CITATION: Paradigm Change Consulting Inc. v Boparai, 2026 ONSC 2382 COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-2795-0000 DATE: 2026-05-06

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

7755 Hurontario Street, Brampton ON L6W 4T6

RE: PARADIGM CHANGE CONSULTING INC., BALWANT BHANDAL, GOGINDER KAUR BHANDAL, and NAVNEET BHANDAL, plaintiffs

AND: AMANJEET BOPARAI, VISHVJEET BOPARAI, SHAMSHER SINGH BRAH, and JASPAL KAUR BOPARAI, defendants

BEFORE: Justice Ranjan Agarwal

COUNSEL: Shayan Kamalie and Michael Campbell, for the plaintiffs James Zibarras, for the defendants Jaspal Kaur Boparai, Amanjeet Boparai, and Vishvjeet Boparai (the Boparai defendants) No one appearing for the defendant Shamsher Singh Brah

HEARD: April 20, 2026

ENDORSEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

1The plaintiffs allege that the Boparai defendants are in contempt of court. The motion is on June 15, 2026. The Boparai defendants move, in advance, for an order striking the contempt motion and, in the alternative, an order striking the plaintiffs’ supporting affidavit. The plaintiffs, at the same time, move for leave to amend the notice of motion and leave to deliver affidavits after cross-examining the Boparai defendants.

2For the reasons discussed below, the Boparai defendants’ motion is dismissed and the plaintiffs have leave to amend their notice of motion and deliver affidavits. The materials filed for the contempt motion, including the plaintiffs’ factums for these motions, have given the Boparai defendants fair notice of the alleged contempt. The Boparai defendants shall pay the costs of these motions, fixed in the amount of $40,000, by June 5, 2026.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

3In December 2024, Wilkinson J found Navdeep Boparai and his companies liable to the plaintiffs for civil fraud. See Paradigm Change Consulting Inc. v Boparai, 2024 ONSC 7068, aff’d 2025 ONCA 569. Navdeep’s total liability is over $2.6m. See Paradigm Change Consulting Inc. v Boparai, 2025 ONSC 4691, at para 50. He has since declared bankruptcy.

4The defendant Jaspal Boparai is Navdeep’s wife. The defendants Amanjeet Boparai and Vishvjeet Boparai are Navdeep and Jaspal’s sons.

5In June 2024, the plaintiffs sued the Boparai defendants for fraudulent conveyance. They allege that Navdeep transferred assets to the Boparai defendants to make himself judgment-proof. The plaintiffs moved, without notice, for an interim preservation order.

6Fowler Byrne J granted an interim interim injunction on February 21, 2025—the Boparai defendants were “prohibited from transferring or otherwise encumbering” four properties (14 Fairmont Close, Brampton; 16 Fairmont Close, Brampton; 4502-4070 Confederation Parkway, Mississauga; and 314 Catsfoot Walk, Ottawa) until February 25. On that day, Doi J granted an interim injunction until the hearing and determination of the plaintiffs’ motion. In May 2025, this action was assigned to me for case management. I extended the interim order until the hearing of the Mareva injunction on July 7. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision. The parties’ lawyers agreed that the interim order continued until the release of my decision.

7On July 28, I endorsed an order for a Mareva injunction against the Boparai defendants. Under my order, the Boparai defendants are barred from “selling, removing, dissipating, alienating, transferring, assigning, encumbering, or similarly dealing with any [of their] assets.” The order was signed in August because the Boparai defendants refused to approve the plaintiffs’ draft.

8The Boparai defendants served sworn statements about their assets in September and October 2025. They were examined for discovery in December 2025. Following the examinations, the plaintiffs contended that the Boparai defendants hadn’t disclosed all their bank accounts. On December 19, the parties consented to an order that the Boparai defendants produce several bank records that same day and cheque copies by early January 2026.

9In January 2026, the plaintiffs moved for contempt of the Mareva injunction. The motion record was served on the Boparai defendants’ lawyer. The Boparai defendants served their motion record on February 6. The affiants were all cross-examined two weeks later. The hearing was scheduled for March 9. On March 3, because of these motions, the hearing was adjourned to June 15. I scheduled these motions for April 20.

10Even though the Mareva injunction froze the Boparai defendants’ bank accounts, the plaintiffs didn’t serve the order on the banks until late 2025. As a result, there was a period of time where the Boparai defendants could access funds from the bank accounts without restriction.

B. Preliminary Issue: whether the motions should be adjourned

11Because of the Mareva injunction, the Boparai defendants require a court order if they seek to use frozen funds for living or legal expenses. The Boparai defendants moved for such an order in writing. On April 16, I dismissed the motion because the Boparai defendants failed to prove that they have no other assets to pay their expenses.

12The Boparai defendants request an adjournment because of that decision. They make two arguments. First, they say it’s bad optics if the contempt motion goes ahead without funding for legal fees. Second, they claim that I have made findings of fact on the funding motion that are prejudicial to them on the contempt motion. I dismissed the request orally. These are my reasons.

13In exercising the court’s discretion to adjourn a hearing, the judge should balance the interests of the plaintiffs, the interests of the defendants, and the interests of the administration of justice in the orderly processing of hearings on their merits. See Khimji v Dhanani, 2004 12037 (Ont CA), at para 14; Ariston Realty Corp. v Elcarim Inc., 2007 13360 (Ont Sup Ct), at para 34.

14The plaintiffs’ contempt motion has been scheduled for months. The Boparai defendants opposed the plaintiffs’ suggestion that these motions all be heard at the same time as the contempt motion. The Boparai defendants understand that they need a court order to use non-proprietary funds for legal expenses. They didn’t move for this relief until March 25. If their position was that they needed clarity on legal expenses, they should’ve moved sooner.

15Further, I have made no findings that the Boparai defendants have, in fact, undisclosed assets that aren’t frozen by the Mareva injunction. My conclusion on the funding motion was only that they hadn’t proven that they had no such assets because they led no evidence on this issue.

III. ANALYSIS AND DISPOSITION

16These motions raise three issues:

(a) whether the plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend the notice of motion;

(b) whether the contempt motion should be struck for lack of particulars and improper service; and

(c) whether the plaintiffs should be granted leave to deliver affidavits after cross-examining the Boparai defendants

17The plaintiffs consent to an order striking paragraphs 34, 35, 36(b), 44, 45, 49, 50, 52, Exhibit V, and part of the preamble of paragraph 36 of Navneet Bhandal’s affidavit. The Boparai defendants maintain that all of paragraphs 36, 46, and 48 are inadmissible. The admissibility of this evidence can be litigated at the contempt hearing.

A. Issue #1: whether the plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend the notice of motion

18The plaintiffs submit that their proposed amendments arise from evidence obtained from the Boparai defendants’ cross-examination and third-party disclosure they received after serving their notice of motion. The Boparai defendants respond that the plaintiffs could’ve discovered these allegations earlier and shouldn’t be allowed to allege contempt first and build their case after.

19I agree with the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs moved for contempt based on the information they had at the time. Given the real-time nature of this litigation, it’s unsurprising that they have discovered new information as the case proceeds. The record doesn’t disclose any tactical conduct. In any event, there’s no point in forcing the plaintiffs to start fresh contempt proceedings based on this newly discovered information. It’s more efficient to allow the plaintiffs to amend the notice of motion, and deal with any costs thrown away in the contempt motion.

1. Law

20The Rules of Civil Procedure don’t discuss amendments to notices of motion. In civil contempt motions, amendments can be made only with leave of the court. See Rocca Dickson Andreis Inc. v Umberto Andreis, 2013 ONSC 5508 (Div Ct), at para 31.

21The relevant factors when deciding whether to allow an amendment of a notice of motion for civil contempt are:

• the nature and extent of any prejudice to either side

• the explanation for any deficiency in the existing materials

• whether the amendment clarifies the allegations or raises new and different ones

• the timing of the request to amend

• whether the anticipated benefit of the contempt proceeding justifies its cost

See Rocca Dickson, at para 35.

2. Facts

22Amanjeet and Vishvjeet were cross-examined on February 19. After the cross-examinations, the plaintiffs received documents from CIBC allegedly showing that Amanjeet had an undisclosed bank account.

23On February 23, the plaintiffs served an amended notice of motion. The amendment particularizes some of the plaintiffs’ allegations and adds fresh allegations.

24On March 3, the plaintiffs received documents from Meridian Credit Union showing that Amanjeet and Vishvjeet had withdrawn funds from a line of credit between February 2025 and July 2025.

25The plaintiffs allege that Amanjeet’s and Vishvjeet’s cross-examinations and their bank records disclose further contempt. The plaintiffs have since filed a fresh amended notice of motion, which: (a) particularizes the accounts at issue; (b) broadens the timeframe of the alleged contempt; and (c) adds fresh allegations of contempt.

3. Analysis and Disposition

26I conclude that the plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend their notice of motion for several reasons.

27First, there’s no prejudice to the Boparai defendants. They’ve had notice of most of the amendments since February. The hearing was adjourned, in part, because of the proposed amendments. That hearing is now two months away.

28The Boparai defendants argue that there’s prejudice because the amended notice of motion doesn’t delete unparticularized allegations, or it adds contempt allegations that are overly broad or de minimis. That’s an argument for striking the notice of motion, which I discuss below, or an argument for the contempt hearing itself.

29Second, the plaintiffs’ explanation for the amendments is reasonable. The amendments arise from the Boparai defendants’ cross-examination evidence or from documents received after the cross-examinations. The Boparai defendants say that information about the Meridian LOC was available to the plaintiffs before the cross-examinations. It’s true that Vishvjeet’s sworn statement discloses the LOC, but the plaintiffs didn’t get any transaction details until later.

30Third, the amendments add new allegations, but these allegations were only discovered from the third-party disclosure. In other words, the plaintiffs are particularizing the claims, which is what the Boparai defendants asked for. The Boparai defendants argue that the plaintiffs could’ve discovered this information sooner if they had served the Mareva order on the third parties earlier. There was no evidence on this point—I don’t know when the banks were served, or how long they took to produce the information. It’s also unclear to me why the Boparai defendants didn’t disclose this information voluntarily. Further, the plaintiffs could’ve served a fresh notice of motion only alleging this new contempt and then asked for the motions to be heard together, which would’ve achieved the same outcome as amending the notice of motion.

31Fourth, the plaintiffs notified the Boparai defendants of the proposed amendments within days of discovering these new allegations. No litigation steps were taken in the meantime.

32Finally, the access to justice issues that arise in Rocca Dickson aren’t the same here. In that case, the plaintiffs’ interim injunction was dissolved after eight weeks. As the court found, the contempt motion was being used to “discomfit” the defendant. The motion hearing was scheduled for five days. Here, the injunction is ongoing, and the motion is only scheduled for a day.

33At bottom, the plaintiffs’ allegations are that the Boparai defendants are playing a shell game. They allege that the Boparai defendants have hidden their father’s assets to make him judgment-proof. They allege that, despite a Mareva injunction, the Boparai defendants continue to hide assets. The plaintiffs may not be able to prove their case. The Boparai defendants have remedies. But the court and the public have an interest in knowing whether the Boparai defendants have disobeyed court orders.

34As a result, I endorse an order granting the plaintiffs leave to amend their notice of motion in the form as requested.

B. Issue #2: whether the contempt motion should be struck for lack of particulars and improper service

35The Boparai defendants’ initial position was that they didn’t know the case they had to meet because the alleged contempt wasn’t particularized in the plaintiffs’ notice of motion. At the hearing, their position narrowed, in part because the plaintiffs have focused the alleged contempt.

36The plaintiffs, for their part, argue that their affidavits and answers to undertakings have given the Boparai defendants fair notice of the allegations against them.¹

37I agree with the plaintiffs. The Boparai defendants know the case they have to meet. If they had any doubt, it’s been clarified on these motions.

1. Law

38A contempt proceeding is a serious matter that is quasi-criminal in nature. Accordingly, motions for contempt are often “strictissimi juris”, which means that “all proper procedures must be strictly complied with”. See Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v Corkery, 2009 ONCA 85, at para 20.

39A person whose liberty is at stake is entitled to know “clearly and unequivocally” the act or omission alleged against them. For that reason, the notice of motion in a contempt proceeding must set out the particulars of the alleged contempt, including the date, place, and other facts sufficient to identify the particular acts alleged to constitute contempt. See Tan-Jen Ltd. v Di Pede, 2017 ONSC 6800, at paras 14-15; Carey v Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, at para 33.

40The “usual requirement” is that the particulars are set out in the notice of motion. That said, there may be cases where it’s not possible or practical to insist that the particulars be in the notice of motion, provided the defendant has “fair notice” of the allegations against them. See Rocca Dickson, at paras 8-26; North Elgin Centre Inc. v McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Limited, 2021 ONCA 173, at para 46.²

41The notice of motion shall be served personally on the person against whom a contempt order is sought, and not by an alternative to personal service, unless the court orders otherwise. See Rules of Civil Procedure, r 60.11(2). This rule “is aimed at ensuring that the alleged contemnor has notice of the contempt proceeding.” See Ting v Borrelli, 2020 ONSC 5976, at para 39.

2. Facts

42The plaintiffs allege that the Boparai defendants are in contempt of five court orders in this proceeding:

• Amanjeet and Vishvjeet borrowed from the LOC secured by the 14 Fairmont Close property, including on June 27, 2025

• Amanjeet borrowed from the LOC secured by the 16 Fairmont Close property on February 27 and July 7

• Tajinderpal Baath paid $100,000 to the Boparai defendants’ lawyer in October 2025, using funds traceable to withdrawals from the 14 Fairmont Close LOC

• on November 10, Vishvjeet withdrew $37,000 from his bank account to pay his wife’s credit card debt

• Amanjeet and Vishvjeet didn’t disclose bank account information

• Jaspal didn’t disclose her cash assets—she deposited around $24,000 in October and November 2025 from unknown sources

43The plaintiffs acknowledge that their notice of motion, amended notice of motion, and materials allege other acts of contempt. In some cases, the allegations are overbroad or unclear. Bu these are the allegations that the plaintiffs are now moving on.

3. Analysis and Disposition

44I find that the Boparai defendants had fair notice of the contempt allegations against them. The notice of motion states the five orders that the Boparai defendants allegedly breached. It also states the manner of the alleged breaches: the Boparai defendants allegedly dissipated or encumbered their assets, with reference to specific transactions, and failed to disclose several assets. The plaintiffs’ affidavit evidence discusses these allegations in detail. The Boparai defendants served their evidence a few weeks later. In those materials, they don’t complain about a lack of particulars. Further, they responded to each of the allegations made by the plaintiffs. Finally, on cross-examination, the Boparai defendants asked for particulars of how they breached each order, and for the evidence the plaintiffs were relying on. The plaintiffs served an undertakings chart in late March 2026 providing a precise answer.

45In sum, the plaintiffs have spelled out the acts or omissions that they say constitute contempt of court. The Boparai defendants know the case they have to meet.

46I also don’t find the lack of personal service to be an issue. Though the plaintiffs should’ve asked whether the Boparai defendants were waiving personal service, there’s no dispute that the Boparai defendants got the materials through their lawyer and, as a result, had fair notice that they were facing contempt proceedings. The strictissimi juris rule shouldn’t be used to play “gotcha!” with service rules.

47The Boparai defendants make several other arguments about each of the allegations. First, in several places, the amended notice of motion pleads “such further and other breaches that will be disclosed prior to the hearing of the motion.” The Boparai defendants argued that this allegation, which is pleaded in multiple places, is unclear and equivocal. I agree. But the plaintiffs have remedied this problem by narrowing the contempt allegations in their undertakings chart and on these motions. The Boparai defendants know the precise transactions that the plaintiffs allege breach the orders.

48Relatedly, the Boparai defendants allege that the plaintiffs are unclear whether Amanjeet or Vishvjeet breached the orders. The plaintiffs’ position is that the accounts are held jointly, so they don’t know who did the transaction. That’s an issue for the contempt motion. For example, if Amanjeet encumbered a joint asset without Vishvjeet’s knowledge, presumably that evidence will come out at the hearing.

49Second, the Boparai defendants argue that several of the allegations are de minimis. As discussed above, one of the factors for leave to amend a contempt notice of motion is “the benefit or purpose to be served by the contempt proceeding in relation to its cost”. See Rocca Dickson, at para 35. Contempt is a “remedy of last resort”. See Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v RI, 2024 ONCA 93, at para 31.

50To support this argument, the Boparai defendants point to individual allegations. For example, the plaintiffs allege that Amanjeet or Vishvjeet withdrew around $200,000 from a LOC despite the non-dissipation orders. These withdrawals range between $200 and $198,000. The Boparai defendants submit that the $198,000 withdrawal doesn’t justify a contempt motion, never mind the much smaller withdrawals.

51I disagree. If the Boparai defendants’ withdrawal of $198,000 from the LOC is a breach of the court order, the benefit of the motion is served despite the cost to the parties or to the court. Contempt of court rests on the “power of the court to uphold its dignity and process”. The rule of law is “directly dependent on the ability of the courts to enforce their process and maintain their dignity and respect”. See Carey, at para 30. Again, the court and the public deserve to know if the Boparai defendants are breaching court orders. If so, the contempt motion may discourage them from doing so again.

52Third, the Boparai defendants argue that there’s no purpose to this proceeding because there’s no risk of ongoing breaches. The Boparai defendants submit that the alleged breaches all happened before the third-party banks froze their accounts. In other words, the Boparai defendants can’t breach the orders now because they can’t access the funds. This factor also comes from the discussion in Rocca Dickson on the issue of amending pleadings. But unlike in that case where the injunction had been dissolved, the Mareva injunction here is still extant. If the Boparai defendants breached the court orders previously, they may try to do so again. The object of civil contempt is “coercive rather than punitive”. See Carey, at para 31.

53In capsule form, the Boparai defendants know the case they have to meet. Indeed, they have adduced evidence answering most of the allegations against them. If there was any lack of clarity, it’s been cleared up by this motion. If there are costs thrown away because of the plaintiffs’ change in position, that can be remedied by a costs order.

C. Issue #3: whether the plaintiffs should be granted leave to deliver affidavits after cross-examining the Boparai defendants

54A party who has cross-examined on an affidavit delivered by an adverse party shall not subsequently deliver an affidavit for use at the hearing without leave. The court shall grant leave, on such terms as are just, where it is satisfied that the party ought to be permitted to respond to any matter raised on the cross-examination with evidence in the form of an affidavit. See Rules of Civil Procedure, r 39.02(2).

55The relevant factors are:

(a) is the evidence relevant?

(b) does the evidence respond to a matter raised on the cross-examination, not necessarily raised for the first time?

(c) would granting leave to file the evidence result in non-compensable prejudice that could not be addressed by imposing costs, terms, or an adjournment?

(d) did the moving party provide a reasonable or adequate explanation for why the evidence was not included at the outset?

See 1944949 Ontario Inc. (OMG ON THE PARK) v 2513000 Ontario Ltd., 2019 ONCA 628, at para 33.

56The plaintiffs seek leave to file two affidavits, which attach the bank records that the plaintiffs received after cross-examination of the Boparai defendants. These are the Boparai defendants’ records.

57First, the evidence is relevant. It may make the existence of the Boparai defendants’ alleged contempt more probable. See R v Candir, 2009 ONCA 915, at para 48. Second, these issues weren’t raised on cross-examination but couldn’t have been since the plaintiffs didn’t have the documents until after. Third, there’s no non-compensable prejudice—the motion is two months away and it’s likely there will be more evidence adduced. And, again, the evidence is the Boparai defendants’ own documents. Finally, for the reasons discussed above, the plaintiffs’ explanation is reasonable—they didn’t have the documents.

58As a result, I endorse an order that the plaintiffs have leave to file the two affidavits.

IV. COSTS

59Subject to the provisions of an act or rules of court, the costs of and incidental to a proceeding or a step in a proceeding are in the discretion of the court, and the court may determine by whom and to what extent the costs shall be paid. See Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43, s 131(1).

60In exercising its discretion to award costs, the court may consider, together with the result in the proceeding and any offer to settle or to contribute made in writing, the factors listed in the Rules of Civil Procedure, r 57.01.

61In the usual case, costs are awarded to the prevailing party after judgment has been given. The traditional purpose of an award of costs is to indemnify the successful party in respect of the expenses sustained either defending a claim that in the end proved unfounded (if the successful party was the responding party), or in pursuing a valid legal right (if the moving party prevailed). Costs awards are “in the nature of damages awarded to the successful litigant against the unsuccessful, and by way of compensation for the expense to which he has been put by the suit improperly brought”. See British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71, at paras 20-21.

62The main objective is to fix an amount of costs that is objectively reasonable, fair, and proportionate for the unsuccessful party to pay in the circumstances of the case, rather than to fix an amount based on the actual costs incurred by the successful litigant. See Boucher v Public Accountants Council (Ontario), 2004 14579(Ont CA), at para 26.

63The plaintiffs seek costs of around $53,000 on a partial indemnity basis. The Boparai defendants’ costs are around $55,000 but they ask me to order costs in the cause of the contempt motion if they’re unsuccessful.

64The usual rule is that costs follow the motion. See Rules of Civil Procedure, r 57.03(1)(a). Costs are awarded in the cause where the motion results in divided success, or the unsuccessful party may ultimately succeed on the motion. See Mark M Orkin, Orkin on Costs, 2nd ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, loose‑leaf), online (WestlawNext Canada), at §4.2.

65There was no divided success here—the plaintiffs’ motion was granted and the Boparai defendants’ motion was dismissed. Though the Boparai defendants may succeed on the contempt motion, I can’t predict that outcome now. Moreover, these motions were unnecessary. The deep issue was whether the Boparai defendants know the case they have to meet for the contempt motion. They do.

66The plaintiffs costs are similar to the Boparai defendants’ costs, so this amount can’t have been unexpected. The issues were important to the parties—the Boparai defendants are seeking to terminate the plaintiffs’ contempt motion. The motion was hard-fought, including an oral request for an adjournment. There were some complex legal issues. That said, the motion led to the plaintiffs refining their position, which mooted some of the issues.

67I find that $40,000 in costs is fair, proportionate, and reasonable. I endorse an order that the Boparai defendants shall pay the costs award by June 5, 2026.

May 6, 2026

Agarwal J

Footnotes

1. 1The plaintiffs also argue that the Boparai defendants require leave for this motion because they’re attacking the contempt motion for irregularity after they took further steps. See Rules of Civil Procedure, r 2.02(b). Given my decision that the Boparai defendants have had fair notice of the claims against them and that disposes the issue, I need not consider this argument.
2. 2In Rosenthal v Rosenthal, 2025 ONSC 2096, at para 64, the court held that particulars “must be set out in the Notice of Motion” (emphasis added). The Court of Appeal’s decision in North Elgin describes that practice as the “usual requirement” but it doesn’t foreclose fair notice from other materials.