COURT FILE NO.: 244/20
DATE: 2022-11-16
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
MATTHEW DARREN SIMPSON
Defendant
Meredith Gardiner, for the Crown
Robert Farrington, for the Defendant
HEARD: October 16, 2022.
thomas, rsj.:
[1] Matthew Simpson is now 38 years old. He entered a guilty plea to the offence of robbery while armed with a sledgehammer and possession of a restricted weapon. These are my reasons with respect to sentence.
The Offence
[2] Matthew Simpson was intimately involved in a jewellery store robbery which occurred at about 6:30 p.m. on March 19, 2019 in a commercial premises in London. The robbery involved three others. A vehicle was stolen at gunpoint before the robbery and used by the three co-accuseds to drive to the robbery. Two of the accused (not Simpson) entered the premises with sledgehammers. The location had been surveyed before the attendance and research conducted on destruction of the glass display cases.
[3] The two accuseds, while inside, smashed the display cases with the sledgehammers after ordering everyone down to the floor. Within a minute they escaped with jewellery valued at $535,545. The proceeds of the crime were never recovered but for a single ring valued at $11,900. which subsequently turned up at a pawnshop. The financial loss is now that of the business’s insurer not the owners themselves.
[4] The stolen vehicle was driven a short distance where Mr. Simpson met them in a Dodge Caravan. After presumably off-loading the contraband, Mr. Simpson drove them away leaving the stolen vehicle behind.
[5] The escape did not last long as a London police officer observing the van, known previously as a vehicle related to Simpson, pursued them to the Oneida First Nation. Simpson was arrested at gunpoint. In his van were several items related to the robbery and an empty 9mm magazine for a handgun. The co-accuseds were apprehended a short distance away. Masks and sledgehammers were recovered. Forensic testing connected some of the accuseds to those items.
[6] A subsequent search of a residence frequented by Simpson and one of the co-accused produced a 9mm handgun with no magazine. A magazine was located located elsewhere in the residence. Matthew Simpson acknowledged that he possessed the handgun and magazine. The facts related to the firearm possession support the second conviction on this indictment.
The Gladue Report
[7] Matthew Simpson is a member of the Oneida First Nation. His Indigenous status comes from the maternal side of his family. He has two sons aged 13 and 18 as a result of two relationships. He is separated from both these partners and his children have been living with his mother Diane Simpson. Diane Simpson was an important source of information for the Gladue report.
[8] Matthew’s maternal grandmother attended the Mount Elgin Industrial Institute for the majority of her youth.
[9] Diane Simpson recounts that her mother seemed unable to show affection for her family and believes this inability has permeated through her generation to Matthew. The residential school at Mount Elgin was known to be in appalling condition and the children there were occupied daily by 5.5 hours of classroom work followed by 7.5 hours of physical labour.
[10] Diane Simpson left high school at 15 when she became pregnant. She says she learned to drink alcohol from watching her parents and both she and Matthew’s father abused alcohol.
[11] Matthew Simpson was sexually assaulted at age 5 by a paternal uncle. Matthew’s parents separated when he was 11 and his father moved away. He lived with his mother on the reserve. As she could no longer afford the apartment, she worked cleaning homes. He then resided with an aunt in London to age 20.
[12] Matthew Simpson consumed alcohol and marijuana starting at age 7, LSD at age 9 and cocaine and Oxycontin at age 19. He struggled with an Oxycontin addiction for five years but advises he has been free of opiate use for approximately eight years. Mr. Simpson attended several high schools but absenteeism and fighting got in the way of his ability to obtain his high school equivalency. It appears he completed grade 10.
[13] Matthew Simpson began employment at age 18 working in insulation and landscaping. In 2016, he obtained a business licence and started his own insulation business. He was working as a subcontractor through the Carpenter’s Union but in 2018 that work stopped. He told the Gladue report writer that he could not obtain work. At the time he was living in a townhouse and had his son Matthew with him.
[14] Matthew Simpson does have a criminal record beginning in 2007. His last conviction was in 2012. He contributes this period of low criminality to being sober, avoiding certain social circles, and spending time with his children. He also noted that during this time he had started his insulation business. In 2018, when his work had slowed down, he eventually ran out of his savings and could no longer pay for rent and food for his children. He said these factors contributed to his current charges before the Court.
[15] I will comment later on the motive for his participation in the robbery but there can be no doubt Matthew Simpson was raised in poverty and was living in poverty at the time of the offence.
[16] His two brothers have as well abused drugs and have been involved in the criminal justice system. One brother is currently in the penitentiary.
Application of Gladue and Section 718.2(e)
[17] In R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, the Supreme Court identified s. 718.2(e) as a watershed, not merely a restatement of existing principles of restraint in sentencing. (Gladue, para. 39).
[18] The Court went on to say:
Not surprisingly, the excessive imprisonment of aboriginal people is only the tip of the iceberg insofar as the estrangement of the aboriginal peoples from the Canadian criminal justice system is concerned. Aboriginal people are overrepresented in virtually all aspects of the system.
(Gladue, para. 61).
There are many aspects of this sad situation which cannot be addressed in these reasons. What can and must be addressed, though, is the limited role that sentencing judges will play in remedying injustice against aboriginal peoples in Canada. Sentencing judges are among those decision‑makers who have the power to influence the treatment of aboriginal offenders in the justice system. They determine most directly whether an aboriginal offender will go to jail, or whether other sentencing options may be employed which will play perhaps a stronger role in restoring a sense of balance to the offender, victim, and community, and in preventing future crime.
(Gladue, para. 65).
[19] Thirteen years later, in R. v. Ipelee, 2012 SCC 13, Justice LeBel reaffirmed the Gladue principles and expressed his frustration in the lack of progress in limiting the over-representation of aboriginal offenders in the criminal justice system.
[20] Justice LeBel confirmed that an offender need not prove a causal link between systematic and background factors and the commission of the offence before the Court. In addition, he emphasized that Gladue and s. 718.2(e) had to be applied in serious offences. Specifically, he said the following at paras. 83 and 87:
[83] As the Ontario Court of Appeal goes on to note in Collins, it would be extremely difficult for an Aboriginal offender to ever establish a direct causal link between his circumstances and his offending. The interconnections are simply too complex. The Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba describes the issue, at p. 86:
Cultural oppression, social inequality, the loss of self-government and systemic discrimination, which are the legacy of the Canadian government’s treatment of Aboriginal people, are intertwined and interdependent factors, and in very few cases is it possible to draw a simple and direct correlation between any one of them and the events which lead an individual Aboriginal person to commit a crime or to become incarcerated.
Furthermore, the operation of s. 718.2(e) does not logically require such a connection. Systemic and background factors do not operate as an excuse or justification for the criminal conduct. Rather, they provide the necessary context to enable a judge to determine an appropriate sentence. This is not to say that those factors need not be tied in some way to the particular offender and offence. Unless the unique circumstances of the particular offender bear on his or her culpability for the offence or indicate which sentencing objectives can and should be actualized, they will not influence the ultimate sentence.
[87] The sentencing judge has a statutory duty, imposed by s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, to consider the unique circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. Failure to apply Gladue in any case involving an Aboriginal offender runs afoul of this statutory obligation. As these reasons have explained, such a failure would also result in a sentence that was not fit and was not consistent with the fundamental principle of proportionality. Therefore, application of the Gladue principles is required in every case involving an Aboriginal offender, including breach of an LTSO, and a failure to do so constitutes an error justifying appellate intervention.
[21] While a straight line perhaps cannot be drawn between the effects of colonialism and the offences committed by Matthew Simpson, there is no doubt that this offender draws a strong application of the Gladue factors. His behaviour and personal circumstances exhibit the intergenerational affects of the residential school system; a loss of ability to emotionally connect with family, the fracturing of domestic relationships, drug and alcohol abuse, sexual abuse, anger, poverty and then criminal activity. This must be factored into a fit sentence.
Positions of the Parties
[22] The Crown seeks a sentence of four years for the robbery and one year consecutive for the firearms offence. The Crown suggests this is a fair application of the totality principle. It is agreed that from that gross sentence should be deducted the Summers credit for his pre-sentence custody, and nine further months as a Downes credit for his 39 months of house arrest, while on judicial interim release. Further, the Crown seeks pursuant to s. 462.37(3) of the Criminal Code, a fine in lieu of forfeiture quantified as $162,500. This amount is the amount of the total loss as apportioned between the four accuseds. There are other non-contentious corollary orders sought.
[23] The defence seeks a sentence of three years for the robbery and one year consecutive for the firearm, less the above-mentioned credits. The defence argues that I should exercise my discretion and refrain from making the s. 462.37(3) order.
Crafting the Sentence
[24] In addition to s. 718.2(e), I have considered the balance of the provisions in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code. I accept that denunciation and deterrence are important sentencing purposes for this violent robbery and this substantial loss. In addition, I have not lost sight of the need to consider Matthew Simpson’s rehabilitation, especially considering the applicable Gladue factors.
[25] Section 718.2 requires me to consider mitigating and aggravating factors.
Mitigating Factors
[26] Matthew Simpson entered a guilty plea. That plea has assisted in saving the administration of justice considerable trial time. This crime had a significant impact on the store owners and employees. They are spared a further protracted Court hearing.
[27] Matthew Simpson has expressed his remorse by his plea but as well in his remarks to the Gladue writer.
[28] Further mitigating, of course, are the Gladue factors already detailed above.
[29] He has support in the community and a strong contact with his mother and sons. He recognizes his need to remove himself from opioid use and has had success of late in doing so.
Aggravating Factors
[30] This was a serious criminal offence. The brazen robbery of a jewellery store in the Northwest of London at a time when patrons would normally be present. A vulnerable business in a position to yield a significant benefit to the accused.
[31] Matthew Simpson did not come upon this innocently. Text messages reveal that he knew exactly what he and the others were about to undertake. The crime took significant planning.
[32] There was a loss in excess of a half million dollars, all but a minimal amount remains outstanding.
[33] Matthew Simpson, as well, has a criminal record. While not extensive, it spans five years from 2007 to 2012. Most offences are property-related and breaches of Court orders. A criminal record consistent with his background including his drug abuse. It must be seen as aggravating.
[34] The possession of a handgun leads me to believe that Mr. Simpson was not just involved in this robbery as a “one-off”. Whatever the purpose of the weapon and the magazines, the possession must be seen as aggravating. As is the level of planning as detailed earlier.
[35] The Crown suggests that Mr. Simpson was motivated by greed and points to other means he could have chosen to sustain himself and his family. While that is certainly true, his history of poverty as I previously mentioned is consistent with the background of many Indigenous offenders.
[36] Finally, the effects of this crime on the victims must be recognized. The owners of Gordon’s Gold Jewellers have had their business affected financially, but more importantly, they continue to suffer anxiety and insecurity as does their victimized employee. The joy in seeing their business thrive has been lost.
Relevant Cases
[37] I have been provided the cases of R. v. Nouri, 2015 ONSC 116, a jewellery store robbery of $700,000 in merchandise. Nouri receiving a six year sentence. R. v. Hartwell, 2015 ONCJ 189, an armoured car robbery of $700,000., again with a sentence of six years. R. v. Levin, 2016 ONSC 6954, a jewellery store robbery involving a handgun. Levin having no prior record and had a history of drug and alcohol abuse. He was sentenced to three years.
[38] Perhaps most importantly to me, the case of R. v. Ireland, 2021 ONCJ 159, a decision of Justice Orsini. Mason Ireland was a co-accused in this robbery with Matthew Simpson. He entered an early guilty plea. He had no criminal record but was deeply involved in the planning of the robbery attending on several occasions to review the premises, the display cases and the targeted jewellery. Ireland was, as well, Indigenous, but at para. 66 Justice Orsini notes:
- At the same time, the degree to which Gladue factors have impacted Mr. Ireland is not as significant as this court had observed in other cases. He does not have a prior record. He does not suffer from any addictions. Gladue factors do not appear to have directly impacted his ability to parent his own child. He is described as an excellent father. As he indicated in the Pre-Sentence Report, his parents were consistently employed, and his physical needs were met. Poverty does not appear to have been an issue.
[39] Justice Orsini sentenced Ireland to 4 ½ years less his Summers and Duncan credits, leaving 38 months to serve. He also ordered a fine in lieu of forfeiture (s. 462.37(3)) in the amount of $162,500. with four years to pay and in default, consistent with s. 462.37(4)(v), two years in custody.
Disposition
(a) Incarceration
[40] Taking into account all available mitigating factors and recognizing what I believe is the appropriate impact of the Gladue principles, I cannot find fault with the position of the Crown taken on sentence. I believe a sentence totalling five years is appropriate and consistent with the sentence of the co-accused recognizing the timing of this plea and that Matthew Simpson has a criminal record and possessed a handgun and magazines while he was not as involved in the planning as in Ireland.
[41] The sentence on the robbery Count therefore is 4 years less 107 days p.s.c. when calculated at 1.5-1 equals 161 days or 5.3 months. I agree that the offender’s lengthy term of house arrest entitled him to a further 9 months credit or 270 days. On the robbery Count there is therefore 1,029 days to serve or 2 years, 292 days (1,460 – 431 = 1,029).
[42] On the firearms Count, Count #4, there will be a sentence of 1 year consecutive amounting to 3 years, 292 days yet to be served.
(b) Fine in Lieu of Forfeiture
[43] As noted above, the Crown seeks a fine of $162,500. with time to pay and 2 years in default. Pursuant to the authorities contained in s. 462.37(3), Justice Orsini granted an identical order in Ireland. I have reproduced that section below.
(3) If a court is satisfied that an order of forfeiture under subsection (1) or (2.01) should be made in respect of any property of an offender but that the property or any part of or interest in the property cannot be made subject to an order, the court may, instead of ordering the property or any part of or interest in the property to be forfeited, order the offender to pay a fine in an amount equal to the value of the property or the part of or interest in the property. In particular, a court may order the offender to pay a fine if the property or any part of or interest in the property
(a) cannot, on the exercise of due diligence, be located;
(b) has been transferred to a third party;
(c) is located outside Canada;
(d) has been substantially diminished in value or rendered worthless; or
(e) has been commingled with other property that cannot be divided without difficulty.
[44] Beyond Ireland, I was only able to find one additional case where an Indigenous offender was ordered to pay a fine in lieu of forfeiture.
[45] In R. v. Gloade, 2019 NSPC 55, Judge Hoskins of the Provincial Court of Nova Scotia convicted Ms. Gloade of defrauding her employer of $9,933. She was the Executive Director of the Elizabeth Fry Society. She was sentenced to a 60 day intermittent sentence with 3 years probation and ordered to pay a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $8,595., while being given 10 years to pay.
[46] Neither Ireland or Gloade consider how a fine in lieu of forfeiture might be affected by the principles of Gladue.
[47] Section 462.37(3) has been considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Lavigne, 2006 SCC 10 and R. v. Vallières, 2022 SCC 10. It has been considered by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Dwyer, 2013 ONCA 306 and R. v. Angelis, 2016 ONCA 675. None of the circumstances in those cases dealt with Indigenous offenders.
[48] It is clear from the authorities above that there is only a limited discretion available to a sentencing judge by Parliament’s choice of the word “may” in s. 462.37(3). (Lavigne, para. 29).
[49] The Court cannot take into account the offender’s ability to pay in deciding whether to impose this fine (Lavigne, para 35), nor is the fine’s effect on the offender’s rehabilitation to form part of the exercise of the discretion (Angelis, para. 57). The ability to pay the fine is to be considered before the offender is committed to jail for default, poverty cannot be equated to refusal to pay. (Lavigne, para. 47).
[50] In Angelis, Justice Watt laid out the application of the subsection in paras. 32, 36 and 37:
[32] Section 462.37 is an essential component of Part XII.2 of the Criminal Code, Proceeds of Crime. The Part reflects a Parliamentary intention to give teeth to the general sentencing provisions in Part XXIII. But the purpose or objective underlying the two Parts is different. Part XXIII has as its purpose the punishment of an offender for the crime(s) she or he committed. The objective of Part XII.2, in particular the forfeiture provisions, is to deprive offenders and criminal organizations of proceeds of crime and thereby to deter future crimes: R. v. Lavigne, 2006 SCC 10, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 392, at para. 16. These provisions seek to avert crime by showing those who may be bent on committing it, not to mention those who have committed it, that any proceeds gained or their monetary equivalent may be forfeited.
[36] Where an order of forfeiture is not possible or practicable, as for example where the proceeds have been used, transferred, transformed or cannot be located despite diligent efforts to do so, a sentencing judge may impose a fine in an amount equivalent to the value of the property in lieu of ordering forfeiture: Criminal Code, s. 462.37(3). The language used in this enabling authority is the permissive “may” rather than the mandatory “shall”: Lavigne, at paras. 19 and 29. This provision ensures that the purpose of the legislation is not frustrated by destruction, dissipation or other removal out of reach of the property.
[37] The exercise of the discretion for which s. 462.37(3) provides is not without boundaries. It is limited by the objective of the provision, the nature of the order and the circumstances in which the order is made: Lavigne, at para. 27.
[51] As noted above in Angelis, there are some prerequisites in s. 462.37(3) (a) – (e) before a fine order can be made. Robbery is clearly a “designated offence” as defined. The term “property of the offender” captured by that section means that at some point the offender must in law have possessed the stolen goods. Here, there is no escaping the inference that Matthew Simpson had the jewellery in his car from the time the robbers discarded the stolen vehicle to the time they fled his vehicle and left him to be arrested. Fleeting possession, but nonetheless satisfying the statutory concern.
[52] As well, I am content on the evidence that despite a diligent police search, the jewellery cannot be located. The statutory prerequisites are therefore in place for me to make the order.
[53] Any discretion available to this Court to not make the order is “limited by the objective of the provision, the nature of the order and the circumstances in which the order is made.” (Angelis, para. 37; Lavigne, para. 27).
[54] Do “the circumstances in which the order is made” allow me to import Gladue principles as a reason to decline the order?
[55] As Justice Watt points out in Angelis, the section in question is contained in Part XII.2 of the Criminal Code, entitled “Proceeds of Crime”. It is not part of Part XXIII, which considers a sentencing scheme which is offender-centric. (Angelis, para. 39). Part XII.2 is different. It looks beyond the offender seeking to deter crime “by showing it doesn’t pay by taking away its proceeds or a monetary equivalent.” (Angelis, para. 39).
[56] In the final analysis, the appellate decisions make it clear that the structure of the Criminal Code and the purposes of the provision exclude them as sentencing provisions. They are not about punishment; they are about retrieval of the proceeds of crime.
[57] Matthew Simpson shows the intergenerational scars of the residential school system. His personal circumstances that I have described above are sadly reminiscent of far too many Indigenous offenders. He has lived in poverty. He has struggled to support himself. He is now going to the penitentiary. I would suggest there is little likelihood that Matthew Simpson will ever be able to repay even a portion of the fine sought.
[58] There is no evidence he possessed the contraband for more than minutes. There is no evidence he will ever benefit from the proceeds of this offence.
[59] I offer, at this point, a passage from the decision of Associate Chief Justice Fairburn and Justice George in R. v. King. 2022 ONCA 665:
[169] As noted by Sharpe J.A. in Leonard, Gladue factors are not limited to criminal sentencing decisions. Rather, “they should be considered by all ‘decision-makers who have the power to influence the treatment of aboriginal offenders in the justice system’ (Gladue, at para. 65) whenever an Aboriginal person’s liberty is at stake in criminal and related proceedings”: Leonard, at para. 85. Gladue principles have been used in multiple contexts beyond the sentencing environment to inform exercises of judicial discretion. These include, for example, extradition hearings, bail hearings, publication ban applications, applications to withdraw guilty pleas, not criminally responsible findings and Review Board hearings, disciplinary hearings, correctional authority decisions and more: see e.g., United States v. Leonard, 2012 ONCA 622, 112 O.R. (3d) 496, at paras. 60, 85, leave to appeal refused, [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 490 (Leonard), and [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 543 (Gionet); United States v. Norton, 2017 ONCA 866, at paras. 9, 14; Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 SKCA 91, at paras. 31-33; R. v. Robinson, 2009 ONCA 205, 95 O.R. (3d) 309, at para. 13; R. v. Hope, 2016 ONCA 648, 133 O.R. (3d) 154, at paras. 9-12; R. v. Magill, 2013 YKTC 8, at paras. 16-17; R. v. Louie, 2019 BCCA 257, at para. 35; R. v. Cake, 2014 ONCJ 126, at paras. 43-51, aff’d 2014 ONSC 3413, at para. 39; R. v. C.K., 2021 ONCA 826, 159 O.R. (3d) 81, at para. 63; R. v. Sim (2005), 78 O.R. (3d) 183 (C.A.), at paras. 17-22; Jacob (Re), 2019 CarswellOnt 366 (Rev. B.), at paras. 40-43; Megan (Re), 2020 CarswellOnt 16128 (Rev. B.), at para. 36; Oakes (Re), 2019 CarswellOnt 18071 (Rev. B.), at para. 39; Chickite (Re), 2008 CarswellBC 3953 (Rev. B.), at para. 39; Law Society of Upper Canada v. Robinson, 2013 ONLSAP 18, [2013] 4 C.N.L.R. 129, at para. 74; Twins v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 537, [2017] 1 F.C.R. 79, at paras. 57, 64; and Ewert v. Canada, 2018 SCC 30, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 165, at paras. 57-58.
[170] As can be seen, the term “Gladue principles” has thus become a short form way of adverting to the idea that those involved in the criminal justice system, particularly judges exercising discretionary power, ought to be aware of the realities of the Indigenous people appearing before them. By this, we mean the historical and present-day treatment of Indigenous people that continues to perpetuate patterns of discrimination and has resulted in “lower educational attainment, lower incomes, higher unemployment, higher rates of substance abuse and suicide, and of course higher levels of incarceration for Aboriginal peoples”: Ipeelee, at para. 60. Failing to recognize these realities can lead to further discrimination against Indigenous people and undermine efforts to apply the law impartially and equitably. We can put it no better than Moldaver J. in Barton, at para. 199: “when it comes to truth and reconciliation from a criminal justice perspective, much-needed work remains to be done.”
[171] While Gladue principles have particular salience in criminal sentencing, as noted above, they have been transposed to guide decision making in other legal contexts as well. …
[60] In R. v. Boudreault, 2018 SCC 58, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the constitutionality of the victim fine surcharge contained in s. 737 of the Criminal Code. While the matter before me is not a constitutional challenge, nor has the fine in lieu of forfeiture been viewed as a sentencing component, nonetheless the principles discussed in Boudreault can be imported to this discussion.
[61] The fine provisions in s. 462.37(3) will disproportionately harm this Indigenous offender who is impoverished and previously addicted. It will cause him to live with indefinite committal hearings, collection agencies and as expressed in Boudreault “a de facto indefinite sentence for some offenders, because there is no foreseeable chance they will ever be able to pay it.” (Boudreault, para. 69).
[62] If the purpose and objective of a fine in lieu of forfeiture is to deter offenders, I would suggest that with Matthew Simpson, it may in fact have the opposite effect. Taking into account the circumstances confronting me as directed by Angelis (para. 37) and Lavigne (para. 27), I adopt the words used in King: “As can be seen, the term “Gladue principles” has thus become a short form way of adverting to the idea that those involved in the criminal justice system, particularly judges exercising discretionary power, ought to be aware of the realities of the Indigenous people appearing before them.” (King, para 170).
[63] Once Matthew Simpson has been paroled from the penitentiary we, as a society, must provide him with a chance to return to his community and to his family and to thrive, if at all possible.
[64] As a result, I decline to impose a fine in lieu of forfeiture.
(c) Corollary Orders
[65] There is a s. 743.21 order prohibiting Mr. Simpson communicating with all persons named in Exhibit 6 to the sentencing.
[66] There is a s. 109 order prohibiting possession of firearms and weapons detailed in the section for Mr. Simpson’s lifetime.
[67] There is a D.N.A. databanking order on both Counts, pursuant to s. 487.055. The firearm and magazines are forfeited. The victim fine surcharge in all the circumstances is waived.
Regional Senior Justice B. G. Thomas
Released: November 16, 2022.
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
MATTHEW DARREN SIMPSON
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THOMAS, RSJ.
Released: November 16, 2022.