Keara Lundrigan

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and appealed on the grounds that the Criminal Code's provocation provisions were unconstitutional and that the trial judge erred in jury instructions on provocation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the constitutional challenge, affirming its reasoning in a companion case.

The court also dismissed the appeal regarding jury instructions, holding that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the elements of assault and self-defence as they relate to the definition of provocation under section 232(2) of the Criminal Code, which requires the provocative act to constitute an indictable offence.

Marco Clayton, accused of human trafficking, sought judicial interim release (bail) mid-trial before a judge (Justice Wadden) other than his trial judge (Justice Fraser).

The Crown opposed, arguing only the trial judge had jurisdiction under s. 523(2)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Justice Wadden found he had jurisdiction because no prior detention order existed, distinguishing the case from precedents where s. 523(2)(a) applied to vacate existing orders.

However, he declined to exercise this jurisdiction for policy and practical reasons, emphasizing that the trial judge is best positioned to assess bail grounds based on the ongoing trial evidence, and to avoid fragmentation and inefficiency.

The application was adjourned to the trial judge's next scheduled appearance.

The appellant, Johnathan Impey, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's response to a jury question regarding the definition of reasonable doubt, and the alleged failure to instruct the jury on how to deal with the complainant's motivation to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's response to the jury's question was appropriate, especially given counsel's joint submission, and that the general instructions on witness credibility were sufficient to address the issue of motive to fabricate.

The applicant, who previously pled guilty to possession and distribution of child pornography, applied to have his name removed from the sex offender registry and his reporting requirements terminated.

Despite having received a record suspension and demonstrating significant rehabilitation, the applicant argued that the reporting requirements caused him severe anxiety and hindered his employment opportunities.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's anxiety and fear of discovery did not meet the high burden of establishing an impact that is grossly disproportionate to the public interest in maintaining the registry.

The Crown brought pre-trial applications to establish the voluntariness of statements made by the accused persons to police.

One of the accused opposed the application, arguing his statement was involuntary and obtained in violation of his section 10 Charter rights because he was not informed of all the investigations for which he was a suspect.

The accused also challenged the admissibility of incriminating videos found on a co-accused's phone, alleging a section 8 Charter breach.

The court found the police questioning did not violate section 10 and the statement was voluntary.

Furthermore, the court held the accused lacked standing to challenge the search of the co-accused's phone as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the videos.

The Crown's applications were granted and the accused's applications to exclude evidence were dismissed.

The accused, Steven Redden-Cox, was sentenced for one count of sexual assault under section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The offence involved forced intercourse and fellatio on a vulnerable, mildly intoxicated 18-year-old complainant, following initial consensual intimate touching.

The court characterized the offence as "predatory" and falling within the "date rape" category, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

Despite the accused's expression of regret and potential for rehabilitation, the court imposed a sentence of two years in penitentiary, along with a 10-year weapons prohibition, a DNA order, a 20-year SOIRA order, and a no-contact order with the complainant.

This ruling addresses final jury instructions in a criminal trial.

The court decided not to leave the partial defence of provocation to the jury due to a lack of air of reality, specifically regarding the absence of an identifiable indictable offense by the victim and suddenness.

However, the court found an air of reality for self-defence, warranting its submission to the jury, based on the accused's belief of threatened force and purpose of protection, despite concerns about the reasonableness of the force used.

A 'rolled-up' instruction, combining provocation, intoxication, fear, and suddenness for the mental intent of murder, was granted.

Limiting instructions were provided for the accused's after-the-fact conduct, clarifying its relevance to self-defence and intoxication but not to the intent for murder.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, brought a pre-trial application (voir dire) to exclude his statement to the police, arguing that his Charter rights (ss. 7, 8, 9) were breached due to a warrantless entry into a dwelling house for his arrest.

The court found that the police lawfully entered the dwelling based on the occupant's invitation and that the accused was found in plain view.

Consequently, no Charter breach occurred.

Even if a breach had been established, the court determined that admitting the statement would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s. 24(2) of the Charter, considering the good faith of the police, the minor nature of any potential breach, and society's interest in adjudicating serious offences on their merits.

The application was dismissed, and the statement was deemed admissible.