William Goodman Flintoft Caven

The offender pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death after crossing the centre line and colliding head-on with the victim's vehicle.

At the time of the collision, the offender had fentanyl, cocaine, methamphetamine, and THC in his system.

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the devastating impact on the victim's family and the offender's driving record, against mitigating factors such as the guilty plea, remorse, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions (triple bunking).

The offender was sentenced to 4.5 years' imprisonment less pre-sentence custody credit, along with a 10-year driving prohibition and other ancillary orders.

During a trial for drug trafficking, the accused brought a Charter application alleging his s. 8 rights were breached by the search of his cell phone.

The accused sought to excise several portions of the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant, arguing they were erroneous or misleading.

The court excised certain paragraphs relating to prior simple possession charges but retained references to the accused's prior proceeds of crime convictions and the officer's opinion on the logistics of drug trafficking.

The court concluded that the excised ITO still provided sufficient credible evidence to justify the search warrant.

In the alternative, the court held that the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court considered whether the mandatory minimum sentence for robbery with a firearm under s. 344(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, recently upheld as constitutional in R. v. Hilbach, would violate the Charter rights of Mr. Dennis, who had already served a sentence for possession of the same firearm.

The court found that the total sentence was not grossly disproportionate and that the circumstances did not warrant a constitutional exemption or a finding of double punishment.

The mandatory minimum was imposed.

The defendant, Tranh To Nguyen, was charged with the importation of 11 kilograms of heroin into Canada, found in a checked suitcase upon arrival at Toronto Pearson Airport.

The central issue was whether the defendant had knowledge and control of the drugs.

The defendant testified, denying knowledge and claiming the suitcase was a gift for a banker from a business associate in Johannesburg.

The court rejected the defendant's testimony, finding his account of the business trip and the suitcase implausible and his statements to border officers untruthful.

Based on the cumulative circumstances and the high value of the drugs, the court inferred full knowledge and control, leading to a finding of guilt.

The accused was tried on multiple sexual assault-related counts involving three complainants, including allegations arising from a blindfolded Play-Doh game, requests to untie swim trunks, and a truth or dare game.

The court refused the Crown’s cross-count similar fact evidence application, holding that the incidents lacked sufficient similarity and had very limited probative value.

Applying the criminal standard of proof, the court found material inconsistencies, memory frailties, and alternative reasonable inferences that prevented the Crown from proving the acts and sexual purpose beyond a reasonable doubt.

The evidence relating to the final incident was found so unreliable that it would be unsafe to convict.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

On a Crown application in a judge-alone criminal proceeding, the court admitted each complainant's evidence as similar fact evidence on the other counts arising from allegations of sexual abuse within a household involving three sisters.

Applying the governing similar fact framework, the court found an air of reality to innocent collusion because of family discussions, but concluded on a balance of probabilities that the evidence was not tainted by collusion.

The court held that the circumstances of the allegations disclosed a persuasive degree of connection across counts, particularly the shared family setting, opportunity, relationship of trust, and broadly similar pattern of sexualized conduct.

The probative value of the evidence on actus reus, credibility, and reliability significantly outweighed the low risk of moral or reasoning prejudice in a judge-alone trial.

The Crown brought pre-trial applications to establish the voluntariness of statements made by the accused persons to police.

One of the accused opposed the application, arguing his statement was involuntary and obtained in violation of his section 10 Charter rights because he was not informed of all the investigations for which he was a suspect.

The accused also challenged the admissibility of incriminating videos found on a co-accused's phone, alleging a section 8 Charter breach.

The court found the police questioning did not violate section 10 and the statement was voluntary.

Furthermore, the court held the accused lacked standing to challenge the search of the co-accused's phone as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the videos.

The Crown's applications were granted and the accused's applications to exclude evidence were dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle with methamphetamine causing death, operating while prohibited, and failing to comply with bail.

He crossed the center line and caused a fatal head-on collision.

The court weighed the severe aggravating factors, including his prior impaired driving record and driving prohibitions, against mitigating factors such as his guilty plea and remorse.

The court imposed a global sentence of 6 years imprisonment, reduced by 60 days for COVID-19 collateral consequences, and granted 1347 days of pre-sentence custody credit, leaving a remnant of 2 years and 53 days to serve.

A 12-year driving prohibition was also ordered.

The applicant, Jahson Sanderson, brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of robbery under s.343(a) of the Criminal Code.

The court granted the motion, finding that the Crown failed to establish the requisite link between the violence or threat of violence and the purpose of the theft.

The evidence indicated that any violence or threats were not for the purpose of extorting the vehicle or preventing/overcoming resistance to its stealing, but rather for other purposes or as an impulsive act.

The accused was convicted after trial of assault causing bodily harm following a senseless, unprovoked attack on the victim in the Church Street area.

The victim sustained severe injuries including a severed orbital nerve, crushed cheek and sinus bones, requiring a five-hour surgical operation and resulting in permanent facial numbness and dental complications.

The accused, with an extensive criminal record including numerous violent offences, was sentenced to 15 months in jail less 9 months pre-sentence custody at a 1.5 to 1 enhancement, followed by three years probation.

The court emphasized specific deterrence and denunciation as the primary sentencing principles while considering the accused's background of substance abuse and efforts at rehabilitation.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence obtained from a warrantless entry and search of his residence, arguing his s. 8 and s. 9 Charter rights were violated.

Police had entered the home without a warrant after receiving a 911 call from a witness who observed a man assaulting a woman in a vehicle that was later located in the applicant's driveway.

The court found that the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, but the warrantless entry was justified under the common law exigent circumstances doctrine due to concerns for the woman's safety.

The court also held that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the applicant and that drugs found in the basement were lawfully seized in plain view.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused was tried for assault following an incident observed by an independent witness driving a truck.

The witness testified to seeing the accused repeatedly strike the female passenger and place her in a headlock while driving.

The complainant, who was the accused's girlfriend, denied the assault occurred, claiming they were merely 'play fighting'.

The court found the independent witness credible and reliable, rejected the complainant's evidence due to inconsistencies and a clear power imbalance, and found the accused guilty of assault.

The accused was charged with 28 counts relating to the robbery of an unmarked police vehicle, including theft of firearms, ammunition, and police equipment.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on a handprint on a package of paper and the accused's subsequent arrest in a stolen vehicle containing some of the stolen items.

The court found the forensic evidence unreliable and concluded the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge and control of the stolen items or committed the robbery.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was charged with possession of marijuana following a search of his vehicle.

The search was initially conducted under section 32(5) of the Ontario Liquor Licence Act after the officer observed open alcohol in the vehicle.

The officer subsequently searched the trunk and opened a shopping bag containing approximately 100 grams of marijuana.

The court found that while the initial search was lawful, the search of the shopping bag exceeded the lawful scope of the search power under the Liquor Licence Act.

Applying the three-factor test from R. v. Grant, the court excluded the evidence of the marijuana, finding that the seriousness of the Charter-infringing conduct, the significant impact on the accused's privacy interests, and the credibility concerns regarding the officer's testimony outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The defendant moved for an order requiring the plaintiff to attend a neuropsychological defence medical examination in a motor vehicle accident action.

The plaintiff argued that the defendant required leave under Rule 48.04(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure because the matter had already been certified for trial.

The court granted leave, finding that defence counsel’s mistaken understanding regarding the plaintiff’s willingness to attend the examination constituted a substantial or unexpected change in circumstances.

Applying the principles governing additional defence medical examinations, the court held that the examination was necessary to allow the defence physiatrist to finalize his opinion regarding the cause of the plaintiff’s cognitive impairments, particularly in light of a prior head injury and the plaintiff’s expert report.

The motion was granted and the plaintiff was ordered to attend the examination.