Thomas, RSJ.

The offender, an Indigenous man, pleaded guilty to robbery and possession of a restricted weapon following a planned jewellery store robbery.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence and a $162,500 fine in lieu of forfeiture.

Applying Gladue principles, the court imposed a total sentence of five years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest.

However, the court declined to impose the fine in lieu of forfeiture, holding that Gladue principles can inform the exercise of discretion under s. 462.37(3) of the Criminal Code, and that imposing such a fine on an impoverished Indigenous offender would disproportionately harm his rehabilitation.

The accused, a commercial truck driver, pleaded guilty to importing 179.2 kilos of opium poppy heads (a Schedule 1 substance) across the Ambassador Bridge.

The accused absconded to India for several years before returning and entering a guilty plea.

The Crown sought a six-year sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, finding that a conditional sentence was inappropriate for the importation of a large quantity of a Schedule 1 substance.

The accused was sentenced to two years' imprisonment, reduced to 22 months to credit time spent on bail conditions.

The accused was arrested on an outstanding warrant for failing to attend court.

Following the arrest, police searched his vehicle and found a loaded handgun.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing the search violated his s. 8 rights.

The court found that the search was not truly incidental to the arrest, as there was no reasonable prospect of securing evidence related to the failure to attend court offence.

The court concluded that the warrantless search violated s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court excluded the handgun from evidence, finding that the police conduct was serious and lacked good faith, and that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The applicant, charged with sexual interference and sexual assault, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was calculated at 48 months.

The court deducted 19 months and 21 days of defence delay, primarily attributed to a late adjournment caused by defence counsel's failure to notice a potential s. 276 issue in the disclosure.

The resulting net delay of 28 months and 9 days fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

Furthermore, the court found that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a discrete exceptional event that justified the remaining delay.

The application was dismissed.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder following a brutal, unprovoked attack on a 75-year-old woman walking on a trail.

The offender, who had consumed marijuana and psilocybin, inflicted severe head injuries that ultimately caused the victim's death 14 months later.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 14-17 years, while the defence sought the minimum 10 years.

The court weighed the severe aggravating factors of the savage attack on a vulnerable victim against the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, and prospects for rehabilitation, ultimately setting parole ineligibility at 13 years.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being denied release on the tertiary ground.

He faced multiple drug trafficking and firearms charges.

The reviewing judge found no error in the initial detention order but concluded that an amended release plan, which included a new residential surety, a significant financial pledge, and a professionally installed security system, constituted a material change in circumstances.

Considering the strict house arrest conditions and the elevated risk posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in correctional facilities, the court granted the application and ordered the applicant's release.

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter for his role in the execution-style shooting of a 16-year-old victim.

The court determined the appropriate sentence range was 8 to 12 years, fixing the sentence at 8 years due to the offender's limited participation and young age.

The court then reduced the sentence to 7 years to account for the collateral consequences of harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, including lockdowns and the COVID-19 pandemic, before applying a 1.5:1 credit for time served.

The final sentence to be served was 2 years and 325 days.

The moving defendants sought leave to vacate a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered by the plaintiffs to allow a corporation to grant a second mortgage to the Royal Bank of Canada.

The plaintiffs and other defendants opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the grounds for discharging the CPL did not satisfy the criteria under section 103(6) of the Courts of Justice Act, nor did the equities favour the moving parties, as ownership interests remained in dispute and the proposed mortgage would dilute the plaintiffs' interests.

The Crown applied for an order granting prohibition with certiorari in aid to quash a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice.

The lower court had ruled that amendments to the Criminal Code (Bill C-75) limiting the availability of preliminary inquiries did not apply retrospectively to cases already scheduled.

The Superior Court held that the amendments are procedural, do not affect a vested or substantive right, and therefore apply retrospectively.

The lower court's decision was quashed, and an order was issued prohibiting the Ontario Court of Justice from conducting preliminary inquiries for the respondents.

The applicants, charged with manslaughter and second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial application to determine whether the amendments in Bill C-75 eliminating peremptory challenges (repeal of s. 634 of the Criminal Code) have retrospective effect.

The court held that the availability of peremptory challenges is a procedural matter, not a substantive right.

Therefore, the repeal applies retrospectively to all matters before the court as of the coming into force date, September 19, 2019.

The plaintiff brought a motion to transfer his wrongful dismissal action from Toronto to Sarnia, citing the declining health of his wife who required his care.

The defendants opposed the transfer.

The court applied the holistic balancing test under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While acknowledging the plaintiff's caregiving responsibilities, the court noted that the other parties and counsel were located closer to Toronto, and the corporate defendant operated virtually.

The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish that Sarnia was a significantly better venue and dismissed the motion.

The accused brought an application seeking the trial judge's recusal, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias based on the judge's findings of fact in previous pre-trial motions.

The accused argued that the judge's findings were palpably unreasonable and consistently favoured the prosecution.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was an attempt to reargue decided issues and that the allegations of bias were without merit.