Michele D. Blais

The applicant sought a temporary order requiring the parties' two children to attend École Élémentaire Catholique Édouard-Bond in Ottawa and a declaration confirming the children's ordinary residence in Ottawa.

The respondent opposed the school choice and sought retroactive child support.

The court found that the respondent failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that a school change was in the children's best interests.

The court ordered the children to continue attending Édouard-Bond and declared that the children have their ordinary residence in both provinces due to equal time-sharing arrangements.

The applicant was awarded partial costs of $7,000.

This family law decision addresses a dispute over parenting time and holiday schedules following the parties' divorce.

The applicant father sought to change the existing 2-2-5-5 shared parenting schedule to a week-about schedule, citing high conflict and negative impacts on the children.

The respondent mother argued the current schedule was effective and the case was not high conflict.

Applying the "best interests of the child" principle under the Divorce Act, the court dismissed the father's request for a week-about schedule, finding the current 2-2-5-5 schedule better served the children's needs, particularly during the school year.

The court also determined the case did not meet the threshold for "high conflict." However, the court formalized specific arrangements for Christmas and March school breaks, largely based on the parties' consent, including fixed transition dates and early notification requirements.

The appellant, Igor Alexander Winter, appealed a trial decision regarding the division of net proceeds from the sale of a jointly owned home following the breakup of his relationship with the respondent, Ronald James MacIntyre.

The trial judge had ordered an equal division, finding that Winter intended to gift his initial contributions (down payments) to MacIntyre.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to properly apply the presumption of resulting trust, which places the burden on the transferee (MacIntyre) to prove a gift was intended by the transferor (Winter).

The Court held that the trial judge's reasoning was flawed, particularly in extrapolating an intention to gift from the joint tenancy established for survivorship purposes, and that there was insufficient clear, convincing, and cogent evidence to rebut the presumption of a resulting trust.

The appeal was allowed, and Winter was ordered to be repaid his initial contributions from the sale proceeds before equal division of the balance.

Following a family law trial regarding spousal support and property division, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The applicant sought costs on a partial or full indemnity basis, arguing he was the most successful party and that the respondent acted unreasonably.

The respondent argued for full recovery costs based on divided success and an offer to settle.

The court found the applicant was the more successful party, having succeeded on periodic spousal support, security for support, and property division.

After considering the parties' conduct, offers to settle, and the reasonableness of the fees claimed, the court ordered the respondent to pay the applicant fixed costs of $150,000.

Following a motion and cross-motion regarding parenting time, decision-making authority, and child support where success was divided, the father sought partial indemnity costs of $32,285.16.

The mother argued no costs should be awarded due to divided success and the father's conduct.

The court found the father was the more successful party overall, particularly on the primary issues of parenting time and decision-making authority.

After considering the factors under Rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules, including the parties' behaviour, time spent, and proportionality, the court ordered the mother to pay the father fixed costs of $18,000.

The Respondent sought costs after the Applicant's urgent motion to prevent her relocation was denied.

The Applicant opposed the costs order, citing the Respondent's alleged breach of their separation agreement regarding notice for relocation and claims of misleading the court.

While acknowledging the Applicant's motion might have been granted pre-COVID and his insistence on the agreement's terms was reasonable, the court found the Respondent's requested costs quantum reasonable.

Ultimately, the court ordered each party to bear their own costs.

The father moved for a temporary order to increase his parenting time, reduce child support, and address section 7 expenses.

The mother opposed and sought orders for decision-making authority, retroactive and ongoing child support, and other child-related issues.

The court addressed the admissibility of hearsay evidence (letters) under the principled exception, finding them reliable and necessary.

The father's request for equal parenting time was granted, applying the "maximum contact" principle.

The mother's request for sole decision-making authority was denied as premature.

Child support was adjusted based on a set-off calculation using the father's 2018 income and the mother's current income.

Summer parenting was set at two five-day periods per parent.

The mother was permitted to renew children's passports without the father's signature due to the father's surreptitious conduct, but international travel without the other parent's consent was denied due to COVID-19 restrictions.

The Superior Court of Justice addressed a motion and cross-motion concerning interim child and spousal support.

The respondent mother sought support, while the applicant father sought income imputation for the mother, specific income determination for himself (including employment expense deductions), and proportional sharing of daycare costs.

The court rejected the father's proposed higher income imputation for the mother, instead imputing a lower part-time income effective several months later, acknowledging her medical leave.

The court included a one-time RSU payment in the father's income for support purposes and allowed his employment expense deductions and ongoing support payments for an older child, but denied anticipated post-secondary expenses for that child.

Interim child and spousal support were ordered, with retroactive application and a future adjustment based on the mother's imputed income, aiming for roughly equal net disposable income.

The applicant sought orders to dispense with the respondent's consent for the sale of the matrimonial home, disburse sale proceeds according to their separation agreement, and grant exclusive possession of the home.

The respondent consented to the listing and sale but wished to remain in the home, raising concerns about his capacity to enter the separation agreement.

The court declined to dispense with the respondent's consent for sale and denied exclusive possession at that time, finding no immediate evidence of non-cooperation.

However, the court ordered the home to be listed for sale within strict timelines, with both parties required to cooperate fully on all aspects of the sale process.

The issue of exclusive possession was adjourned, to be revisited if the respondent failed to comply with the sale orders.

The parties brought cross-motions seeking primary care of their 18-month-old child.

Both parents had flexible work schedules and had shared care since the child's birth.

Since separation, they continued living in the same home, leading to significant conflict.

The court declined to name either parent as primary caregiver, instead ordering temporary joint custody with a shared parenting schedule.

To minimize conflict, the court ordered a nesting arrangement where the parent with care of the child has exclusive possession of the matrimonial home during their parenting time.

Child support was ordered on a set-off basis.

Following a motion to vary a prior family law order, the responding party sought costs after partially succeeding in terminating child support but failing to vary spousal support.

The opposing party argued that no costs should be awarded because the offer to settle was not clearly bettered.

The court held that the written offer to settle should have been taken seriously and that it was better than the ultimate order with respect to the child support issue.

Although success was mixed, the court exercised its discretion to award modest costs.

Costs were fixed at $1,000.

The moving party father brought a motion to vary a 2006 order to terminate his child and spousal support obligations following his job loss.

The court found that the 23-year-old daughter was no longer a child of the marriage as she was independent and had withdrawn from parental care, terminating child support.

However, the court dismissed the motion to vary spousal support as premature, noting the father's severance package and the lack of financial disclosure from both parties, requiring a better evidentiary record.