Lee Anthony Burgess

The Crown brought pre-trial applications to establish the voluntariness of statements made by the accused persons to police.

One of the accused opposed the application, arguing his statement was involuntary and obtained in violation of his section 10 Charter rights because he was not informed of all the investigations for which he was a suspect.

The accused also challenged the admissibility of incriminating videos found on a co-accused's phone, alleging a section 8 Charter breach.

The court found the police questioning did not violate section 10 and the statement was voluntary.

Furthermore, the court held the accused lacked standing to challenge the search of the co-accused's phone as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the videos.

The Crown's applications were granted and the accused's applications to exclude evidence were dismissed.

The Crown applied to vacate a Justice of the Peace's release order for the accused, Justin Sleeper, and sought his detention pending disposition of charges.

The application was based on new evidence of the accused's non-compliance with prior release conditions and alleged errors in law by the Justice of the Peace regarding the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

The court found the new evidence sufficient to vacate the release order and ordered the accused's detention, also concluding that the Justice of the Peace erred in assessing the tertiary grounds, particularly concerning the gravity of the offences involving drugs, firearms, and explosives.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple serious offences including sexual assault with a weapon, making and possessing child pornography, sexual interference, voyeurism, assault, uttering threats, and failing to comply with probation.

The accused sexually abused young children in his care while babysitting, filming the abuse, and also possessed a large collection of internet-based child pornography.

The court imposed a global sentence of 12 years, less enhanced pre-trial custody credit of 2 years and 9 months, resulting in an additional 9 years and 3 months in custody.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, lifetime sex offender registration, and lifetime restrictions on contact with children.

The applicant sought severance of five criminal charges (two sexual assault, one sexual touching, two child pornography) into three separate trials, arguing potential prejudice if he wished to testify on some counts but not others.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to objectively support his testimonial intention and that a viable similar fact application by the Crown connected the sexual offence counts.

The court also noted that a judge-alone trial significantly reduces the risk of reasoning prejudice from similar fact evidence.

The offender was convicted of assault, threatening to kill an animal, sexual assault, and criminal harassment after luring the complainant to a remote cottage under false pretences.

The court found significant aggravating factors, including premeditation, the offender's prior record for sexual assault, and his subsequent stalking behaviour.

The court imposed a global sentence of 5.5 years imprisonment net of time served, along with restitution, a victim fine surcharge, and mandatory ancillary orders.

The accused was found guilty on four counts: common assault, uttering threats, sexual assault, and criminal harassment.

The case involved competing narratives regarding consensual sexual activity at a secluded cottage, followed by a car accident and subsequent harassment.

The court found the accused's testimony lacked credibility, while the complainant's evidence, despite some discrepancies and delayed reporting, was accepted as honest and reliable.

The court applied the "rape shield" provisions of the Criminal Code and found no Kienapple overlap for the distinct offences.

This endorsement addresses an application by the accused, N.K., under section 276 of the Criminal Code, seeking to introduce evidence of prior sexual activity with the complainant during a sexual assault trial.

The accused claimed a long-standing sexual relationship existed, which the complainant was expected to deny.

The court conducted a two-step process, first determining the evidence's potential admissibility, then holding a voir dire to assess actual admissibility.

The court reiterated the "twin myths" prohibition, preventing the use of prior sexual activity to infer consent or diminish credibility.

While the accused sought to use the evidence to prove actual consent, the court found this indistinguishable from prohibited reasoning.

However, the court ruled the evidence admissible for the limited purpose of challenging the complainant's credibility, specifically her expected testimony that the relationship was platonic.

The court emphasized that the sexual nature and duration of the relationship were in issue, not explicit details of sexual acts, and that this balance protected the complainant's privacy while ensuring fairness to the accused.

Following a motion in family proceedings in which the applicant obtained a temporary restraining order under s. 46 of the Family Law Act but not to the full extent sought, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and the presumption that the successful party is entitled to costs, the court considered proportionality, the parties’ conduct, the absence of settlement offers, and the financial circumstances of the respondent.

The applicant sought partial indemnity costs of $4,415.79, while the respondent argued for $2,500 with a payment plan.

The court found the claimed disbursements reasonable but the time spent slightly excessive.

Costs were fixed at $3,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable in monthly instalments.

On a family law motion concerning interim support and the proposed sale of the matrimonial home, the court used the applicant's 2014 line 150 income, subject only to deduction of a $12,000 car allowance, to calculate support.

The court rejected the position that dividend income accumulating but not paid out should be excluded, finding it constituted available income for support purposes.

Monthly spousal support, summertime child support, and a 60% contribution to the child's s. 7 expenses were ordered effective July 1, 2015.

The request for an immediate sale of the matrimonial home was dismissed, and arrears issues were left to the trial judge.

The accused pleaded guilty to child luring by means of a computer contrary to Section 172.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and breach of recognizance contrary to Section 145(3).

The Crown sought the mandatory minimum sentence of 90 days imprisonment.

The defence challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum under Sections 12 and 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing it constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated fundamental justice.

The court rejected both constitutional challenges and imposed the mandatory 90-day sentence to be served intermittently, along with 15 months probation and ancillary orders.

The court expressed significant concern about the appropriateness of the mandatory minimum in the circumstances but found itself bound by Parliament's legislative intent.

In a family law motion arising from minutes of settlement concerning custody and access, the applicant sought an order compelling the respondent to sign a parenting coordination agreement with a named parenting coordinator.

The court found the evidentiary record deficient because the proposed agreement was not filed and there was insufficient evidence that the respondent was in default of any obligation to execute it.

The court also held that an earlier order already implicitly required the parties to complete the documentation necessary to retain the parenting coordinator.

Rather than duplicating the order, enforcement remedies under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules were available if non-compliance occurred.

The motion was therefore dismissed.

In a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal of two bar owners for manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision.

The deceased driver, who had consumed alcohol at the defendants' licensed establishment, was found to have a blood alcohol level exceeding 200 milligrams percent at the time of the collision.

The Crown alleged violations of the Ontario Liquor Licence Act constituted unlawful acts supporting manslaughter charges, or alternatively, that the defendants' conduct amounted to criminal negligence.

The court discharged both accused, finding that violations of liquor licensing regulations, while potentially constituting unlawful acts, were not objectively dangerous as required by law, and that the evidence did not establish the marked departure from the standard of care necessary for criminal negligence.