Matthew Smith

In the receivership of the Bridging Funds, the Receiver brought a motion to determine whether unitholders with Potential Statutory Rescission Claims (based on misrepresentations in offering memoranda) or Potential Redemption Claims (based on unfulfilled redemption requests) were entitled to priority over General Unitholder Claims.

The court held that Potential Redemption Claims were not entitled to priority because the redemption requests had not been completed prior to the receivership.

However, the court held that Potential Statutory Rescission Claims were entitled to priority, finding that the statutory right of rescission under s. 130.1(1) of the Securities Act creates a de facto priority and justifies the imposition of a constructive trust over the invested funds.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to implement a Pierringer settlement agreement with 18 of the defendants following a multi-vehicle collision, and to strike the jury notice filed by the non-settling defendants due to anticipated COVID-19 trial delays.

The court granted the order implementing the settlement with some modifications to the proposed terms, including a mechanism to enforce the settling defendants' discovery obligations.

The motion to strike the jury notice was dismissed as premature, as no pre-trial conference had yet occurred to determine the expected length of the trial.

The defendants brought a motion to discharge certificates of pending litigation (CPLs) registered against their properties pursuant to an ex parte order.

They argued the plaintiff failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts, including communications between counsel and a settlement agreement.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to disclose material facts that would have affected the outcome of the ex parte motion.

The CPLs were discharged, but the court ordered that the defendants not further encumber or sell the properties without consent or 45 days' notice.

The moving party sought costs following a successful motion to be appointed as her husband's litigation guardian.

She sought substantial indemnity costs against two respondents due to their counsel's failure to communicate, and partial indemnity costs against the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) for opposing the motion.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs against the respondents, finding their counsel's conduct unprofessional but not warranting an elevated scale.

The court also awarded partial indemnity costs against the PGT, rejecting its argument for presumptive immunity as a statutory agency and finding it had pursued meritless arguments.

The moving party sought to be appointed as the litigation guardian for her husband, whose capacity was at issue in a proceeding challenging the validity of powers of attorney and wills.

The Public Guardian and Trustee opposed the appointment, arguing that section 3 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 rendered a litigation guardian unnecessary.

The court held that section 3 counsel and a litigation guardian serve complementary roles, and that appointing a litigation guardian was appropriate to safeguard the husband's legal interests.

The moving party was appointed as litigation guardian, as she had no disqualifying conflict of interest.