Gavin Hamish Finlayson

The defendant brought a motion to vary an ex parte Mareva injunction to allow him to appoint a receiver over the property of a company controlled by the bankrupt.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the advances made by the defendant were equity rather than debt and that the security was a sham.

The court applied the 'just or convenient' test under the Courts of Justice Act and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

Finding that the company had no active business to stabilize and that the validity of the security was highly contested, the court concluded it was not just or convenient to appoint a receiver and dismissed the motion.

The court considered whether the plaintiffs could post security for costs by way of a third-ranking charge against real property, rather than in cash or by letter of credit.

The court found that the plaintiffs had not provided sufficient sworn evidence regarding the value and equity of the property, nor had they demonstrated that the proposed security would be a reliable and accessible source of funds for the defendants.

The court declined to approve the third-ranking mortgage as security and ordered that security be posted in an acceptable form, such as cash or a letter of credit, extending the deadline for posting security by one week.

The plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction against the defendants for passing off their sports hydration products (Cwench) as the plaintiffs' (BioSteel).

The plaintiffs alleged that Cwench's products, flavors, and packaging ("get-ups") were confusingly similar to BioSteel's.

The court dismissed the injunction request, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a strong prima facie case or a serious issue to be tried regarding goodwill in their product's get-ups, misrepresentation causing confusion, or actual/potential damages.

The court determined the injunction was mandatory, requiring a higher "strong prima facie case" standard, and found that similarities were common industry features or functional choices, and evidence of consumer confusion was insufficient.

LTL Management LLC, an indirect subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, sought recognition of its second US Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding as a foreign main proceeding under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) in Canada.

This application followed the dismissal of its initial Chapter 11 filing due to insufficient immediate financial distress.

The new Chapter 11 was based on a negotiated Plan Support Agreement establishing an $8.9 billion trust for talc-related claims.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice granted the recognition order, along with ancillary relief including a stay of proceedings against LTL and related Canadian co-defendants, and the appointment of Ernst & Young Inc. as Information Officer.

The court found the US proceeding to be a foreign main proceeding, with LTL's Centre of Main Interests (COMI) in the United States, and that the relief was appropriate to coordinate proceedings and ensure equal treatment of talc-related claims.

The application was unopposed.

This was a summary judgment motion brought by Andrew Cole and Andrew Cole Corporation, defendants to a counterclaim, seeking to dismiss the counterclaim advanced by Demilec Inc. Demilec alleged that Mr. Cole, as Executive Director of the Canadian Urethane Foam Contractors Association Inc. (CUFCA), acted out of self-interest by developing a competitive product, improperly certifying a competitor's product, and sending misleading emails.

The court found that Demilec failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The allegations against Mr. Cole involved conduct undertaken in his capacity as a CUFCA employee, and no personal liability was established.

The motion was granted, and the counterclaim against Andrew Cole and Andrew Cole Corporation was dismissed.

In the receivership of the Bridging Funds, the Receiver brought a motion to determine whether unitholders with Potential Statutory Rescission Claims (based on misrepresentations in offering memoranda) or Potential Redemption Claims (based on unfulfilled redemption requests) were entitled to priority over General Unitholder Claims.

The court held that Potential Redemption Claims were not entitled to priority because the redemption requests had not been completed prior to the receivership.

However, the court held that Potential Statutory Rescission Claims were entitled to priority, finding that the statutory right of rescission under s. 130.1(1) of the Securities Act creates a de facto priority and justifies the imposition of a constructive trust over the invested funds.

The plaintiffs' motion for interlocutory injunctive relief and a certificate of pending litigation was dismissed.

The defendants and non-party Project Companies sought costs.

The plaintiffs opposed an award of costs or argued for a reduced amount, but failed to provide their own costs outline.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments to deny costs or defer them to the trial judge.

Applying the principle that an attack on costs without providing one's own dockets is an 'attack in the air,' the court found the claimed amounts reasonable and awarded partial indemnity costs of $65,000 to the defendants and $39,000 to the Project Companies.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Lavine J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties fixed at $5,000.

The moving party sought an interim stay of a decision that ended an ex parte interlocutory injunction restraining the respondents from dealing with a mortgage, pending a motion for leave to appeal.

The underlying dispute involved a property development and a contest over the ownership of the moving party corporation.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the motion for leave to appeal was weak, there was no irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience did not favor extending the injunction.

The parties, two brothers who jointly own a cement delivery business through separate corporations, reached a settlement in their oppression applications involving a shotgun buy-sell agreement.

A dispute arose regarding the payment of legal fees incurred by one brother (DN) from the business's revenues, which had been the historical practice.

The other brother (GN) refused to transfer funds to pay a $364,346.96 legal invoice, arguing the fees were unreasonable and disproportionate to his own.

The court found that GN's refusal breached the status quo agreed upon in the settlement and ordered GN to transfer the funds.

The court also dismissed GN's request to refer the legal accounts for assessment, finding he lacked standing under section 9 of the Solicitors Act.

The court dismissed two motions seeking to consolidate other proceedings with a main action scheduled for trial.

The first motion, brought by the defendants, sought to consolidate the main action with a separate claim against former employees for breach of fiduciary duty (the "Brampton action").

The second motion, brought by 320 Bronte Road Inc., sought to consolidate its newly commenced action (alleging misconduct by the plaintiffs) and the Brampton action with the main proceeding.

The court found that the issues in the various proceedings were distinct, and consolidation would cause significant delays to the fixed trial date.

It concluded that any theoretical benefits of judicial economy or avoiding inconsistent findings were outweighed by the practical concerns of delay and managing unwieldy, disparate claims.

The court also criticized 320 Bronte Road Inc. for failing to follow proper Commercial List scheduling protocols.

The appellants appealed an order determining the terms of a shotgun buy/sell agreement reached to settle oppression claims.

They argued the application judge erred by refusing to include a term requiring the corporation to indemnify one of the appellants for personal tax liability.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the application judge's conclusion that there was insufficient evidence of such an agreement and that the proposed term was not commercially reasonable.

The parties, equal shareholders in a real estate business, underwent a court-ordered sales process overseen by a Sales Officer.

The moving party brought a motion for the distribution of $10 million from the net proceeds of the sale.

The responding party opposed, arguing the funds should be frozen until trial to secure his claims.

The court held that the prior Appointment Order did not function as a Mareva injunction and there was no basis to freeze the funds.

However, due to a lack of evidence regarding potential corporate tax liabilities, the court approved a reduced distribution of $8 million, split equally between the parties.

The plaintiff in two proposed class actions alleging a price-fixing conspiracy in the canned tuna industry brought a motion for approval of a third-party litigation funding agreement.

The plaintiff could not bear the financial burden of funding the required expert evidence.

After extensive negotiations and due diligence, the plaintiff entered into an agreement with Lake Whillans Fund.

The court applied the four-factor test for approving third-party funding agreements and found the agreement to be necessary for access to justice, fair, reasonable, and protective of the defendants' interests.

The motion to approve the funding agreement was granted.

A class action was brought against an auditor for negligently auditing Form 9 reports filed with the Ontario Securities Commission that falsely confirmed a securities dealer's compliance with segregation and minimum capital requirements.

The dealer subsequently failed and investors lost millions.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for the class, finding the auditor owed a duty of care.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that no duty of care existed because there was insufficient proximity between the auditor and the class members.

The class members never saw or knew of the Form 9 reports, made no representations to them, and the interposition of the OSC and the dealer between the auditor and the class rendered the relationship too remote.

Following a summary judgment motion in a class proceeding where the plaintiff succeeded on four of five common issues, the plaintiff sought an elevated partial indemnity costs award of $1,287,296.

The defendant argued for partial indemnity costs capped at $500,000 due to divided success.

The court rejected the elevated scale, applied the recommended Grid rates for hourly fees, and reduced the fees by one-quarter to reflect the divided success.

Costs were fixed at $775,000 all-inclusive, payable within 30 days.

The plaintiff, Barry Lavender, representing a class of investors, moved for summary judgment on five common issues in a class action against Miller Bernstein LLP, the auditor of a defunct securities dealer, Buckingham Securities.

The class members suffered $10.6 million in losses due to Buckingham's failure to segregate client assets and maintain minimum capital, which the defendant auditor negligently failed to report in Form 9s filed with the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC).

The court applied the Anns-Cooper analysis to establish a duty of care owed by the auditor to the class members, finding sufficient proximity and foreseeability, and no concerns of indeterminate liability.

The court found that Buckingham was required to segregate assets and failed to do so, and that the defendant breached its duty of care, causing damages.

However, the court could not determine the quantum of damages on a class-wide basis from the evidence presented.

Self-represented long-term disability beneficiaries sought leave to appeal a sanction order from the Superior Court of Justice in the Nortel Networks CCAA proceedings.

The applicants challenged their binding status under the 2009 Representation Order for Disabled Employees and the 2010 Employee Settlement Agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the stringent test for leave in CCAA proceedings was not met.

The proposed appeal lacked merit, the applicants were bound by the settlement agreement, and further delays in the protracted litigation were to be avoided.

The court also rejected a late-filed notice of constitutional question challenging sections 6(1) and 11 of the CCAA.

The Monitor in the CCAA proceedings of Nortel Networks Corporation brought a motion to pass its accounts and those of its legal counsel for the period from January 2009 to May 2016.

The fees sought totaled over $250 million CAD and USD combined.

The court applied the Belyea factors to assess the fairness and reasonableness of the fees.

Despite the unprecedented size of the fees, the court found them justified given the massive scale, complexity, and duration of the cross-border insolvency, the extraordinary powers granted to the Monitor, and the highly successful results achieved for the Canadian estate.

The accounts were approved in full.

The appellants, holding unsecured crossover bonds, appealed a CCAA judge's decision that the common law 'interest stops' rule applies in CCAA proceedings, preventing them from claiming post-filing interest above their principal debt and pre-petition interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the 'interest stops' rule is a fundamental tenet of insolvency law that applies to CCAA proceedings to ensure fair treatment of creditors and orderly administration.

The Court clarified that while creditors cannot legally claim post-filing interest, the rule does not preclude a negotiated CCAA plan from providing for such payments.