Lorraine J. Por

The respondents requested to remove the individual respondent, a school board employee, from a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability.

The Tribunal applied the factors from Sigrist and Persaud, noting that the corporate respondent accepted vicarious liability for the individual respondent's actions, the individual was acting within the scope of her employment, and the corporate respondent could satisfy any remedies.

Finding no compelling reason to keep the individual as a party, the Tribunal granted the request and removed the individual respondent.

The respondents in a human rights application filed a Request for an Order During Proceedings seeking an extension of time to file their Response and an order for particulars.

The Tribunal found the extension request moot and denied the request for particulars, noting that parties are expected to complete the exchange of pleadings before raising preliminary matters.

The respondents were ordered to file their Response within seven days.

The applicant, a gas station attendant, alleged she was terminated because of her sex (pregnancy) and family status.

The respondent failed to comply with disclosure rules and was barred from calling witnesses or presenting documentary evidence.

Despite this, the Tribunal found the applicant failed to establish discrimination.

The evidence showed her termination resulted from performance issues and a dispute over whether she had to pay for a customer's gas 'drive-off', rather than her recently discovered pregnancy, which the terminating manager was not proven to know about.

The respondent school board requested the removal of the applicant's mother as his Litigation Guardian, arguing the applicant had capacity to bring the application himself and alleging a conflict of interest.

The Tribunal found insufficient basis to conclude the applicant lacked capacity to consent to an application being brought on his behalf under section 34(5) of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal ordered the application converted from one with a Litigation Guardian to a section 34(5) application, with the mother acting as the applicant and the son as the claimant, subject to any objections.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a previous Tribunal decision that dismissed his application alleging discrimination in the respondent's paratransit service booking features.

The applicant argued the Tribunal erred in finding he had not established a prima facie case and in its assessment of the evidence regarding undue hardship and witness statements.

The Tribunal found that the applicant was attempting to re-argue his case and had not established any of the threshold criteria under Rule 26.5 to justify reconsideration.

The request for reconsideration was denied.

The applicant, who has a mobility disability, alleged discrimination after the respondents refused to allow him to bring his Segway on specialized transit vehicles.

The Tribunal found that while the policy prohibiting Segways was prima facie discriminatory, it was justified under s. 11 of the Human Rights Code.

The respondents met their procedural and substantive duty to accommodate, demonstrating that the Segway could not be safely secured during loading or transport due to its lack of brakes and tie-down points, and that accommodating it would cause undue hardship.

The applicant requested that the Tribunal disregard the respondent's late Response and reactivate his deferred application following the conclusion of an Ontario Labour Relations Board proceeding.

The Tribunal waived the time limit for the late Response, finding no prejudice to the applicant and noting the applicant contributed to the delay by improperly delivering an unfinalized copy of the application to the respondent.

The Tribunal granted the request to reactivate the application, as the applicant complied with the Rules and the respondent did not oppose.

The matter was directed to mediation.

The applicant, a person with a disability who relies on a motorized wheelchair, alleged that the respondent transit commission discriminated against him by requiring paratransit rides to be booked exactly three days in advance.

The applicant argued this policy denied him equal access to public transportation compared to able-bodied users of the conventional transit system.

The Tribunal found that the applicant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, as he was capable of using accessible conventional transit but lived in an area not serviced by it, making his disadvantage related to residence rather than disability.

Furthermore, the Tribunal held that even if a prima facie case were established, the respondent had accommodated the applicant to the point of undue hardship, as expanding the booking window would require significant administrative resources and reduce the overall number of trips provided.

The defendants brought motions to dismiss a civil action commenced by a former teacher alleging workplace harassment, bullying, and constructive dismissal.

The plaintiff had been a member of a bargaining unit governed by a collective agreement between the school board and the teachers’ federation.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear the dispute or whether the claims fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitration under the Labour Relations Act.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada’s framework from Weber, the court held that the essential character of the dispute arose from the employment relationship governed by the collective agreement.

As the matters should have been addressed through the grievance and arbitration process or before the Ontario Labour Relations Board, the court lacked jurisdiction.

The applicant, a student with disabilities, filed an Application for Contravention of Settlement alleging the school board breached a previous settlement regarding her accommodation.

Subsequently, a new Application was filed alleging discrimination with respect to services.

The Tribunal considered whether to consolidate the two Applications.

Finding common issues of fact and law, and no prejudice to the respondents, the Tribunal ordered the Applications consolidated and cancelled the scheduled hearing for the first Application to allow for a single hearing on the merits.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment.

The respondents noted that the corporate respondent was incorrectly named as EDPRO Energy Capital instead of EDPRO Energy Group Inc. Following a Case Assessment Direction, the applicant consented to the name change.

The Tribunal ordered the application and style of cause amended to reflect the correct corporate name.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability arising from an administrative transfer.

The applicant's union had previously filed a grievance regarding the same transfer, which was settled between the union and the employer.

The respondents requested early dismissal of the application under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal found that the grievance settlement appropriately dealt with the substance of the application and dismissed the application.

The applicant sought a review of an Employment Standards Officer's decision denying her claim that she was terminated because of her pregnancy.

The employer claimed she was terminated for poor attendance and inability to work full-time hours.

The Board found that the employer's reasons were not credible, as the applicant was an excellent worker and the employer had previously accommodated her schedule.

The Board concluded that the termination was tainted by consideration of her pregnancy, violating section 44 of the Employment Standards Act.

The applicant was awarded $13,639.00 in compensation, including direct wage loss, loss of reasonable expectation of continued employment, and pain and suffering.

The applicant employer sought review of an Employment Standards Officer's order to pay severance to an employee who was forced to retire at age 65.

The employer argued that mandatory retirement at age 65 was an implied term of the employment contract and did not constitute a 'termination' under the Employment Standards Act.

The Board found that the employee did not voluntarily resign and was unilaterally terminated by the employer.

Because the employee was retired without an unreduced pension benefit, the Board held that the retirement constituted a termination under section 58 of the Act, entitling the employee to severance pay.

The application for review was dismissed.