James Zibarras

The plaintiff, a co-founder of 1PLUS12, brought an action against numerous defendants, including the corporation's lawyers and investors, alleging a Ponzi scheme and claiming unpaid compensation.

Several groups of defendants brought motions to strike the statement of claim under Rules 21.01 and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court struck the plaintiff's affidavit and the claims against the investors, finding the plaintiff lacked standing to advance claims on their behalf.

The court also struck certain scandalous and irrelevant paragraphs from the pleadings.

However, the court dismissed the motions to strike the entirety of the claims against the defendant lawyers and law firms, finding it was not plain and obvious that the claims for negligence and misrepresentation would fail.

This is an appeal from an order striking the appellant’s action as an abuse of process.

The appellant claimed the motion judge erred in concluding the action was a collateral attack on prior family court orders.

The Court of Appeal found no error, concluding the action entirely paralleled the basis upon which the appellant challenged those orders in Family Court and was a clear attempt to relitigate issues from the child protection proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants sought to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to remove a litigation guardian.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction as the order was interlocutory, not final, and quashed the appeal.

The panel then reconstituted as the Divisional Court and denied leave to appeal, finding no confusion in the relevant rule (r. 7.06(2)) and no general importance warranting leave.

The plaintiff father brought an action against the Children's Aid Society of Ottawa (CAS) for negligence, Charter breaches, and misfeasance in public office, alleging improper conduct during child protection and adoption proceedings that occurred while he was facing a murder charge for which he was ultimately acquitted.

The CAS moved to strike the action.

The court granted the motion, finding the action was an abuse of process as a collateral attack on valid Family Court orders.

The court also held that the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action, as the CAS owes a duty of care only to the children, not the parents, and the Charter and misfeasance claims were bound to fail.

The parties, equal shareholders in a real estate business, underwent a court-ordered sales process overseen by a Sales Officer.

The moving party brought a motion for the distribution of $10 million from the net proceeds of the sale.

The responding party opposed, arguing the funds should be frozen until trial to secure his claims.

The court held that the prior Appointment Order did not function as a Mareva injunction and there was no basis to freeze the funds.

However, due to a lack of evidence regarding potential corporate tax liabilities, the court approved a reduced distribution of $8 million, split equally between the parties.

The plaintiffs, two numbered companies acting as financing vehicles for tax shelter schemes, sued the defendant investor for repayment of $6.29 million in loans.

The defendant argued that the loans were satisfied by preferred shares held in trust and that claims for earlier loans were statute-barred.

The court found that the claims for the earlier loans were out of time as the limitation period commenced when the loans matured or were demanded by the tax shelter's operating company acting as the plaintiffs' agent.

Furthermore, the court held that the preferred shares were intended to repay the loans.

The action and the defendant's counterclaim were dismissed.

The defendant and plaintiff by counterclaim, Donald Wright, brought a motion seeking leave to amend his statement of defence and counterclaim and to compel answers to certain follow-up discovery questions.

The responding parties opposed the motion and sought to strike an affidavit.

The Master granted leave to amend the pleadings, finding no new cause of action or non-compensable prejudice.

The Master also ruled on the follow-up questions, ordering one to be answered and two not to be answered.

The preliminary issue regarding the striking of an affidavit was dismissed.

The applicant father sought to enforce Letters Rogatory and a subpoena issued by a Florida court against several Ontario lawyers who had represented his ex-wife and daughter in previous family law proceedings.

The Florida action sought damages for interference with parental rights.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application on public policy grounds, holding that the underlying cause of action is forbidden in Canada and that enforcing the subpoena would violate solicitor-client privilege and confidentiality.

The appellant, Lease Administration Corporation (LAC), appealed an order from Master McGraw granting the defendants' motion for security for costs.

The appeal raised questions regarding the standard of review for a Master's decision, whether factual findings from an interim motion are binding, and the Master's appreciation of the merits of LAC's claim, including the ability of a co-plaintiff to satisfy a costs award.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Master applied correct legal principles and made reasonable factual findings.

It clarified that interim findings are not binding and that co-plaintiffs' claims must be sufficiently similar to rely on one's ability to pay costs for the other, requiring evidentiary support for such ability.

The applicant sought costs of over $20,000 following the respondent's motions, which were largely abandoned at the hearing without proper notice.

The respondent argued costs should be fixed at $1,000 and reserved to the trial judge.

The court noted the respondent's failure to update the confirmation of motion and unreasonable refusal of the applicant's offer to adjourn the motions sine die.

Applying principles of proportionality and reasonableness, the court awarded the applicant fixed costs of $7,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST, payable forthwith.

The defendants brought a motion to vary a Mareva injunction to permit payments for legal fees and living expenses out of frozen funds.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing the defendants failed to demonstrate they lacked access to other assets.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the moving parties failed to discharge their onus because they did not provide evidence explaining why related corporate defendants (Incryptex and ApexDX) could not fund the litigation, nor did they provide sufficient details of their living expenses or account for other funds.

The moving party sought to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) obtained ex parte by the responding parties over a property slated for redevelopment.

The dispute centered on an alleged agreement to sever and transfer a heritage house on the property to the responding parties.

The court applied the Dhunna factors and found that the responding parties' interest was primarily financial rather than a genuine claim for specific performance of unique land.

The court ordered the CPL discharged on the condition that the moving party post $1 million in security, allowing the redevelopment project to proceed.

This is a costs judgment following an interim proceeding where an injunction was granted.

The court received costs submissions from all parties.

However, due to allegations of subsequent events that may impact the appropriate costs award, the judge exercised discretion under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act to reserve the costs of the interim proceeding to the trial judge or, with consent, to the judge disposing of an oppression application.

The court emphasized that costs are not appropriately awarded on the interim proceeding until an assessment of evidence and findings of fact considering these subsequent events can be made.

An appeal concerning the interpretation of a term in an amended Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The appellant challenged the application judge's interpretation of a contractual provision.

The Court of Appeal applied the deferential standard of review established in Creston Moly Corp. v. Sattva Capital Corp. and found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's findings of fact or interpretation of the impugned provision.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The plaintiffs sought an interim injunction to restrain the defendants, including a former shareholder and several former employees, from competing against the plaintiff company and soliciting its clients and employees.

The court found that the former shareholder breached the restrictive covenants in the unanimous shareholder agreement and his fiduciary duties by orchestrating a plan to use confidential information to divert business to a newly formed competitor.

The court applied the strong prima facie case standard for the first branch of the RJR-MacDonald test and found that the plaintiffs established a strong case, would suffer irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction.

The court granted the injunction against the former shareholder and the former employees, enjoining them from using confidential information and competing in association with the former shareholder.

This is a costs judgment following a dispute over the face value of a vendor take-back (VTB) mortgage, which was contingent on a development application that ultimately failed.

The plaintiff (mortgagor) successfully argued that the defendant (mortgagee) acted high-handedly and abused process by initiating Power of Sale proceedings for the full face value despite the known contingency, and by raising spurious allegations.

The court found the plaintiff entitled to costs, departing from a standard mortgage cost clause due to the defendant's conduct.

The plaintiff was awarded $50,000 for fees and $8,746.82 for disbursements, with the court noting some "over-lawyering" by the plaintiff's counsel but emphasizing the defendant's inappropriate behaviour.

A dispute arose after the defendant purchased a winning $2 million scratch lottery ticket while in a romantic relationship with the plaintiff and living with her parents.

The plaintiff claimed the parties had agreed to share lottery winnings, while the parents argued they owned the winnings because the ticket was purchased using their company's debit card.

The court held that the evidence did not establish any express or implied agreement between the romantic partners to share the winnings and rejected claims of constructive trust or unjust enrichment.

The court further found that the parents had implicitly permitted the debit card use and had no entitlement to the proceeds.

The winnings belonged solely to the defendant, subject only to a small damages award relating to a lost deposit caused by a freezing order obtained by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff supplier moved for summary judgment to recover a liquidated debt for packaging products delivered under purchase orders totaling over US$280,000.

The defendants asserted a counterclaim alleging the plaintiff bribed a purchasing employee to manipulate purchasing practices, causing losses exceeding $1.7 million.

After previously granting the defendants an opportunity to provide evidence of damages, the court found the defendants had failed to produce expert or analytical evidence establishing material damages.

The court held that the evidence supported only a potential claim for unliquidated punitive damages and did not justify delaying payment of the uncontested debt.

Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff for the liquidated claim, the defence of set‑off was dismissed, and the counterclaim was permitted to proceed to trial.