Anne Marie Frauts

This is an appeal from an order dismissing an action, primarily sounding in defamation, under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

The motion judge had dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff (appellant) had not discharged his burden under s. 137.1(4).

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in his consideration of the respondents' defences to the defamation claims and in his weighing of the public interest in the expressions against the plaintiff's interest in proceeding.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the plaintiff had established grounds to believe the action had substantial merit and the respondents had no valid defence, and that the public interest in permitting the action to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the impugned expressions.

The appeal was allowed, and the action was permitted to proceed in its entirety.

The plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction to enforce restrictive covenants against a former sales consultant who allegedly used confidential information to start a competing business.

An interim injunction was already in place on consent.

The court dismissed the application for an expanded interlocutory injunction, finding the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case for relief beyond the existing interim terms, which already enforced the substance of the restrictive covenants.

The moving defendants brought motions to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay and failure to comply with court orders, and for summary judgment on a counterclaim.

The plaintiff and the defendant by counterclaim failed to file any responding material and did not have counsel appear.

The court granted the motions, dismissing the action, granting summary judgment on the counterclaim for $750,000, and awarding costs against the plaintiff and the defendant by counterclaim jointly and severally due to their abuse of process and delay.

The plaintiff employee brought a summary judgment motion seeking a declaration that termination provisions in an employment contract were unenforceable and did not rebut the common law presumption of reasonable notice.

The employer argued the clause validly limited termination entitlements to the minimum standards under the Employment Standards Act.

The court held that a contractual reference to employment standards legislation was sufficient to incorporate statutory minimum notice requirements and could displace the common law presumption, but found the termination provision nonetheless void because it effectively excluded the continuation of benefits required during the statutory notice period.

As the clause attempted to satisfy all termination entitlements solely through notice or pay in lieu and severance pay, it violated the Employment Standards Act, 2000 and was therefore null and void.

The presumption of reasonable notice at common law was not rebutted and partial summary judgment was granted in favour of the employee.