Andrew Domacina

The accused, Dwayne Scott, was tried for sexually assaulting the complainant, C.L., who experienced an alcohol-induced blackout and had no recollection of the events.

The sexual relations were not disputed, but the accused claimed they were consensual.

The court considered forensic toxicology evidence and video surveillance of C.L.'s state immediately prior to the alleged incident.

The judge found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that C.L. did not consent or was incapable of consenting, emphasizing that a blackout does not automatically equate to incapacity.

The accused's explanation for his post-incident conduct (lying and unsending messages) was found plausible and not indicative of consciousness of guilt.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant, Tyrone Jackson, sought a bail review under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code, challenging a prior detention order.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to a new, stronger surety plan, allowing for a de novo bail application.

Despite the serious nature of the charges (firearm possession) and the applicant's criminal record, the court was persuaded that the proposed release plan, including 24/7 supervision by a strong primary surety and GPS monitoring, mitigated the risks on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court granted the bail application, ordering release on a recognizance with two sureties and strict conditions.

The Crown brought pre-trial applications to admit text messages extracted from a seized cellphone for the truth of their contents and to qualify a police officer as an expert in drug trafficking.

The accused was charged with possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking after police observed suspected drug transactions and seized fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine from a vehicle.

The court found the text messages were admissible under the principled exception to hearsay, as their content strongly corroborated police surveillance, establishing threshold reliability and necessity.

The court also qualified the officer as an expert, finding his practical experience in the illicit drug trade sufficient despite a lack of formal training.

The appellant appealed his convictions for having a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL and driving while prohibited.

At trial, the sole issue was identity.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing eyewitness reliability, misapprehended evidence regarding a gap in police observation, and reversed the burden of proof.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the eyewitness identification was contemporaneous and corroborated by circumstantial evidence, and that the trial judge made no errors in apprehending the evidence or applying the burden of proof.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The total delay from arrest to the scheduled end of trial was 1029 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed the delay, attributing significant periods to the defence due to issues like obtaining and changing counsel.

Additionally, the court recognized the COVID-19 pandemic as a discrete exceptional circumstance, deducting the associated delays.

After accounting for defence-attributable and exceptional delays, the net delay fell substantially below the Jordan ceiling.

Consequently, the court found no infringement of the applicant's right to be tried within a reasonable time and dismissed the application for a stay.

This is a sentencing decision for an accused who pleaded guilty to multiple criminal offences, including two counts of assault causing bodily harm by strangulation, uttering a threat to cause death, and breach of a probation order.

The offences involved brutal domestic violence against an intimate partner, with a history of unreported abuse and the accused's extensive criminal record.

The court considered a joint submission for a sentence of two years less one day imprisonment, followed by a three-year probation order, a DNA order, and a 20-year weapons prohibition.

A key issue was the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit, including additional credit for time served during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court accepted the joint submission, granting 1.5:1 credit for 161 days (242 days) plus an additional 0.25:1 COVID credit (40 days), totaling 282 days, resulting in a further 15 months of incarceration.

The applicant sought a review of his bail detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

He argued the detaining justice erred in law due to technical difficulties during the hearing and by relying on his COVID-19 diagnosis, and alternatively that his subsequent negative test and new release plan constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no error in law as the applicant was detained on secondary grounds due to numerous serious breaches of court orders and a lengthy criminal record.

The court also found the proposed release plan lacked adequate supervision and did not constitute a material change in circumstances.