Julie Audet

The applicant brought a motion for interim spousal support and orders to maintain her as a beneficiary of life and health insurance.

The parties had a traditional 26-year marriage where the applicant was a stay-at-home parent.

The respondent, who was on permanent disability, had an income of $88,171 for spousal support purposes, while the applicant earned $45,100.

The court found the applicant had a strong compensatory claim and ordered interim spousal support of $1,350 per month, adjusting for her contribution to the interest on a joint line of credit.

The issue of retroactive support was deferred to the trial judge.

The applicant sought divorce, custody, child support, and an order for the respondent to sell jointly owned property in Quebec to satisfy child support arrears.

The court dismissed the divorce claim due to lack of jurisdiction, as neither spouse met the one-year residency requirement under the Divorce Act.

The court granted sole custody to the applicant and ordered the respondent to make a lump sum child support payment equal to the respondent's share of the equity in the Quebec property.

However, the court declined to make an in personam order compelling the respondent to sell the Quebec property, finding it could not supervise the execution of such an order in a foreign jurisdiction, despite having in personam jurisdiction over the respondent for child support.

Costs were awarded to the applicant, reflecting mixed success.

The applicant brought a motion seeking an order compelling the parties to resolve their parenting disputes through arbitration pursuant to clauses contained in a prior divorce order.

The respondent initially challenged the court’s jurisdiction based on the arbitration clause but later consented to having the issues determined by the court.

The court held that the applicant could not invoke the arbitration clause after having already commenced litigation to modify the arbitration outcome and after strategically changing positions.

Interpreting s. 7 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, the court concluded that a party who initiated court proceedings cannot seek a stay in favour of arbitration.

The court exercised jurisdiction to determine the parenting issues.

The applicant brought a motion to vary a separation agreement and prior order that terminated child support when the parties’ children reached age 21.

The court considered whether the contractual provision was enforceable where the children remained full‑time post‑secondary students.

The court held that the clause terminating support at age 21 was unreasonable and unenforceable under s. 56(1.1) of the Family Law Act because it conflicted with the objectives of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court further concluded that a motion to vary under s. 17 of the Divorce Act does not require that the children be “children of the marriage” at the date of filing.

Retroactive variation was granted and the motion adjourned to determine the appropriate quantum of support for adult children under s. 3(2) of the Guidelines.

Following a decision on a motion to change concerning child support, the court determined costs under the Family Law Rules.

Although both parties achieved partial success on certain issues, the court found the applicant was substantially more successful because the litigation secured child support arrears and ongoing support for the children.

The court also considered the respondent’s conduct, including unilaterally ceasing child support payments and failing to provide financial disclosure without litigation.

Applying Rule 24 and the principles governing costs in family law proceedings, the court concluded the applicant was entitled to partial indemnity costs.

The respondent was ordered to pay $6,500 in costs.

The applicant brought a motion to change a separation agreement to adjust child support retroactively and prospectively.

The court found a material change in circumstances arising from the parties' transition to a shared parenting arrangement.

However, the court declined to revisit historical support payments between 2008 and 2011 because the parties had managed child support adjustments privately under their agreement.

The court ordered retroactive child support for 2012 after the respondent unilaterally stopped paying support and set ongoing set-off support based on the parties’ incomes.

The court refused to impute additional income from corporate expenses and retained earnings due to insufficient evidence.

Following a motion to change concerning child support in a hybrid parenting arrangement—where one child resided primarily with one parent and another child shared residence—the parties resolved the substantive support issues but disputed costs.

The court had previously accepted the respondent’s proposed hybrid set-off approach to calculating child support and ordered retroactive support along with reduced section 7 expenses.

In determining costs under Rule 24, the court considered the closeness of the respondent’s settlement offer to the ultimate result and the reasonableness of both parties’ litigation conduct.

Although the applicant argued that the respondent’s earlier refusal to address arrears and alternative dispute resolution increased litigation costs, the court found the respondent was the successful party.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The applicant brought a motion to change child support in a hybrid custody arrangement where one child resided primarily with the mother and another child was shared between the parents.

The court reviewed approaches to calculating child support in hybrid custody situations under the Child Support Guidelines, including the economies of scale approach and the hybrid set‑off method discussed in prior case law.

After considering the parties’ respective incomes, household circumstances, and the absence of a detailed Contino budget analysis, the court adopted a middle-ground approach and set support above the basic set‑off amount but below the table amount for two children.

Retroactive adjustment was limited to June 2011.

The court also ruled that only certain extracurricular registration fees qualified as section 7 extraordinary expenses.

Following a family law motion, the court addressed the issue of costs under Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules.

The respondent was substantially successful and sought partial indemnity costs of $4,000.

The court reviewed the bill of costs and found the amount reasonable, noting the applicant agreed with the assessment.

In an addendum, the court corrected an omission in its earlier reasons and ordered reimbursement for medical and dental expense insurance proceeds received by the applicant that belonged to the respondent.

The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent a total of $10,215.77 including the additional reimbursement.

The respondent mother brought an interim motion seeking sole custody of the parties’ two children along with child and spousal support.

The court declined to grant interim sole custody, finding no evidence that the existing de facto joint custody arrangement negatively affected the children’s interests.

However, the court ordered the father to pay combined child and spousal support based on imputed incomes of $60,000 for the father and $12,000 for the mother, along with retroactive support and proportional payment of section 7 expenses.

Standard decision‑making and communication clauses were imposed to improve parental cooperation and guide joint decision‑making pending trial.

The respondent brought a motion seeking retroactive adjustment of child support and contribution to the children’s special or extraordinary expenses under s. 7 of the Child Support Guidelines.

The applicant father opposed aspects of the motion and brought his own motion concerning parenting arrangements, which the parties resolved by agreement during the hearing.

The court found the children primarily resided with the respondent and ordered the applicant to pay full table child support based on his income, retroactive to May 1, 2010.

The court also determined the parties’ proportionate responsibility for section 7 expenses at 70% for the applicant and 30% for the respondent and confirmed that certain extracurricular expenses were reasonable.

Arrears and ongoing monthly contributions toward section 7 expenses were ordered, along with annual financial disclosure and adjustments.

The appellants appealed an order declaring that the respondent Merali was not a 'franchisor's associate' under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge's factual finding that Merali controlled the franchisor rendered him a franchisor's associate.

Consequently, Merali was declared jointly and severally liable with the other respondents for payments owed under s. 6(6) of the Act.

The appellants entered into a franchise agreement with the respondents.

The business failed, and the appellants sought to rescind the agreement under s. 6(2) of the Arthur Wishart Act, arguing the franchisor failed to provide adequate disclosure.

The application judge found the disclosure was incomplete but not void ab initio, restricting the appellants to the 60-day rescission period under s. 6(1).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the disclosure document was so materially deficient—lacking a signed certificate, financial statements, and other required information—that it amounted to no disclosure at all.

The appellants were therefore entitled to the two-year rescission period under s. 6(2).

The respondent obtained summary judgment in an action on a mortgage.

The appellant conceded default but argued summary judgment was unjust due to an outstanding third party claim involving a disability insurance policy that would cover mortgage payments.

The Court of Appeal found that granting summary judgment would be unjust because there was an issue as to whether the mortgage and insurance policy were linked.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment was set aside.

The appellant appealed a comprehensive decision in a matrimonial proceeding on a single issue: whether the application judge erred in finding issue estoppel regarding a potential variation of support arrears for the 1995-1999 period.

The respondent conceded the error.

The Court of Appeal agreed, allowing the appeal on consent and ordering no costs.