James Marentette

Clark Eric Sauve was convicted of second-degree murder of his wife, Linda Sauve.

The court considered aggravating factors including attempts to deflect culpability, lack of remorse, elements of planning, use of a gun, and domestic homicide.

Mitigating factors included his age (62), lack of criminal record, prior good character, and significant health issues and depression.

The court applied sections 745(c) and 745.4 of the Criminal Code to determine parole ineligibility.

Citing R. v. Shropshire and R. v. McKnight, the court set the parole ineligibility period at 12 years, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence.

The accused was charged with second degree murder following the shooting death of his wife in their home.

The accused claimed that unknown female intruders broke in, pistol-whipped him, and shot his wife.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including gunshot residue on the accused's hands, his DNA on the murder weapon and ammunition, and the lack of physical evidence supporting a home invasion or struggle.

The court rejected the accused's exculpatory statements as unbelievable and found the circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused shot his wife.

The accused was found guilty of second degree murder.

Breanna Flynn was found guilty of theft over $5,000 and possession of stolen property over $5,000, with the latter charge stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The court considered aggravating factors, including breach of trust and the amount stolen, and mitigating factors such as no prior criminal record.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for breach of trust offences, the court rejected the defence's request for an intermittent sentence and imposed a four-month custodial sentence followed by thirty months of probation with a restitution order for the remaining loss of $2,937.85 to Wilfrid Laurier University.

Breanna Flynn, a financial operations assistant at Wilfrid Laurier University bookstore, was charged with theft over $5,000 and possession of property obtained by crime over $5,000.

Missing deposits totaling $31,298.20 were discovered from the bookstore safe.

Police found $27,962 in Canadian currency and the three missing Brinks deposit bags in Flynn's bedroom closet.

Flynn's explanation for the cash and bags was deemed implausible and defied logic and common sense.

The court applied the W.(D.) analysis, disbelieved the accused's testimony, and found her evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

Based on circumstantial evidence, the court inferred that Flynn stole the deposits.

She was found guilty of both counts.

The accused, charged with theft over $5,000 and possession of property obtained by crime, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized from her home.

She argued the search warrant was invalid because the Information to Obtain (ITO) failed to disclose that the workplace video surveillance was motion-activated and contained a time gap.

The court dismissed the application, finding the omissions were not material to the existence of reasonable and probable grounds and were not made intentionally or recklessly.

The court concluded the search did not violate s. 8 of the Charter and, alternatively, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The Registrar proposed to revoke the registration of the Applicant, a real estate salesperson, on the grounds that his past conduct afforded reasonable grounds for belief that he would not carry on business in accordance with the law and with integrity and honesty.

The allegations involved three properties where the Applicant engaged in self-dealing, failed to disclose offers to his clients, facilitated dubious transactions, and profited from artificially inflated resale prices.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the Applicant acted contrary to his clients' interests, participated in transactions indicative of mortgage fraud, and failed to demonstrate honesty and integrity.

The Tribunal concluded that conditions on his registration would not adequately protect the public and directed the Registrar to carry out the proposal to revoke his registration.

The Applicant, a registered real estate salesperson, appealed a Notice of Proposal by the Registrar to revoke his registration.

The Registrar alleged the Applicant engaged in three fraudulent property transactions in 2008, involving double-dealing, inflating property prices to assist purchasers in obtaining higher mortgage financing, and breaching his fiduciary duties to his clients for personal gain.

The Applicant admitted the misconduct but sought a suspension with conditions, including a non-binding condition to pay restitution, rather than revocation.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found it lacked jurisdiction to order restitution and concluded that the serious nature of the Applicant's misconduct, which included orchestrating sophisticated schemes to defraud clients and lenders, overshadowed mitigating factors such as his remorse, psychological counseling, and support from his broker.

The Tribunal directed the Registrar to carry out the proposal to revoke the Applicant's registration.

In a pre‑trial ruling on the admissibility of hearsay evidence in a second degree murder prosecution, the Crown sought to admit various statements made by the deceased to acquaintances concerning the accused’s prior abusive conduct, the nature of the relationship, and her intentions shortly before her death.

Applying the principled approach to hearsay under R. v. Khelawon and R. v. Starr, the court considered necessity, reliability, relevance, and the balance between probative value and prejudicial effect.

Certain evidence, including statements reflecting the deceased’s intention to go to a shelter and evidence of a meeting in which the accused admitted prior assaults, was admitted as relevant to the relationship and the deceased’s state of mind.

Other statements and proposed testimony were excluded where they risked reasoning prejudice, lacked proximity or relevance, or were unnecessary given other admissible evidence.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that excluded breath test results due to an alleged breach of the informational component of section 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appeal judge erred by failing to conduct a meaningful analysis under the Grant framework.

The Court held that any breach was minor, especially since the accused subsequently contacted duty counsel, and that a proper balancing mandated the admission of the evidence.

The trial conviction and sentence were reinstated.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged both the grounds for the breath demand and the adequacy of the right to counsel advice under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

While the court found sufficient grounds existed for the breath demand based on the officer’s observations and circumstances of the collision, it concluded that the informational component of the right to counsel was not satisfied after the accused twice indicated he did not understand his rights.

The officer failed to make reasonable efforts to ensure comprehension before proceeding.

The resulting Charter breach required exclusion of the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2).

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on drug trafficking charges, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding intercepted text messages.

The trial judge had ruled that the wiretap authorization required police to be certain the target was using the cellphone before intercepting text messages, finding a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's interpretation was unworkable and inconsistent with the authorization as a whole, which specifically exempted non-oral telecommunications from live monitoring requirements.

The Court found no section 8 breach and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation, arguing the Crown improperly split its case by cross-examining him on a segment of his police statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that defence counsel at trial did not object to the cross-examination, did not object to the jury instructions, and specifically declined the trial judge's offer of a mistrial.

The court found no basis to conclude the trial was unfair.