D. Ives

The applicants, charged with possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The anticipated trial date was 45 months after the charges were laid, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court deducted periods of defence delay, including communal delay for counsel unavailability, and exceptional circumstances delay arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, an unavailable witness, and the assigned judge's illness.

After deductions, the net delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The defendant sought a bail review after being denied bail by a Justice of the Peace.

He was charged with robbery, disguise with intent, dangerous driving, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and failing to comply with release conditions.

The defendant proposed a new release plan including his mother as surety for a higher amount, residing at her home, GPS monitoring, and drug counselling.

The court found that the new evidence, including GPS monitoring, constituted a material relevant change in circumstances, triggering a review.

However, the court ultimately found that the defendant failed to discharge the reverse onus on both secondary and tertiary grounds, given his serious criminal record, long-standing drug addiction, past breaches, and the escalating nature of his criminal activity.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

The applicant, Mustafa Hassan, brought an application under sections 8, 9, and 24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking to exclude evidence obtained through alleged unreasonable search and seizure.

The application challenged the lawfulness of police video surveillance in the common hallway of a multi-unit apartment building without a warrant, and the subsequent search warrant for his apartment, arguing it was based on unconstitutionally obtained evidence and lacked reasonable grounds.

The court found that the covert video surveillance in the hallway without a warrant violated the applicant's attenuated, but still existing, reasonable expectation of privacy under section 8 of the Charter.

However, the court determined that the search warrant for the apartment was still valid after excising the unconstitutionally obtained video evidence, as sufficient independent grounds remained.

Applying the section 24(2) Grant test, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, considering the seriousness of the breach (low), the impact on the applicant's Charter rights (low, as the apartment was not his primary residence), and society's interest in adjudicating serious drug trafficking offences on their merits (high).

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed after conviction for mischief to data and unauthorized use of a computer.

The sentencing judge imposed a fine and probation and treated the accused’s allegedly false testimony and manner of conducting the defence as a significant aggravating factor.

On appeal, the court held that the manner in which an accused presents a defence, including false testimony rejected at trial, cannot be treated as an aggravating factor in sentencing.

The appellate court found this constituted an error in principle and reconsidered the appropriate disposition.

Given the offender’s lack of prior record, restitution, personal circumstances, and collateral employment consequences, the court substituted a conditional discharge with probation.

Accused charged with drug offences sought exclusion of evidence seized from residences pursuant to search warrants under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, alleging breaches of ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court conducted a Garofoli review of the Information to Obtain and found the warrants were issued without sufficient grounds.

The police had re‑submitted essentially the same ITO to a different judicial officer after a justice of the peace refused the warrant, amounting to impermissible judge‑shopping and misleading drafting.

The search warrants were therefore invalid and the searches constituted unreasonable searches contrary to s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court held the seriousness of the police misconduct and the impact on the accused’s privacy interests outweighed society’s interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.