Robert Allan Klotz

The defendant, Maria Rita Ferreira, brought a motion to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) and dismiss the action against her.

The CPL was granted to the plaintiffs without notice.

Maria alleged material misrepresentation by the plaintiffs regarding two mortgages and unreasonable delay in prosecuting the proceeding.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no material non-disclosure or misrepresentation, and that while there was delay, it was excusable due to counsel's inadvertence and related litigation, and did not cause substantial prejudice to a fair trial.

The equities favored the plaintiffs.

No costs were awarded.

The bankrupt, his father, and a creditor (his former partner) brought overlapping motions in a bankruptcy proceeding.

The court ordered equitable set-off of multiple costs awards made in family and bankruptcy proceedings between the bankrupt and the creditor, effective September 28, 2018.

The court dismissed the father's claim for a charge over the balance of the costs award, finding that solicitor's liens and charging orders do not apply to non-lawyers who fund litigation.

The balance of the costs award was ordered payable to the bankruptcy trustee.

The court also dismissed the creditor's request for a stay of enforcement and declined to dismiss the creditor's civil action for delay at this stage.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Justice M. Koehnen dated August 10, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

This urgent motion before the Court of Appeal addressed whether a non-party, John Kavanagh, had an automatic right to appeal or should be granted leave to appeal two approval and vesting orders related to the sale of properties in a mortgage enforcement and insolvency proceeding.

The Receiver brought the motion to prevent automatic stays of the property sales.

The court found no automatic right of appeal under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) because the orders were procedural and no loss exceeding $10,000 was demonstrated.

The court also denied leave to appeal under s. 193(e) of the BIA, concluding that the issues raised were not of general importance, lacked prima facie merit, and granting leave would unduly hinder the insolvency proceedings.

Consequently, Kavanagh's notices of appeal were quashed, and his motions for leave to appeal were dismissed, ensuring the property sales could proceed without automatic stays.

The Receiver brought a motion seeking approval of its activities, approval of a sales process for two properties, and an order requiring a tenant to disclose tenancy documentation.

The court declined to grant a generic approval of the Receiver's activities, finding it unnecessary.

The court ordered the tenant to comply with its disclosure obligations, rejecting the tenant's confidentiality objections.

The court approved the proposed sales process and listing agreements, subject to conditions including a time-limited sealing order for appraisals and the circulation of redacted listing proposals to the parties.

The Appellant, Anthony Falasca, brought a motion appealing the wording of a formal Order settled before Master Jean, arguing it was inconsistent with its preamble by omitting the word "advanced" in relation to document production, leading to ambiguity.

Alternatively, Falasca sought to vary the Order pursuant to s. 187(5) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The creditor, Goldcourt Developments Inc., brought a cross-motion to quash the appeal on the grounds that it was out of time.

The court dismissed Goldcourt's cross-motion, finding that while an appeal on the merits would be out of time, the motion to vary the order was properly brought under s. 187(5) due to subsequently discovered facts, specifically Goldcourt's counsel misinterpreting the order's scope.

The court granted Falasca's motion, ordering the amendment of Master Jean's Order to ensure clarity regarding document production obligations.

This endorsement addresses costs following a motion to strike claims.

The defendants, Anthony Volpini, Linda Aceti, and Mary Ann Ley, sought to strike claims against them for disclosing no cause of action.

The plaintiffs, Anthony Falasca and Aryle Developments Inc., successfully defended the motion against Volpini and Aceti, though they conceded the claim against Ley in their reply factum.

The court found the plaintiffs were the most successful party and entitled to partial indemnity costs.

However, the claimed hourly rates and time spent by plaintiff's counsel were deemed excessive, and the plaintiffs' late concession regarding Ley was noted.

Consequently, the court reduced the requested costs.

The defendants Anthony Volpini, Linda Aceti, and Mary Ann Ley brought a motion under Rule 21 to strike the plaintiffs' claims against them for disclosing no cause of action.

The court applied the "plain and obvious" test, assuming pleaded facts to be true unless patently ridiculous, and reading the statement of claim generously.

The motion to strike was dismissed for Volpini and Aceti, as the pleadings provided sufficient factual matrix for a cause of action.

The claim against Ley was struck as the plaintiffs did not oppose it.

The applicant sought an extension of time to perfect a motion for leave to appeal from an order dismissing his motion for security for costs against the trustee in his bankruptcy.

The trustee had sought re-appointment following the discharge of the original trustee to realize on the appreciated equity of the bankrupt's property.

The lower court judge dismissed the security for costs motion, finding that the trustee was not a nominal plaintiff and that the justice of the case did not warrant the order.

The applicant failed to meet the perfection deadline and sought an extension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the extension motion, finding insufficient intention to appeal, prejudice to the respondent, and no prima facie merit to the proposed appeal.

The landlord, INCC Corp., sought a declaration to terminate a lease with its tenant, Oxford Medical Imaging Inc. (OMI), alleging insolvency and liquidation proceedings.

OMI sought to restrain termination and assign the lease to 2617949 Ontario Limited, arguing INCC unreasonably withheld consent.

The court found OMI was not insolvent, no liquidation proceedings were commenced, and INCC unreasonably withheld consent to the lease assignment.

This is an appeal from a Registrar in Bankruptcy's decision to transfer a bankruptcy application from Toronto to Hamilton, based on the debtor's residence.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the Registrar erred in law by concluding the Toronto court lacked jurisdiction.

The court clarified that Hamilton falls under Bankruptcy Division 32, which is administered by the Toronto bankruptcy court, making Toronto the proper jurisdiction for such applications under s. 43(5) of the BIA.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the Registrar's decision.

The court issued its third and final set of reasons following a hearing on June 27, 2018, confirming an interim ruling and addressing costs.

The court drew negative inferences against Greyslone Ltd., Belview Management Ltd., and Mr. Czerlau due to evasive conduct and lack of corporate authority, disallowing claims of privilege over solicitors' files.

It ordered all solicitors' files (Assuras, Lof, Brown) to be delivered to an Independent Supervising Solicitor for review and production of relevant documents to the plaintiff.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $19,878.53 against Mr. Czerlau, Greyslone Ltd., and Belview Management Ltd. jointly and severally, and partial indemnity costs of $13,626.70 against Ms. Assuras, also jointly and severally with the others to that extent.

The plaintiff, Canadian National Railway Company (CN), brought a motion to compel the production of files and examination for discovery of three non-party lawyers: Mr. Brown, Mr. Lof, and Ms. Assuras.

The motion arose from a Mareva and Anton Pillar order and a subsequent summary judgment against Greyslone and Belview, which were found to have no legal status at the time of certain transactions and failed to account for $661,000.

Ms. Assuras, counsel for Greyslone and Belview, opposed the motion, asserting privilege, while Mr. Lof and Mr. Brown took no position.

The court found Mr. Czerlau's (who instructed Ms. Assuras) testimony to be evasive and misleading, and inferred that Greyslone and Belview were not acting at arm's length to Mr. Holmes, suggesting they were shams.

Consequently, the court proposed to draw negative inferences against Greyslone and Belview's bona fides, disallow claims of privilege, and ordered the production of the entire files of Ms. Assuras, Mr. Lof, and Mr. Brown to the plaintiff, subject to a 14-day period for further submissions.

An appeal from a Registrar in Bankruptcy's order denying an absolute discharge and imposing a condition requiring payment of $61,000 as a prerequisite to discharge.

The appellant, an electrician who became bankrupt following an acrimonious divorce, received settlement funds but could not account for their disposition due to severe mental health issues including clinical depression and dissociative identity disorder.

The appeal judge refused to admit fresh psychiatric evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, admitted the psychiatric evidence, found the Registrar made a factual error regarding non-disclosure of a Polish property, and concluded the $61,000 condition was unreasonable given the appellant's mental health circumstances.

The court granted an absolute discharge.

Following the dismissal of the bankrupt's appeal of his discharge conditions, the court determined the issue of costs.

The bankrupt requested that the trustee's costs be paid out of the $61,000 he was ordered to pay into the estate, while the trustee sought substantial indemnity costs of $6,915.31 due to allegations made against it.

The court rejected the bankrupt's request, finding it unfair to impose the costs on the creditors.

The court also declined to award substantial indemnity costs, noting the allegations were not severe enough.

The bankrupt was ordered to pay costs of $4,250 on a partial indemnity basis.

The bankrupt appealed a Registrar's order requiring him to pay $61,000 as a condition of his discharge from bankruptcy, and moved to admit fresh medical evidence regarding his mental health during the period he defaulted on his consumer proposal.

The court dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding the treating psychiatrist's letters were not sufficiently credible or probative to affect the outcome.

The court upheld the Registrar's decision, concluding there was no error in principle in finding the bankrupt dissipated funds and failed to perform his proposal despite having the means to do so.

Rytec Corporation sought an order declaring that the automatic stay of proceedings under s. 69(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) did not apply to a motion it intended to bring for injunctive relief against Emergency Door Service Inc. (EDS) to prevent post-filing conduct.

EDS had filed a notice of intention to make a proposal under the BIA.

The court dismissed Rytec's motion, holding that the term "remedy" in s. 69(1)(a) of the BIA includes injunctive proceedings to prevent post-filing conduct of a debtor who has filed a notice of intention to make a proposal.

The court emphasized a purposive interpretation of the BIA, aiming to provide breathing room for debtors to restructure, and found no material prejudice to Rytec that would warrant lifting the stay.

The appellant appealed the bankruptcy Trustee's disallowance of her proof of claim for an estimated $500,000 equalization payment against her bankrupt spouse.

The court determined the appeal should proceed as a true appeal based on the record before the Trustee, rather than a hearing de novo.

The court found the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence to support or quantify her equalization claim, noting that the family law trial judge had previously concluded no equalization payment would be owing.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellant sought full indemnity costs for his successful appeal and two underlying motions regarding his bankruptcy discharge and the treatment of a personal injury settlement.

The Court of Appeal declined to award full indemnity costs, finding that the Trustee's conduct was not reprehensible and that Rule 49.10 did not apply to grant a defendant substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the appellant partial indemnity costs of $5,000 for the motion before Spence J. and $10,000 for the appeal.

The appellant, a bankrupt who suffered severe injuries in a motor vehicle accident, appealed a motion judge's order regarding the calculation of his surplus income under s. 68 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The motion judge had included financial assistance payments, statutory accident benefits settlement proceeds, and portions of a personal injury settlement in the appellant's total income, resulting in a surplus income payment obligation and a $15,000 penalty for failing to disclose the settlements.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the financial assistance loan, legal costs, and damages for future care and housekeeping should not have been included in the total income calculation.

The surplus income payment was set aside, but the $15,000 penalty for non-disclosure was affirmed.