Walter Devenz

The accused brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging unreasonable delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The accused was charged with attempted murder and numerous firearms-related offences arising from a drive-by shooting on July 23, 2014.

The trial was scheduled for July 11-22, 2016, representing a delay of approximately 23.5 months from the laying of charges.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the Crown was responsible for approximately one month of delay in disclosing a sealed Information to Obtain a search warrant, the overall delay was reasonable when considering the complexity of the case, the inherent time requirements, the accused's implicit waiver through his actions and tactical choices, and the significant societal interest in trying serious offences on the merits.

The accused brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging unreasonable delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The accused was charged with numerous counts related to firearms use and two counts of attempted murder arising from a drive-by shooting incident on July 23, 2014.

The delay from charge to trial was approximately 23.5 months.

The court rejected the application, finding that while the Crown was responsible for approximately one month of delay in disclosing a sealed Information to Obtain a search warrant, the majority of the delay was attributable to inherent time requirements of the complex case, actions of the accused (including multiple changes of counsel), and institutional scheduling constraints.

The court found the accused had implicitly waived his right to a speedy trial through his conduct and tactical choices.

On a voir dire in a criminal prosecution, the court considered whether statements made by the accused to an Eligibility Review Officer during an investigation under the Disability Support Program Act were voluntary and whether their use would breach the accused’s section 7 Charter right against self‑incrimination.

The accused argued the officer was a person in authority and that the interview was effectively compelled.

The court held the officer was conducting an administrative eligibility investigation and was not acting on behalf of police or prosecuting authorities.

Applying the principles from R. v. Hodgson and R. v. Jarvis, the court found the officer was not a person in authority and the statements were voluntary.

The court further held that the investigation had not crossed the line into a penal inquiry and therefore no section 7 Charter breach occurred.

The accused was tried on multiple charges arising from an incident involving a complainant and her teenage daughter, including sexual assault, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, unlawful confinement, assault, and breaches of recognizance conditions.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of breaching recognizance conditions.

At trial, the court closely scrutinized the credibility of the complainant and the testimony of the daughter who was present during the events.

The judge found significant inconsistencies and credibility concerns in the complainant’s evidence and preferred the daughter’s testimony on key issues.

The court held that the Crown failed to prove sexual assault, weapon possession for a dangerous purpose, or unlawful confinement beyond a reasonable doubt, but found the accused guilty of the included offence of simple assault based on minor injuries observed by medical evidence.

The offender was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit causing bodily harm after operating a vehicle while impaired and driving the wrong way on a highway, resulting in a serious collision that caused life‑threatening injuries to another driver.

The court considered the offender’s youth, lack of criminal record, remorse, and positive personal circumstances alongside aggravating factors including significant impairment, extremely dangerous driving behaviour, and the severe and lasting injuries to the victim.

Applying the sentencing principles in ss. 718–718.2 of the Criminal Code and appellate guidance emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for impaired driving offences, the court determined that a custodial sentence was required.

A term of imprisonment, probation, and a driving prohibition were imposed to reflect the gravity of the offence while recognizing the offender’s rehabilitative prospects.