Neha Chugh

The respondent brought a motion to remove the applicant's counsel and for equal parenting time.

The applicant brought a counter-motion for interim custody, access, and child support.

The court dismissed the motion to remove counsel.

Finding that the applicant was the primary parent prior to separation, the court granted interim custody to the applicant and specified access to the respondent, subject to conditions regarding alcohol consumption and smoking.

The respondent was also ordered to pay interim child support and a share of section 7 expenses.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a motion challenging the validity of a DNA warrant issued under s. 487.05 of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued that after excising certain impugned statements from the Information to Obtain (ITO), there were no longer reasonable grounds to believe he was a party to the offence.

The court conducted a sub-facial review and found that even with the excisions, the ITO contained sufficient information to meet the standard for issuing the warrant.

The court also allowed amplification evidence that corrected good faith omissions by the police.

Furthermore, the court held that even if a s. 8 Charter breach had occurred, the DNA evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused brought a pre‑trial Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained after their arrests for alleged human smuggling and related conspiracy offences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and Criminal Code.

They argued the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest them, rendering the detention arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter and the subsequent searches unreasonable under s. 8.

The court held that the directing officer possessed both subjective and objectively reasonable grounds based on the totality of the circumstances, including information from U.S. authorities, phone records linking smugglers to a Cornwall residence, and surveillance of a Toronto‑registered vehicle connected to that address.

The arrests were therefore lawful.

In any event, the court held the evidence would not have been excluded under s. 24(2) because the officers acted in good faith and the evidence was reliable and essential to prosecuting a serious human‑smuggling offence.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether Mie-Tha Lah, a conditionally accredited Karen interpreter, was competent to provide interpretation services for the accused in a trial for impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(a) and operating a motor vehicle with more than the legal limit of alcohol in blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused's counsel objected to the interpreter's qualifications.

The court found the interpreter competent to provide interpretation services meeting constitutional standards under section 14 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, applying the test established in R. v. Tran.

The accused subsequently pleaded guilty to the section 253(1)(b) charge and was sentenced.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The central issue was whether the trial judge erred in law regarding the statutory requirement under s. 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code that a roadside breath demand be made “forthwith” after the officer forms reasonable suspicion of alcohol in the body.

Crown counsel at trial conceded that the roadside demand had not been made forthwith.

The trial judge nevertheless admitted subsequent breathalyzer results after conducting a Charter s. 24(2) analysis and convicted the accused.

The appeal court held that once the Crown conceded the statutory precondition was not met, the roadside screening results and the subsequent breathalyzer results were inadmissible.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal entered.