Aaron Prevost

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused was charged with second-degree murder of Dakoda Martin and aggravated assault of Andre Williams.

The defence conceded sufficient evidence for aggravated assault and manslaughter but argued there was no evidence of subjective foresight of death required for second-degree murder.

The court found that circumstantial evidence, including the location and nature of the fatal chest wound, the depth of penetration, and evidence of a deliberate stabbing to a vulnerable area while the victim lay on the ground, could reasonably support an inference that the accused knew the bodily harm would likely cause death.

The accused was committed to stand trial on second-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The applicant, charged with production of marijuana and possession of oxycodone, brought a Charter application under sections 8 and 9 challenging the validity of a search warrant and his subsequent arrest.

The search warrant was based on a detailed tip from a named informant who had dated the applicant.

The applicant argued the police failed to sufficiently corroborate the tip before obtaining the warrant.

The court dismissed the application, finding the detailed, first-hand information provided reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant without the need for further surveillance, and that the arrest was lawful.

The applicant, found guilty of drug trafficking and possession of proceeds, sought a stay of proceedings based on entrapment.

The court examined whether the undercover officer had reasonable suspicion to offer an opportunity to commit the offence or if the police conduct constituted random virtue testing.

The court found that the police had reasonable suspicion based on information from a known citizen and that the investigative steps taken were legitimate, not inducing the crime.

The entrapment defence failed, and the application for a stay was dismissed.

The applicant, Leon Kofman, charged with drug and weapon offenses, sought to exclude evidence obtained from searches of two residential condominiums pursuant to a search warrant.

The applicant alleged a violation of his section 8 Charter right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure, arguing the Information To Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable grounds to connect drug trafficking to the target locations and was misleading.

The court found the ITO deficient and misleading, concluding that the warrant could not have issued and the searches were unlawful, thus breaching the applicant's section 8 Charter rights.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court determined that the seriousness of the state conduct (reckless and negligent ITO preparation), the significant impact on the applicant's high expectation of privacy in his residences, and the societal interest in maintaining the repute of justice (despite the importance of the evidence to the Crown's case) favoured exclusion.

Consequently, all evidence seized from both condominiums was excluded.

Anna Thiessen, charged with possession of cocaine and methamphetamine for trafficking, brought an application for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case.

The court considered whether there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer that she had constructive or attributed possession of the drugs found in a crawl space at her jointly owned property.

Applying the test for a directed verdict, the court found no reasonable inference could be drawn that she had knowledge, consented to, or controlled the drugs.

The application was granted, and Anna Thiessen was acquitted of both counts.

The court accepted a joint sentencing submission for the accused, Jason Daniel.

The sentence included credit for 189 days of pre-sentence custody (calculated at 1.5x, totaling 284 days), an additional 60 days of intermittent custody, and two years of probation.

Probation conditions included non-association with specified individuals, reporting requirements, residence approval, counselling, and prohibitions against possessing controlled drugs/substances or weapons.

A DNA order was issued, and a $200 victim fine surcharge was imposed.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving contrary to section 249(2) of the Criminal Code following a motor vehicle accident at the intersection of Oxford Street and Veterans Memorial Parkway in London, Ontario.

The Crown alleged the accused was racing another vehicle at speeds exceeding 150 kilometres per hour in a 60 kilometre per hour zone, resulting in a collision with an innocent third party.

The accused claimed she was fleeing an aggressive pursuer.

The court found the accused was operating the trailing vehicle in a race, rejected her evidence as tailored and illogical, and convicted her based on the credible testimony of three independent witnesses who consistently described dangerous high-speed driving.

The accused was charged with common assault against his domestic partner.

The complainant recanted her allegations two days after the incident, providing written and oral statements to police that she had fabricated the assault allegations.

Despite this recantation and the Crown's own screening for a non-custodial disposition on guilty plea, the Crown opposed bail and proceeded with prosecution.

The accused was acquitted at trial after the Crown called the complainant, who testified to the fabrication.

The court found the Crown's conduct constituted a marked and substantial departure from reasonable prosecution standards and awarded costs against the Crown for breach of the accused's Charter rights under section 7.

The accused were charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at a residence.

Cocaine was found in a bedroom and the kitchen.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove constructive or joint possession.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the first accused occupied the bedroom or that the second accused had a measure of control over the drugs found in the common kitchen area.

Both accused were acquitted.

The accused was charged with common assault against his common-law spouse.

The complainant recanted her allegations orally, in writing, and under oath at a bail hearing, stating she had fabricated them.

Despite this, the Crown proceeded to trial without taking steps to evaluate the viability of the prosecution.

At trial, the complainant again testified that the allegations were false.

The Crown invited an acquittal.

The court found that the Crown's decision to proceed violated the accused's section 7 Charter rights by failing to conduct an objective assessment of whether there was a reasonable prospect of conviction.

The court also found the Crown's opposition to bail was not fairly exercised.

An acquittal was entered and costs were awarded against the Crown.

The offenders, both of aboriginal descent, pleaded guilty to offences arising from an altercation at a private residence.

Doxtator pleaded guilty to possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and Elijah pleaded guilty to assault.

The court applied Gladue principles, noting both offenders' difficult backgrounds and recent rehabilitative efforts.

Doxtator received a suspended sentence and 18 months' probation.

Elijah, who caused significant facial injuries to the victim, received a 45-day intermittent custodial sentence and 18 months' probation.

The applicant, charged with drug and firearms offences, brought a Charter motion to exclude evidence seized from his residence and vehicle.

The court initially denied standing regarding the residence but allowed the applicant to reopen evidence, ultimately finding he had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The court found the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant for the residence lacked sufficient corroboration, resulting in a section 8 Charter breach.

However, the court dismissed the section 7, 8, and 9 claims regarding the vehicle search and arrest, finding them lawful.

Applying the Grant framework under section 24(2), the court admitted the evidence from the residence, concluding the police acted in good faith and the highly reliable evidence was essential to the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The applicant sought Charter relief arising from a brief roadside stop during a police search for escaped youths.

The court held the officers had articulable cause to stop the truck to determine whether its occupants were the missing youths, and that the detention was justified under the common law investigative detention power.

After the officers observed the driver switch seats with a rear passenger, the court found there were fresh grounds for a regulatory detention and licence inquiry under the Highway Traffic Act.

Although the Crown conceded a s. 10(b) breach and abandoned reliance on the applicant's admission, the application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that a warrantless police search of his basement following a 911 call violated his rights under s. 8 of the Charter.

Police had forcibly entered the home after a 25-minute delay and conducted a cursory search of the premises for safety, discovering cocaine in plain view.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the principle that police responding to a 911 call are entitled to satisfy themselves that all occupants are safe, and that privacy does not trump household safety.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing to comply with a recognizance contrary to s. 145(3) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable, the reasons were inadequate, and the trial judge improperly applied the credibility analysis from R. v. W.(D.).

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that strict adherence to the W.(D.) formula is unnecessary so long as the substance of the instruction is respected.

Reviewing the reasons as a whole, the court found the trial judge properly assessed credibility, rejected the appellant’s explanation, and concluded the Crown proved the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

Accused charged with drug offences sought exclusion of evidence seized from residences pursuant to search warrants under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, alleging breaches of ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court conducted a Garofoli review of the Information to Obtain and found the warrants were issued without sufficient grounds.

The police had re‑submitted essentially the same ITO to a different judicial officer after a justice of the peace refused the warrant, amounting to impermissible judge‑shopping and misleading drafting.

The search warrants were therefore invalid and the searches constituted unreasonable searches contrary to s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court held the seriousness of the police misconduct and the impact on the accused’s privacy interests outweighed society’s interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for offences including uttering threats.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly instructed himself on credibility and did not misapprehend the evidence.

The trial judge's rejection of the appellant's denial as self-serving was upheld.

Regarding the sentence, the global sentence was at the low end of the range due to mitigating factors, and the court found no error in the trial judge's refusal to impose a conditional sentence or his decision to impose a concurrent sentence for uttering threats.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.