The court considered whether a retroactive child support award should be made against the father, Mark Thompson, for the years 2014 to 2023, in light of his failure to comply with annual financial disclosure obligations under a Parenting Agreement.

The court found that the father had not provided proper disclosure and had misled the mother, Vanessa Sorrenti, about his income, resulting in underpayment of child support.

The court ordered retroactive child support to be paid from January 1, 2014, and denied both parties' claims for contributions toward childcare and private tuition costs, finding both had failed in their disclosure obligations.

Pre-judgment interest was not awarded.

The Applicant mother sought full indemnity costs of $5,556.66 following her successful summary judgment motion for the return of her children to her primary care.

The Respondent grandmother did not file a response to the costs submission.

The court found the grandmother's failure to attend a settlement conference and compelling the mother to file for summary judgment constituted unreasonable conduct, warranting an elevated costs award.

However, the court determined this conduct did not meet the high threshold for bad faith to justify full indemnity costs.

The court awarded the mother $4,500 in fixed costs.

The father brought an urgent motion seeking an order for the child to remain enrolled in a private academy, arguing that a prior consultative process had superseded the mother's sole decision-making authority regarding education.

The mother, who had sole decision-making authority, had registered the child in a public school closer to her new home in Richmond and brought a cross-motion for the child to remain there.

The court found no change to the mother's sole decision-making authority and determined that the transfer to the public school was in the child's best interests, considering practical factors such as proximity to the new home, social opportunities, and elimination of after-school care.

The father's motion was dismissed, and the mother's cross-motion was granted.

The applicant father sought an interim order to increase his access visits with his 10-year-old daughter from once a month to every second weekend and to permit unaccompanied air travel for the child.

The respondent mother opposed this, proposing instead an extension of the duration of existing visits.

The court refused to admit the report of the child's treating psychologist due to lack of objectivity and incompleteness.

The court also declined to rely on the Office of the Children's Lawyer reports for increasing access frequency or changing the transportation method, finding that the circumstances did not meet the "exceptional circumstances" or "Bos" criteria for interim reliance on assessment reports.

While acknowledging the "maximum contact" principle, the court found the applicant's cited cases distinguishable.

The court granted the respondent's proposal for extended access duration for specific months, adjusted summer access dates slightly, allowed flexibility in access location within Canada, and ordered disclosure of the respondent's residential address with a restriction.

The primary requests for increased frequency and unaccompanied air travel were denied on an interim basis.