Richard Prendiville

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the facial validity of a tele-warrant issued for her residence during a drug trafficking investigation.

The court found that while there were reasonable and probable grounds to search other locations associated with the main target, the evidence connecting the applicant's residence to drug activity amounted to mere suspicion based solely on a single visit by the target.

The court concluded the search violated section 8 of the Charter and excluded the seized methamphetamine under section 24(2), finding the serious intrusion into a private residence outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The accused was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon (switchblade knife) and possession of cannabis marihuana for the purpose of trafficking following a vehicle stop.

The Crown alleged the accused was in care or control of a vehicle with an odour of alcohol emanating from it.

The trial judge found that the initial detention was arbitrary, the search of the vehicle was unreasonable, and the accused's rights to counsel were breached.

The judge determined that the police officer's stated concerns about officer safety were pretextual and that the officer was motivated by a hunch rather than reasonable grounds.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and all charges were dismissed.

The accused, charged with possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, sought a Rowbotham order requiring the state to fund counsel of his choice after Legal Aid refused authorization to replace previously retained counsel.

The court reviewed the legal framework governing state-funded counsel and emphasized that an accused must demonstrate financial inability to retain counsel and that representation is necessary to ensure a fair trial.

The accused failed to provide evidence of financial inability and primarily sought publicly funded counsel of choice after discharging previous counsel.

The court found the case was not overly complex and that the accused was capable of conducting his defence.

The application for state-funded counsel was dismissed, but amicus curiae was appointed to assist the court and ensure the orderly conduct of proceedings.

The applicants, charged with unlawful production of marijuana, brought a pre-trial application alleging breaches of their ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights following a warrantless police search of their apartment.

Police had responded to a report of a domestic disturbance and, despite the applicants' explanations and lack of apparent distress, entered and searched the apartment based on a general police policy, discovering a small marijuana grow operation.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable grounds to believe anyone else was in the apartment requiring assistance, rendering the search unreasonable and the detention arbitrary.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused brought a Rowbotham application seeking a stay of proceedings until state-funded counsel was provided.

The accused had been refused legal aid after failing to execute a contribution agreement assigning confiscated funds, but evidence showed the refusal resulted from confusing and misleading notices issued by the legal aid plan.

The court found the accused was indigent, unable to retain counsel privately, and faced serious drug charges with potential incarceration and complex Charter issues.

Given the likelihood that self-representation would compromise trial fairness, the court held that state funding was required.

The proceedings were conditionally stayed to allow the Attorney General of Canada to arrange funding for counsel covering pre‑trial proceedings and trial.

The accused was involved in a single vehicle accident.

The police arrived approximately one hour after the accident was reported and took breath samples.

The trial judge convicted the accused of driving 'over 80', but the summary conviction appeal judge quashed the conviction, holding that the Crown failed to explain the delay by not calling evidence of police organization.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that evidence of police organization is not strictly required if other evidence, such as the arresting officer's testimony that it was a busy night, sufficiently explains the delay.

A new trial was ordered.