Glen S. Donald

The accused, a police officer, was charged with attempting to obstruct justice contrary to section 139(2) of the Criminal Code.

After his common-law spouse discovered embarrassing videos on an external hard drive and threatened to report alleged child pornography to police, the accused removed his laptop from their shared residence and reformatted it, deleting all prior data.

The Crown alleged this constituted an attempt to obstruct justice.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused wilfully intended to obstruct the course of justice, as there were plausible alternative inferences supported by the evidence, including that the accused reformatted the laptop to avoid further embarrassment and conflict rather than to obstruct a police investigation.

The accused was acquitted.

The appellant appealed a conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and misapplied W(D) principles, leading to an unreasonable verdict, particularly regarding the officer's lack of specific notes on the refusal.

The Crown contended the trial judge properly assessed credibility and the verdict was reasonable.

The appellate court found the trial judge's assessment of credibility reasonable, noting that the officer was extensively cross-examined.

The court affirmed that the mens rea for the offence is knowledge or awareness of the prohibited act, and the verdict was reasonable given the appellant's failure to produce a sample after four attempts.

The appeal was dismissed.

A London Police Service constable was charged with dangerous driving contrary to section 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code after responding to a Code 1 armed robbery call.

While responding with lights and sirens activated, the officer approached an intersection controlled by a red light.

The officer slowed significantly but did not come to a complete stop, failed to reactivate her siren (which she had turned off per a sergeant's direction), and did not see an oncoming vehicle proceeding on a green light.

The collision resulted in injuries to two pedestrians and occupants of the other vehicle.

The trial judge acquitted the officer, finding that while the conduct constituted the actus reus of dangerous driving, the Crown failed to establish the required mens rea of a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the officer's circumstances.

A Court Prisoner Security Officer was convicted of assault causing bodily harm after forcefully shoving a handcuffed and shackled inmate into a wall, causing broken teeth and facial injuries.

The court rejected a conditional discharge despite the offender's exemplary twelve-year employment record and strong character references, finding that the breach of trust and abuse of authority required a custodial sentence to satisfy principles of denunciation and general deterrence.

However, the court imposed a conditional sentence of thirty days house arrest rather than jail time, balancing the seriousness of the offence against the offender's personal circumstances and rehabilitation prospects.

A Court Prisoner Security Officer (CPSO) was charged with assault causing bodily harm under section 267 of the Criminal Code after forcefully pushing a prisoner into a concrete wall in a dry cell, causing dental injuries.

The Crown alleged the accused used excessive force beyond what was necessary.

The Defence argued the accused was justified under section 25 of the Criminal Code in using force to place a resistant prisoner into custody.

The court found the accused guilty, determining that the force used was intentional and excessive, driven by frustration and a desire to assert authority rather than by legitimate security concerns.

The accused faced five charges under the Criminal Code and two charges under the Youth Criminal Justice Act for historical allegations of assault, unlawful confinement, and sexual assault with a weapon spanning from 1995 to 1999.

The charges were laid in January 2011 but the trial was not scheduled to commence until April 2014, resulting in a delay of approximately 39 months.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on a violation of his Charter right under section 11(b) to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court found that 21.75 months of the delay was attributable to Crown, institutional, and other causes and was unreasonable, exceeding the guideline of 14 to 18 months for a two-stage process.

The court inferred prejudice from the length of delay and found that the accused had demonstrated a desire to resolve the matter expeditiously.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.