James Zibarras

Following a trial where the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed and the defendants' counterclaim was granted in part, the parties made submissions on costs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs based on the plaintiff's oppressive conduct and a prior award of punitive damages.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs to the defendants, finding it would result in double compensation, and instead awarded partial indemnity costs subject to a significant discount for time spent on unsuccessful allegations.

The court also awarded substantial indemnity costs to a defendant to the counterclaim who successfully defended against unproven allegations of fraud.

The plaintiff, the former President of a family-run painting corporation, brought an action for oppression and wrongful dismissal after being terminated and removed as a director.

The defendants counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging the plaintiff misappropriated corporate funds, redirected rebates, and performed cash jobs for personal benefit.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the plaintiff's claims, finding his termination was justified for cause due to his dishonest conduct.

The court granted the counterclaim in part, ordering the plaintiff to pay $470,000 for redirected rebates and cash jobs, refund unauthorized transfers, disgorge profits, and pay $75,000 in punitive damages for reprehensible self-dealing.

Money Gate Corporation (MGC) brought a motion for an extension of time to file its notice of appeal and a declaration that it had an appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), or alternatively for leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The underlying matter involved a receivership where a motion judge had dismissed MGC's claim for payment from the proceeds of a property sale, finding no valid assignment of a second mortgage and that MGC was not the registered owner.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension of time, finding MGC's grounds of appeal not frivolous and no real prejudice to the responding parties.

Crucially, the court declared that MGC had an appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the BIA, concluding that the motion judge's order finally determined MGC's economic interests in the property proceeds, distinguishing it from a mere priorities dispute.

This is a costs endorsement following motions by three groups of defendants to strike the plaintiff's fresh as amended statement of claim.

The court had previously substantially granted the motion by the 1Plus12 Corporation defendants, dismissed the motions by the Ricci and Karp defendants to strike the statement of claim against them, and struck the plaintiff's affidavit.

This endorsement determines the costs payable between the parties.

The 1Plus12 defendants were awarded $17,000 in partial indemnity costs from the plaintiff, as they were substantially successful.

The Ricci defendants were awarded $9,000 in partial indemnity costs from the plaintiff, despite their motion to stay being dismissed, due to the necessity of responding to allegations of criminal conduct that were struck.

No costs were awarded to or against the Karp defendants, as their motion to strike the claim against them was dismissed, although they succeeded in striking the plaintiff's affidavit.

The appellant, Robert Glegg, appealed judgments declaring him a vexatious litigant and associated costs orders.

The underlying litigation stemmed from his daughter's withdrawal from parental control, with Glegg initiating numerous proceedings, including tort claims against the respondents (family friends and a legal aid clinic with its lawyers), alleging they conspired to assist his daughter's mother in "brainwashing" her.

The application judge declared Glegg a vexatious litigant, stayed his existing proceedings, and barred him from commencing further related proceedings without leave, also ordering full indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Glegg's appeal, affirming that his claims were an abuse of process and a collateral attack on previously determined facts, specifically that his daughter acted of her own free will.

The court upheld the vexatious litigant declaration, the permanent stay of actions, the prohibition on future litigation without leave, and the full indemnity costs award.

The plaintiff, a co-founder of 1PLUS12, brought an action against numerous defendants, including the corporation's lawyers and investors, alleging a Ponzi scheme and claiming unpaid compensation.

Several groups of defendants brought motions to strike the statement of claim under Rules 21.01 and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court struck the plaintiff's affidavit and the claims against the investors, finding the plaintiff lacked standing to advance claims on their behalf.

The court also struck certain scandalous and irrelevant paragraphs from the pleadings.

However, the court dismissed the motions to strike the entirety of the claims against the defendant lawyers and law firms, finding it was not plain and obvious that the claims for negligence and misrepresentation would fail.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Lavine J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties fixed at $5,000.

This is an appeal from an order striking the appellant’s action as an abuse of process.

The appellant claimed the motion judge erred in concluding the action was a collateral attack on prior family court orders.

The Court of Appeal found no error, concluding the action entirely paralleled the basis upon which the appellant challenged those orders in Family Court and was a clear attempt to relitigate issues from the child protection proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants sought to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to remove a litigation guardian.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction as the order was interlocutory, not final, and quashed the appeal.

The panel then reconstituted as the Divisional Court and denied leave to appeal, finding no confusion in the relevant rule (r. 7.06(2)) and no general importance warranting leave.

The plaintiff father brought an action against the Children's Aid Society of Ottawa (CAS) for negligence, Charter breaches, and misfeasance in public office, alleging improper conduct during child protection and adoption proceedings that occurred while he was facing a murder charge for which he was ultimately acquitted.

The CAS moved to strike the action.

The court granted the motion, finding the action was an abuse of process as a collateral attack on valid Family Court orders.

The court also held that the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action, as the CAS owes a duty of care only to the children, not the parents, and the Charter and misfeasance claims were bound to fail.

The parties, equal shareholders in a real estate business, underwent a court-ordered sales process overseen by a Sales Officer.

The moving party brought a motion for the distribution of $10 million from the net proceeds of the sale.

The responding party opposed, arguing the funds should be frozen until trial to secure his claims.

The court held that the prior Appointment Order did not function as a Mareva injunction and there was no basis to freeze the funds.

However, due to a lack of evidence regarding potential corporate tax liabilities, the court approved a reduced distribution of $8 million, split equally between the parties.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Koehnen J. dated March 25, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in writing.

Costs were awarded to the defendants, fixed at $5,000 for each of the two defendant groups, totaling $10,000.

The plaintiffs, two numbered companies acting as financing vehicles for tax shelter schemes, sued the defendant investor for repayment of $6.29 million in loans.

The defendant argued that the loans were satisfied by preferred shares held in trust and that claims for earlier loans were statute-barred.

The court found that the claims for the earlier loans were out of time as the limitation period commenced when the loans matured or were demanded by the tax shelter's operating company acting as the plaintiffs' agent.

Furthermore, the court held that the preferred shares were intended to repay the loans.

The action and the defendant's counterclaim were dismissed.

The appellant, Canada Investment Corporation (CIC), appealed an order directing that surplus proceeds held for CIC from a receivership sale be paid to the respondent creditors.

The respondents had successfully challenged the validity of CIC's pre-assignment expenses in a related action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the claims process did not require a statement of claim, the onus correctly shifted to CIC to dispute the Receiver's recommendation, and issue estoppel precluded CIC from re-litigating the quantification of pre-assignment expenses already decided in the related action.

The appellant sought to enforce letters of request from a Florida court to obtain documents from the former Ontario lawyers of his ex-wife and daughter for use in a Florida action for parental alienation.

The application judge dismissed the application on public policy grounds, finding it would interfere with solicitor-client privilege and client confidentiality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the hearing was procedurally fair and the application judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing to enforce the letters of request because they sought presumptively privileged documents.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Penny J. dated December 20, 2019.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the fixed amount of $4,762.00.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment finding them liable for breaching a share purchase agreement, arguing the respondents misrepresented the condition of the equipment.

The respondents cross-appealed the dismissal of their claim for contribution and indemnity against a third-party corporation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the agreement contained no misrepresentation regarding the equipment.

The cross-appeal was allowed and remitted to the motion judge because no reasons were provided for dismissing the third-party claim.

The defendant and plaintiff by counterclaim, Donald Wright, brought a motion seeking leave to amend his statement of defence and counterclaim and to compel answers to certain follow-up discovery questions.

The responding parties opposed the motion and sought to strike an affidavit.

The Master granted leave to amend the pleadings, finding no new cause of action or non-compensable prejudice.

The Master also ruled on the follow-up questions, ordering one to be answered and two not to be answered.

The preliminary issue regarding the striking of an affidavit was dismissed.

The applicant father sought to enforce Letters Rogatory and a subpoena issued by a Florida court against several Ontario lawyers who had represented his ex-wife and daughter in previous family law proceedings.

The Florida action sought damages for interference with parental rights.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application on public policy grounds, holding that the underlying cause of action is forbidden in Canada and that enforcing the subpoena would violate solicitor-client privilege and confidentiality.

The appellant, Lease Administration Corporation (LAC), appealed an order from Master McGraw granting the defendants' motion for security for costs.

The appeal raised questions regarding the standard of review for a Master's decision, whether factual findings from an interim motion are binding, and the Master's appreciation of the merits of LAC's claim, including the ability of a co-plaintiff to satisfy a costs award.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Master applied correct legal principles and made reasonable factual findings.

It clarified that interim findings are not binding and that co-plaintiffs' claims must be sufficiently similar to rely on one's ability to pay costs for the other, requiring evidentiary support for such ability.