George Joseph

The accused was charged with sexual touching contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code and sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code involving a complainant under the age of sixteen years.

The Crown alleged that the accused engaged in sexual activity with a fourteen-year-old complainant over a weekend.

The accused raised the defence of mistaken belief of age under section 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code, arguing he took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age and honestly believed she was at least sixteen years old.

The court found that the accused took reasonable steps to determine the complainant's age, including asking her multiple times, checking her Facebook profile, and making visual observations.

The court accepted the accused's evidence that the complainant appeared to be seventeen or eighteen years old and that her age was not disclosed on her Facebook profile.

The court also found that the complainant was a willing participant who pursued the accused, planned to stay overnight, and did not verbally or physically communicate discomfort or lack of consent.

The court acquitted the accused on both charges.

The accused applied to have the trial judge call Leoncia Roundhead as a witness in a jury trial for aggravated assault, arguing the Crown had an oblique motive for not calling her, that the defence was prejudiced by relying on her being called, and that the jury was led to believe she would testify.

The court denied the application, finding no oblique motive and that the Crown's opening did not create a firm expectation.

However, the court ordered several accommodations for the defence, including making the witness available for an interview, allowing cross-examination without meeting Canada Evidence Act s. 9 requirements if called by the defence, and permitting comment on the Crown's decision not to call her during closing arguments.

The accused applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained after police conducted a warrantless entry into their apartment while investigating suspected animal cruelty.

Officers forcibly entered despite the occupant repeatedly demanding a warrant and despite the absence of ongoing sounds indicating distress.

The court held that exigent circumstances did not exist and that the Crown failed to justify the warrantless search under s. 8 of the Charter.

Statements made by one accused prior to entry were admissible, but statements by the other accused obtained while she was effectively detained without being advised of her right to counsel violated s. 10(b).

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the dog, the presence evidence, and the improperly obtained statement.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault and two related breaches of court orders involving a former intimate partner.

The sentencing court considered the principles in s. 718 and s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and applied the Gladue framework, taking into account systemic and background factors affecting the offender as an Indigenous person from a remote northern community.

Despite these mitigating considerations, the court emphasized the accused’s significant criminal record, repeated breaches of court orders, and a pattern of violence against the same complainant.

The court concluded that denunciation, deterrence, and protection of the complainant required a custodial sentence.

The accused received a global sentence of six months for assault plus 60 days consecutive for breach of recognizance and 30 days concurrent for breach of probation, with credit for pre‑sentence custody and a two‑year probation order.

The Crown appealed a sentencing judge's decision to suspend the respondent's conditional sentence order and direct her to serve 30 days in custody intermittently on weekends following three admitted breaches.

The Crown argued that the Criminal Code does not permit intermittent sentences for conditional sentence breaches.

Applying the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Ng, the Superior Court agreed that the sentencing judge lacked jurisdiction to impose an intermittent sentence.

The appeal was allowed, but because the respondent had already served the 30 days, the sentence was varied to time served plus probation.