D.R. Lent

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and having an excess blood alcohol concentration (BAC).

He brought a Charter application to exclude breath test results, alleging violations of his ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found that the initial arrest for failing to remain at the scene of an accident was unlawful, constituting a s. 9 Charter violation, as the offence was not legally applicable to the facts.

A s. 10(b) violation also occurred due to the police's inadvertent failure to fully advise Duty Counsel of all charges, delaying the defendant's ability to receive complete legal advice.

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct and the impact on the defendant's Charter-protected interests strongly favoured exclusion of the breath test results.

Without the breath readings, the excess BAC charge could not be proven.

The court also found insufficient evidence to establish impaired operation beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, both remaining charges were dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of having care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg.

The trial judge had excluded breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a breach of the accused’s s. 8 privacy rights arising from continuous video monitoring of a detention cell while the accused used the toilet.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by finding a sufficient nexus between the Charter breach and the breath samples and by misapplying the Grant framework.

The court held that a causal connection was not required and that a sufficient temporal and contextual nexus existed between the breach and the obtaining of the breath samples.

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded the exclusion of the evidence was justified and dismissed the Crown’s appeal.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make an approved screening device demand and that the trial judge erred in rejecting his evidence regarding alcohol consumption.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that the constellation of factors—including departure from a bar near closing time, admission of recent drinking, and bloodshot eyes—objectively supported reasonable suspicion.

The court also found no reversible error in the trial judge’s credibility findings or rejection of the defence theory that mislabelled beer bottles explained the elevated readings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction decision quashing an information charging the accused with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The trial judge had held that the information was a nullity due to deficiencies in the confirmation process under s. 508 of the Criminal Code.

Relying on the Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Ladouceur, the appeal court held that non-compliance with the confirmation process does not invalidate a properly laid information but only affects jurisdiction over the person.

Because the accused attended court on multiple occasions, any loss of jurisdiction over the person was cured.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Ontario Court of Justice to set a trial date.