Phillip Andrew Malcolm Millar

Summary conviction appeal from an impaired driving conviction under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the investigating officer arbitrarily detained him and unlawfully searched him when the officer stopped his vehicle while looking for another individual suspected of trespass and driving under suspension.

The appeal court held the officer had articulable cause and reasonable grounds to detain and question the driver based on the specific location, vehicle description, and surrounding circumstances, and that the subsequent arrest for impaired driving was supported by reasonable and probable grounds.

No breach of ss. 8 or 9 of the Charter was established, and the evidence would not have been excluded under s. 24(2) in any event.

Judge-alone criminal trial on historical sexual offence allegations spanning youth and adult periods, involving multiple complainants who were neighbours, relatives, daughters, or step-daughters of the accused.

The court admitted cross-over similar fact evidence between the youth and adult indictments, and also considered prior sworn evidence from another complainant, applying the similar fact evidence framework from Handy and related authorities.

After applying W. (D.), the court accepted the evidence of four complainants as credible and reliable beyond a reasonable doubt, but found a reasonable doubt on two adult counts because of a material inconsistency in one complainant's account.

Convictions were entered on 26 adult counts and all 26 youth counts, with acquittals on counts 27 and 28 of the adult indictment.

The accused was tried on a charge under s. 153.1 of the Criminal Code alleging sexual conduct with a complainant who had Down syndrome and functioned at the level of a young child.

The court found both the complainant and the accused credible, but held the complainant was highly susceptible to suggestion from authority figures.

The allegation first emerged only after the complainant's sister, in a frightened state over sores she believed might indicate a sexually transmitted disease, directly suggested the accused's name and sexual acts.

Because the origin of the allegation created a reasonable doubt as to its authenticity, the accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with failing to remain at the scene of a motor vehicle collision and provide her name and address contrary to section 252(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of her section 10(a) and (b) rights.

The court found that police deliberately misled the accused regarding the extent of her jeopardy during a police interview to extract an admission of driving.

The court excluded the accused's statements as a result of the Charter breach.

However, the court convicted the accused on the basis of care and control of the vehicle independent of driving, finding that as the vehicle owner, she had a duty to ensure her name and address were provided at the scene of the collision.

At a preliminary hearing, the court considered whether there was sufficient evidence to commit four accused persons to trial on various charges related to marijuana production and trafficking conspiracies.

The court discharged two accused (Tuan Vu and Thu Tran) on conspiracy charges, finding that while they may have facilitated or furthered the commission of crimes, the evidence was insufficient to establish they were parties to the formation of the conspiracy agreement itself.

The court applied the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. J.F., which restricts party liability in conspiracy cases to conduct that aids or abets the formation of the agreement.

The court also discharged one accused (Cong Nguyen) on a count involving a warehouse conspiracy, finding that merely selling equipment with knowledge it would be used for illegal purposes does not constitute conspiracy.

Two accused were committed to trial on trafficking and conspiracy counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine.

The Crown conceded that the guilty verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal.

The court noted it could not address the sentence for a separate marijuana possession conviction as leave to appeal sentence was not sought.