Jordan David Winch

The defendant employer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal action on the basis that it was commenced after the expiry of the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff argued that the claim was not discoverable until settlement negotiations broke down and the employer refused to make further payments.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, knew she had suffered damages and that litigation was an appropriate remedy shortly after her termination.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed as statute-barred.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging his termination was discriminatory and a reprisal.

Prior to the application, his union filed a grievance for unjust termination, which proceeded to arbitration.

The arbitrator found the employer had just cause to terminate the applicant.

The applicant and union explicitly chose not to raise human rights issues at the arbitration.

The Tribunal held that the substance of the application—the termination of employment—was appropriately dealt with by the arbitrator.

Allowing the applicant to re-litigate the termination by raising discrimination arguments that could have been raised at arbitration would be an abuse of process.

The application was dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his wrongful dismissal action.

He had been terminated for cause after bypassing a safety device on a machine, following a history of progressive discipline for safety violations.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge relied on unpleaded grounds, made palpable and overriding factual errors, and failed to resolve evidentiary conflicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors and concluding that the trial judge's findings on the appellant's misconduct were well-supported by the evidence.

The applicant's representative, whose application for a paralegal license was denied by the Law Society of Upper Canada for lack of good character, sought to represent the applicant before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario under the unpaid friend exemption.

The Tribunal found that the representative met the criteria for the exemption, as he was acting on only three matters, was not receiving compensation, and was not carrying on a profession providing legal services.

The representative was permitted to act for the applicant at the next stage of the proceeding.

The appellant employee appealed the dismissal of his motion for partial summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action.

He argued that the termination provision in his employment contract was ambiguous, failed to oust his common law entitlement to reasonable notice, and violated the Canada Labour Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the contractual language clearly rebutted the common law presumption and did not contravene the Code, as it explicitly incorporated statutory minimums if the contractual severance fell short.

The applicant filed a Request for an Order During Proceedings to re-activate his human rights application, which had been deferred pending the conclusion of a grievance arbitration and subsequent judicial review.

The respondents requested that if re-activated, the Tribunal consider dismissing the application under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal ordered the application re-activated and directed that a teleconference hearing be scheduled to determine whether the grievance proceedings appropriately dealt with the substance of the application.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside an order quashing his application for judicial review of an arbitrator's decision upholding his termination.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness because his union failed to provide a Somali interpreter at the arbitration hearing, which he claimed fell under the deficient representation exception to the rule against individual standing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the evidence did not support the need for an interpreter and noting the applicant's proper remedy was before the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

The applicant employee sought judicial review of an arbitration award that dismissed his grievance regarding his termination for cause.

The respondent union and employer brought a motion to quash the application on the basis that the employee lacked standing.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that the union was the exclusive bargaining agent and the employee had no independent right to seek judicial review.

The court rejected the employee's argument that he was denied natural justice due to the lack of an interpreter at the arbitration, noting that he was fluent in English and that any complaint regarding the union's representation should have been brought before the Ontario Labour Relations Board as a breach of the duty of fair representation.

Following a trial in which the plaintiff obtained judgment exceeding $543,000, the court issued supplementary reasons on costs after learning that the plaintiff had previously delivered a formal offer to settle under Rule 49.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The judgment obtained was more favourable than the terms of the offer.

Applying Rule 49 cost consequences, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to substantial indemnity costs from the date of the offer to the date of judgment.

The adjustment increased the plaintiff’s cost entitlement.

The total costs award was amended accordingly.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.

The Tribunal previously deferred the application pending a grievance arbitration.

After the arbitrator upheld the applicant's termination, the respondents sought to dismiss the application under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

However, the applicant initiated an application for judicial review of the arbitration award.

The Tribunal granted the union intervenor status and decided to further defer the human rights application until the judicial review proceedings are finalized, noting that the grievance proceedings are not final while a judicial review is pending.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging age discrimination in his employment termination.

The respondent sought early dismissal on the basis that the applicant had signed a full and final release in exchange for a severance package.

The applicant argued he signed the release under duress.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's shock at losing his job and financial obligations did not amount to duress, especially since he had eight days to consider the offer and obtained independent legal advice before signing.

The application was dismissed as an abuse of process.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision upholding the assignment of certain I-beam installation work to a rival union.

The applicant argued the Board breached procedural fairness by failing to consider twenty drawings submitted with its reply.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board had considered the drawings and its decision was not patently unreasonable.

Following an unsuccessful application for judicial review regarding mill closures, the applicants argued that no costs should be awarded due to the public interest nature of the litigation.

The court rejected this argument, noting the applicants had a personal and pecuniary interest in the outcome.

The court awarded costs to the successful respondents, fixing the Ministry's costs at $22,368.68 and reducing Domtar's claimed costs to $12,000 to account for duplication of work among the respondents.

The applicants sought judicial review and an order of mandamus to compel the Minister of Natural Resources to require public consultation and amendments to Forest Management Plans before two forestry companies could restructure their operations, close certain sawmills, and redirect wood supply.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Plans regulate forest operations and sustainability, not the processing of harvested wood at specific mills.

As the restructuring did not change the forest operations or impact sustainability, no Plan amendments or public consultations were required under the Crown Forest Sustainability Act.