R. v. Ramroop, 2026 ONSC 1088

R. v. Ramroop, 2026 ONSC 1088

CITATION: R. v. Ramroop, 2026 ONSC 1088

COURT FILE NO.: CR-25-111

DATE: 20260223

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

JUSTIN RAMROOP

Defendant/Applicant

COUNSEL:

J. Roos and D. Ives, for the Crown/Respondent

M. Farquhar for the Defendant/Applicant

HEARD: November 10 and 13, 2025

Charter ruling

MOSER J.

Overview

1Justin Ramroop (the “Applicant”) seeks an order pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms excluding all evidence found during the search of the motor vehicle he operated on March 14, 2024.

2The Applicant argues that the evidence should be excluded because the police infringed his rights guaranteed under ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter. This ruling addresses the Charter application following evidence and submissions heard on November 10 and 13, 2025.

The Facts

3The parties do not dispute the following facts for the purpose of this motion.

4On March 14, 2024, members of the London Police Service received information indicating that Mr. Daniel McCallum, a wanted male, potentially resided at 48 Kinnear Crescent in London, Ontario. Police wanted Mr. McCallum on several first-instance warrants, including an allegation of robbery with violence. They knew he had a history of violence.

5Four police officers (PC Dixon, PC Deep, DC Rayner and PC Bright) set up surveillance at 48 Kinnear Crescent. All four officers testified at this pre-trial motion. Their testimony constitutes the only evidence before me.

6On March 14, 2024, each officer sat in an unmarked police vehicle wearing plain clothes. However, they all wore vests displaying the word “police” on the front and back.

7PC Deep positioned himself to get the clearest view of the address and notified the other officers when he observed Mr. McCallum exit the residence at approximately 11:46 a.m. At that time, a 2022 white Lexus RX pulled up near the house and stopped at the curb. The Applicant drove the Lexus. It remained parked and running as Mr. McCallum entered the front passenger side door.

8Within seconds of Mr. McCallum entering the idling Lexus, the police decided to execute a containment stop. They did this to effect a safe arrest of Mr. McCallum.

9PC Deep quickly approached the Lexus from the front in his unmarked police vehicle. He pulled up nose to nose with the Lexus. The Applicant put the Lexus in reverse, but only managed to back up a couple of inches before PC Bright’s unmarked vehicle pulled in behind him. At the same time, PC Rayner pulled up alongside the driver’s side of the Lexus. This effectively boxed in the Applicant’s vehicle next to the curb. PC Dixon then pulled in behind PC Bright.

10The Crown concedes that, at this point, the police detained the Applicant. They boxed in his vehicle, and he could not move.

11Immediately after the police boxed in the Lexus, Mr. McCallum exited the passenger side door. He quickly walked away from the vehicle. All four police officers exited their vehicles. PC Deep identified himself as police and demanded that Mr. McCallum stop. He told Mr. McCallum that he was under arrest, but Mr. McCallum continued to walk away. PC Deep then told him to remove his hands from his pockets, and Mr. McCallum refused. All four police officers testified that they believed Mr. McCallum may have a firearm. This led to all the officers pulling out their firearms and pointing them at Mr. McCallum. Mr. McCallum remained uncooperative. The officers grounded him to effect his arrest.

12Once the officers handcuffed Mr. McCallum, PC Deep and DC Rayner turned their attention to the Applicant, who remained seated in the Lexus. When the officers approached him, he raised his hands with his palms facing outwards. There is conflicting evidence about the speed in which the Applicant put the Lexus in park, which I will address later. However, he eventually did so, and PC Deep removed him from the vehicle. He told the Applicant that he was being detained for the investigation of flight from police. PC Deep told the Applicant that he wanted to establish that he did not have any weapons on him. At this point, Mr. McCallum was still on the scene and being tended to by PC Bright and PC Dixon.

13PC Deep walked the Applicant to the curb and performed a safety pat down search of his person. He located nothing of concern on the Applicant. He asked the Applicant for his name and date of birth. PC Deep provided the Applicant with his right to counsel and caution at 11:52 a.m. When asked if he wanted to speak to counsel, the Applicant responded “yup”. PC Deep placed the Applicant in handcuffs and seated him on the curb.

14PC Deep returned to his unmarked police vehicle to run a Canadian Police Information Centre (“CPIC”) search on the Applicant. He learned that the Applicant was on a firearms prohibition order and currently serving a conditional sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking a controlled substance.

15PC Deep returned to the Lexus where he had previously seen two satchels on the driver’s side floor. He decided to search the contents of one of the satchels incident to the Applicant’s detention. Once he opened the first satchel, he noted suspected drugs inside of it. He described these bags as a number of plastic bags individually tied off containing suspected cocaine and fentanyl. He then stopped his search and arrested the Applicant for possession for the purpose of trafficking at 12:05 p.m. He again provided the Applicant with his rights to counsel and a caution. At this time, the Applicant specifically requested to speak with Aaron Prevost as his counsel of choice.

16After arresting the Applicant, PC Deep continued searching the satchels in the Lexis. He found more suspected drugs in the second satchel in separately tied off bags. In addition, he found cash totalling $1,076.65, a digital scale, and plastic pull bags.

17Authorities later weighed the drugs. The weights were documented as 79.5 grams of cocaine, 421Dilaudid (8 milligram Hydromorphone) pills, and 4.5 grams of fentanyl.

18This motion concerns the items found in the satchels during these searches.

The Issues

19The following issues are before me on this motion:

a) Did the police breach the Applicant’s ss.8 and 9 Charter rights?

b) Did the police breath the Applicant’s s.10 Charter rights?

c) Should the evidence be excluded as per s. 24(2) of the Charter?

The Applicant’s Position

20The Applicant maintains that the officers arbitrarily detained him contrary to s. 9 of the Charter and that the warrantless search incident to the detention breached his s. 8 Charter rights. The Applicant argues that the unlawful detention and subsequent search resulted in the discovery of drugs, which led to the unlawful arrest and further unlawful warrantless search incident to the Applicant’s arrest.

21The Applicant further submits that the police breached his ss. 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights. The Applicant became detained as soon as the officers boxed in his vehicle. Thus, the officers’ ought to have immediately informed him of the reasons for his detention pursuant to s. 10(a). The Applicant did not receive this information at that time. He also submits that the police failed to facilitate his access to counsel of choice both at the roadside and at the police station, thereby breaching his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

22The Applicant requests the exclusion of the evidence found in the two distinct warrantless searches. He submits that admitting this evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute per s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Respondent’s Position

23The Respondent maintains that the Applicant’s initial detention was lawful. However, the Respondent concedes that if this court finds the detention unlawful, then the search incident to that detention, the arrest, and the search incident to the arrest were also unlawful.

24The Respondent argues that the Applicant’s detention was authorized at common law and not arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter. PC Deep had both a subjective and objective reasonable suspicion that the Applicant might have a weapon and flee the area.

25The Respondent describes the Applicant’s act of reversing the Lexus when PC Deep’s vehicle pulled up as an “apparent attempt to defeat containment.”

26The Respondent submits that, in a fast-moving scene involving a violent offender takedown, briefly detaining the driver to investigate flight and weapon risks, verify identity, and conduct a limited safety check was reasonably necessary for officer and public safety, scene control, and to investigate ongoing crimes. Police were not obligated to rule out innocent explanations for what they observed: the Lexus reversing; non-compliance in shutting off the engine; or the satchels placed by the Applicant on the driver’s side floorboard. The standard is reasonable suspicion, not proof. The Applicant’s detention was brief and targeted. Authorities tailored it to the immediate risks. It was not “investigative fishing”.

27Regarding the search incident to the detention, the Respondent acknowledges that these searches must be purpose driven by immediate safety concerns. The common law only permits measures reasonably necessary to neutralize a live risk to an officer or public safety, provided officers have reasonable grounds for that safety concern. The power is not unrestricted, but its scope may extend to items in the detainee’s control, such as a bag, where the same safety risk persists.

28The Respondent argues that the search of the first satchel on the driver’s side floor of the Lexus was permitted and reasonable. It relies on R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, which permits a safety search beyond a pat-down so long as the search remains anchored to its protective purpose and limited to a search for weapons.

29The Respondent further submits that the reasonable expectation of privacy is diminished in a motor vehicle, particularly one not registered to the Applicant.

30The Respondent maintains that this lawful search following detention led to a lawful arrest and lawful post-arrest search of the satchels and the Lexus.

31The Respondent also denies any breach of s. 10 of the Charter. There is an absence of any connection between the evidence sought to be excluded and the alleged breach.

32On s. 24(2) of the Charter, the Respondent argues that excluding the evidence will bring the administration of justice into disrepute if the court finds a Charter breach. It emphasizes the circumstances of the search, the high-risk takedown of Mr. McCallum, the Applicant’s actions, and the fact that the drugs seized included fentanyl and other opioids during a recognized nationwide opioid epidemic. Excluding the drugs would end the Crown’s case. The Respondent urges the court to apply the first two branches of the test from R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R 353. This assessment does not weigh in favour of excluding the evidence in these circumstances and the third branch calls for its admission.

The Evidence at the Motion

(i) The Evidence of PC Dixon

33PC Dixon’s evidence supports the agreed upon facts. PC Dixon testified that once Mr. McCallum was under arrest and police control, PC Deep and DC Rayner shifted their focus to the Applicant in the Lexus.

(ii) The Evidence of PC Bright

34PC Bright confirmed that he pulled in behind the Lexus in the police containment. He recalled the Lexus rolling back and stopping abruptly.

35In cross-examination, he agreed that he would not have been immediately recognizable as a police officer when sitting in his car. He also agreed that the Lexus moved back at a slow rate of speed while reversing. The Lexus stopped very close to his own vehicle. When he got out of the unmarked cruiser, he had to walk behind his vehicle and PC Dixon’s vehicle to get to Mr. McCallum as there was not enough room between the vehicles to walk between them.

36Before the morning recess on November 10, 2025, defence counsel asked PC Bright in cross-examination if he observed any other threats to his safety after Mr. McCallum was in police control. He answered that there was the “threat of the unknown of the driver in the car.” He specified that the main reason why he perceived the Applicant as a threat was because he remained unknown to authorities. PC Bright had no evidence otherwise to support the position that the Applicant posed a threat to authorities.

(iii) The Evidence of DC Rayner

37In examination in chief, DC Rayner testified that it looked like the Lexus was going to flee when it went into reverse. He saw the Lexus reversing away from PC Deep’s vehicle towards PC Bright’s vehicle. He then positioned his police vehicle at the Lexus’ driver’s side to effect containment. However, in cross-examination, he acknowledged that the Lexus was travelling at a slow rate of speed.

38At the start of cross-examination, DC Rayner admitted that PC Bright spoke to him and PC Deep after PC Bright testified that morning. This occurred during the morning break. DC Rayner confirmed that PC Bright told them that defence counsel had asked questions about having “fear of the unknown”. This communication did not breach the witness exclusion order as one had not yet been made. Defence counsel only requested the order when DC Rayner’s notes were being qualified in his examination-in-chief.

39The court granted the witness exclusion order.

40Defence counsel read s. 320.17 of the Criminal Code (flight from police) to DC Rayner in cross-examination. He acknowledged that the Lexus was not being pursued at the point of containment.

41DC Rayner also acknowledged that after Mr. McCallum was safely arrested, he no longer felt any threat to his safety. This contradicts PC Bright’s earlier testimony of his continuing fear of the unknown. I accept DC Rayner’s testimony and reject PC Bright’s testimony that the police believed the Applicant posed a threat to their safety after the arrest of Mr. McCallum. PC Bright’s decision to inform his colleagues about this part of his testimony makes his evidence suspect at best. The fact that this part of his testimony did not accord with the next officer’s perception of the situation brings me to the finding that it was not true. I find it an exaggeration meant to create a perceived threat of the Applicant that did not exist at the time of his detention.

42After Mr. McCallum’s arrest, DC Rayner testified that he approached the Lexus at the passenger side door. He saw the Applicant in the driver’s seat with both hands raised. The vehicle was running and still in drive. DC Rayner directed the Applicant to put the car in park and turn it off. The Applicant complied immediately. DC Rayner described the Applicant as a black male in his mid 20s with long curly hair, wearing a black hoodie. DC Rayner could not recall where PC Deep was at the time he asked the Applicant to put his vehicle in park and turn it off.

43DC Rayner observed PC Deep detain the Applicant. He saw the Applicant place two cell phones on the centre console of the Lexus and saw a grey pouch and black fanny pack in the wheel well of the driver’s seat. DC Rayner testified that he searched the Applicant for weapons after PC Deep detained him. The Applicant did not have any weapons on his person. DC Rayner stated that he searched the Applicant for safety reasons.

44DC Rayner acknowledged that the Applicant could not have known that the police wanted him to stop when they confined the Lexus with unmarked vehicles, with no lights or sirens, wearing plain clothes. However, DC Rayner maintained his suspicion that the driver was trying to flee from the police.

The Evidence of PC Deep

45PC Deep had the best view of the Applicant when the police contained the Lexus. PC Deep testified that as he approached the Lexus from the front in his own unmarked police vehicle, he saw the Lexus move backwards and the Applicant looked behind him. The Lexus quickly stopped as PC Bright had already maneuvered to the rear of the Lexus in his unmarked police vehicle. PC Deep described this as an “overt movement to reverse the vehicle”.

46PC Deep described his role in the arrest of Mr. McCallum. It involved pulling out his firearm as Mr. McCallum refused to cooperate with his demands. Counsel did not challenge PC Deep on the necessity of him having to deliver a kick to Mr. McCallum to effect his arrest. By all accounts, this was a high-risk and dynamic situation. It involved four officers who all felt the need to pull out their firearms on Mr. McCallum in a residential neighbourhood close to lunchtime on a sunny spring day. Counsel did not challenge any of the officers in cross-examination about the necessity of conducting a gun point arrest on Mr. McCallum.

47Once other officers had Mr. McCallum under control, PC Deep turned his attention to the Lexus. He testified that he knew he did not have clear control of the situation. He saw the Applicant in the driver’s seat with both hands raised. The Lexus was in drive and running. PC Deep testified that the Applicant initially did not respond to his demand that he put the vehicle in park.

48PC Deep described the Applicant as a black male between 25-30 years old, with black medium length hair in dreadlocks wearing a black hoodie and sweatpants. He acknowledged that he was in a “raised state” when he first demanded that the Applicant put the car in park. The Applicant made no gestures to turn off the car. He sat staring at him. Given this, PC Deep decided to change his approach. He started negotiating with the Applicant, asking calmly if he would turn off the car. PC Deep testified that this approach worked, and the Applicant turned off the car.

49PC Deep went to the driver’s side door and took hold of the Applicant’s left arm. He saw the Applicant place two cell phones on the centre console. He also noticed two satchels on the driver’s side floor.

50At this point, PC Deep told the Applicant that he was being detained for flight from police and that he wanted to establish that he had no weapons on his person. PC Deep testified that the Applicant was cooperative. He walked with PC Deep to the curb and allowed him to perform a weapons pat down. The Applicant did not have any weapons on his person. At this time, PC Deep also asked the Applicant to identify himself. The Applicant provided his name and date of birth. PC Deep provided the Applicant with his rights to counsel and a caution. When asked if he wanted to speak with a lawyer, the Applicant responded “yup”.

51PC Deep returned to his police vehicle and conducted a CPIC inquiry on the Applicant. He learned that the Applicant was serving a conditional sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking and that he was also on a weapons prohibition order as a result of a previous drug conviction.

52The Respondent asked PC Deep to outline why he detained the Applicant. PC Deep determined that the following reasons, coupled together, justified an expanded safety search and the Applicant’s detention:

(i) Mr. McCallum was a violent individual.

(ii) Mr. McCallum had numerous outstanding warrants for his arrest. Some of them were violent in nature.

(iii) Authorities found Mr. McCallum exiting a residence that had two other violent parties associated with it.

(iv) At the time of the containment stop, the Applicant had made an overt action to reverse the vehicle to flee with Mr. McCallum.

(v) The information from the CPIC search about the Applicant’s history.

53PC Deep testified that he decided to perform the containment stop for a variety of reasons. The vehicle was static, and it was safer to contain it than to conduct a mobile surveillance of the vehicle. He noted that there was a child on a scooter in the neighbourhood and there were numerous people walking, with at least one person walking a dog. PC Deep reiterated the potential violent reaction of Mr. McCallum, given the information known to police at that time.

54PC Deep testified that he decided to remove the Applicant from the car, even after it was turned off, because he believed that the Applicant still posed a threat to the public. The Applicant could attempt to avoid containment. He could drive his vehicle into the parked police cars or drive up on the boulevard with nearby pedestrians.

55When PC Deep decided to expand his search incident to detention to include the two satchels on the driver’s side of the Lexus, the Applicant was seated and handcuffed on the curb beside the Lexus.

56PC Deep testified that he searched the bags for weapons. He did not feel that the risk to the public would have been mitigated if he released the Applicant back to the car without first checking the satchels for weapons. He acknowledged in cross-examination that a weapon would be hard and could have been felt for in the first bag he picked up before unzipping the bag. However, he did not feel the bag for weapons. Instead, he opened it up before feeling what might be inside.

57In cross-examination, PC Deep acknowledged that his only intention when he first made the decision to contain the Lexus was to effect the safe arrest of Mr. McCallum.

58He also acknowledged that he cannot say one way or another if his police vest would have been viewable to the Applicant from where he was sitting in the Lexus when he pulled his vehicle up in front of it. PC Deep operated a Dodge Caravan. It would have sat at about the same or similar height to the Lexus.

59As aforementioned, PC Deep found drugs in his search. This also led to the Applicant’s arrest and further drugs and other evidence found in the second satchel in a search incident to his arrest.

60PC Deep informed the uniformed officer, PC McDowell, who arrived to transport the Applicant at 12:21 p.m. of the Applicant’s request to speak to his counsel of choice, Aaron Prevost.

61When PC Deep returned to the station, he formed grounds to rearrest the Applicant for breaching his conditional sentence order. He rearrested the Applicant in cells at 4:16 p.m. He again provided the Applicant his right to counsel and a caution. Once again, the Applicant requested to speak to Aaron Prevost. PC Deep spoke to cell staff and told them that the Applicant wished to speak to Aaron Prevost.

62Cell staff informed PC Deep that the Applicant left a message for Aaron Prevost at 1:26 p.m. and that at 2:27 p.m. the Applicant spoke to duty counsel. At 4:27 p.m., PC Deep returned to the phone room. He advised the Applicant that further attempts would be made to contact Aaron Prevost and if he wanted to speak to anyone else, he should let cell staff know.

63In cross-examination, PC Deep acknowledged that PC Bright spoke to him after his testimony. I reviewed this area of PC Deep’s cross-examination. While it is troubling that PC Bright engaged in this behaviour, I do not find that his comments influenced PC Deep’s testimony. PC Deep acknowledged the conversation but could not recall verbatim PC Bright’s comments. Counsel did not cross-examine any further on this point. Nor did counsel put suggestions to PC Deep about the topics of conversation or identify inconsistencies in his evidence.

The Law

64Sections 8, 9, 10 and 24 of the Charter are relevant in this motion. I will review the law on each in turn.

[Section 8](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html) of the [Charter](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html)

65Section 8 of the Charter states that “[e]veryone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.” If a search is unreasonable, it is unlawful.

66In Mann, Iacobucci J. described the power to search incidental to an investigative detention at para. 45:

To summarize, as discussed above, police officers may detain an individual for investigative purposes if there are reasonable grounds to suspect in all the circumstances that the individual is connected to a particular crime and that such a detention is necessary. In addition, where a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that his or her safety or that of others is at risk, the officer may engage in a protective pat-down search of the detained individual. Both the detention and the pat-down search must be conducted in a reasonable manner. In this connection, I note that the investigative detention should be brief in duration and does not impose an obligation on the detained individual to answer questions posed by the police. The investigative detention and protective search power are to be distinguished from an arrest and the incidental power to search on arrest, which do not arise in this case.

67Mann does not limit safety searches flowing from an investigative detention to the person. In some circumstances, the search may go beyond a pat-down to include containers, so long as it remains anchored to the purpose and limited to weapons. This is a modest and tightly cabined extension. Any expansion beyond a pat-down must stay strictly tied to immediate officer safety concerns, not evidence gathering, and remain proportionate and temporally connected to the detention: Mann, at paras. 85–87.

68In R. v. Plummer, 2011 ONCA 350, the Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed for a search of a motor vehicle as part of an officer safety search in an investigative detention. Plummer carefully analyzes the principles in Mann. It helpfully considers the proper approach to balancing an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable searches with the public’s legitimate safety concerns.

69In Plummer, the police drove past a house known for drug activity and saw a vehicle parked the wrong way in a no-parking zone. The appellant sat in the passenger seat. When he saw police, he looked shocked and moved downward as if concealing something. Officers stopped, approached, and asked the occupants for their names. The appellant gave his name to the police. One officer immediately linked the name to a safety alert issued a week earlier. The alert warned that the appellant might have a handgun and bulletproof vest. It also mentioned that the appellant actively sought revenge for his brother’s recent shooting in the same area. Officers detained him for investigate purposes based on his movements and the alert. They removed him from the car and conducted a pat-down search. During the search, the police discovered the appellant was wearing a bulletproof vest. Considering the circumstances, the police continued their search to the bag in the car that the appellant reached for when he saw them. In this bag, the police discovered a handgun. The Court of Appeal held the search was reasonable given the circumstances and the real concern for officer safety.

70Plummer is instructive. It identifies when police may search areas beyond the person during investigative detention. It also explains the circumstances where this type of extended search is permitted.

71In Plummer, at para. 53, the Court of Appeal wrote:

However, there is nothing in Mann confining a search incidental to an investigative detention to only the person detained. Indeed, in Mann, the court actually considered both a pat-down search of the person detained, which it upheld, and a search inside the detainee’s pockets, which it found to be unreasonable. Accordingly, I agree with this court’s interpretation of Mann in R. v. Batzer (2005), 200 C.C.C. (3d) 330 at para. 16: “the [Supreme Court of Canada] leaves the clear inference that on the right facts, a search incidental to a lawful stop could comply with the common law and pass constitutional muster even though it went beyond a pat down.”

72In Plummer, the Court of Appeal adopted the trial judge’s reasoning at para. 66:

In the end, I can put it no better than did the trial judge:

[W]here the police see conduct consistent with concealing something in the area of the front passenger seat, have information the person may be carrying a gun and wearing a bullet proof vest, and confirm he is wearing a bullet proof vest, to find that the police had to stop their search once they found he was not carrying a gun on him, flies in the face of concerns for officer safety.

[Section 9](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html) of the [Charter](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html)

73Section 9 of the Charter provides that “[e]veryone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned.” The onus is on the Applicant to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that they were arbitrarily detained: R. v. L.B., 2007 ONCA 596, 86 O.R. (3d) 730, at para. 60.

74The purpose of s. 9 is to protect individual liberty from unjustified state interference. Consistent with its purpose, a lawful arrest or detention is not arbitrary and does not infringe s. 9, unless the law authorizing the arrest or detention is itself arbitrary: R. v. Tim, 2022 SCC 12, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 234, at paras. 21–22.

75The threshold of reasonable grounds for an investigative detention must be determined through an examination of the totality of the circumstances: Mann, at para. 34; R. v. Clayton, 2007 SCC 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725, at para. 30.

76Police officers do not possess a general power of detention for investigative purposes: Mann, at para. 17. However, police officers may detain individuals when there are reasonable grounds to suspect that they are connected to a crime and that detention is reasonably necessary. As Iacobucci J. wrote at para. 34 of Mann:

The detention must be viewed as reasonably necessary on an objective view of the totality of the circumstances, informing the officer’s suspicion that there is a clear nexus between the individual to be detained and a recent or on-going criminal offence. Reasonable grounds figures at the front-end of such an assessment, underlying the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the particular individual is implicated in the criminal activity under investigation. The overall reasonableness of the decision to detain, however, must further be assessed against all of the circumstances, most notably the extent to which the interference with individual liberty is necessary to perform the officer’s duty, the liberty interfered with, and the nature and extent of that interference, in order to meet the second prong of the Waterfield test. [Emphasis added.]

77Doherty J.A. defined the phrase “reasonable grounds to detain” in R. v. Simpson (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 182 (C.A.), at p. 202, as requiring “a constellation of objectively discernible facts which give the detaining officer reasonable cause to suspect that the detainee is criminally implicated in the activity under investigation.”

78The totality of circumstances must be considered, both inculpatory and exculpatory, to “determine whether there are objective ascertainable grounds to suspect that an individual is involved in criminal behavior”: R. v. Chehil, 2013 SCC 49, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 220, at para. 6. However, the police do not have to “investigate to rule out exculpatory circumstances”: Chehil, at para. 6. As Karakatsanis J. explained in Chehil, at para. 35:

Finally, the objective facts must be indicative of the possibility of criminal behaviour. While I agree with the appellant’s submission that police must point to particularized conduct or particularized evidence of criminal activity in order to ground reasonable suspicion, I do not accept that the evidence must itself consist of unlawful behaviour, or must necessarily be evidence of a specific known criminal act.

79In the context of a detention, “reasonable grounds” means reasonable grounds to suspect that an individual is involved in a particular criminal activity. This is also called reasonable suspicion. The definition of reasonable suspicion means something more than a mere suspicion and something less than a belief based upon reasonable and probable grounds: R. v. MacKenzie, 2013 SCC 50, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 250, at paras. 38, 41; R. v. Kang-Brown, 2008 SCC 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456, at paras. 74, 164; and R. v. Dymkowski, 2021 ONSC 8428, at para. 31.

80In forming reasonable suspicion, an investigating officer must consider all available information and is entitled to disregard only information in which they have good reason to believe is unreliable. Police officers are not required to undertake further investigation to seek out exculpatory factors or rule out possible innocent explanations: Chehil, at paras. 33­–34.

[Section 10(a)](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html) of the [Charter](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html)

81Section 10(a) of the Charter provides that “[e]veryone has the right on arrest or detention to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor.” The right has both an informational and a temporal component: R. v. Roberts, 2018 ONCA 411, at para. 63.

82From an informational standpoint, the right imposes a constitutional duty on the police to, at minimum, advise the person detained in “clear and simple language, of the reasons for the detention”: Mann, at para. 21; R. v. Evans, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869, at p. 888. If police have more than one reason for detaining an individual, they must disclose each reason to the person detained: R. v. Borden, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145, at pp. 165–166.

83When evaluating the adequacy of what police told a detainee, the ultimate question is “whether what the accused was told, viewed reasonably in all the circumstances of the case, was sufficient to permit him to make a reasonable decision to decline or submit to arrest [or detention], or alternatively, to undermine his right to counsel under s. 10(b)”: Evans, at p. 888; R. v. Latimer, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217, at para. 30.

84In terms of the temporal requirement, as directed by the text of s. 10(a), the police must tell the person detained “promptly” of the reason or reasons. This means immediately: R. v. Nguyen, 2008 ONCA 49, at paras. 16–22.

[Section 10(b)](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html) of the [Charter](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html)

85Section 10(b) of the Charter provides that “[e]veryone has the right on arrest or detention to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right.” The Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that s. 10(b) requires the police to inform a detainee of the right to speak to counsel immediately (an “informational duty), and if that right is exercised, the police must immediately provide the detainee with a reasonable opportunity to speak to counsel (an “implementational” duty): R. v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 460, at paras. 38, 42; R. v. Griffith, 2021 ONCA 302, at para. 37.

86If counsel of choice cannot be available within a reasonable time, detainees should exercise their right to counsel by calling another lawyer. The person exercising their right to counsel of choice should assert that right diligently: R. v. Willier, 2010 SCC 37, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 429, at paras. 24–25.

[Section 24(2)](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html) of the [Charter](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html)

87Section 24(2) of the Charter provides:

Where, in proceedings under section (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

88Section 24(2) does not create an automatic exclusionary rule. If the court finds a Charter breach, then the Applicant bears the onus of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The well-known three-part test was first articulated in Grant and recently reviewed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Tim.

89A s. 24(2) inquiry examines the impact of admitting the evidence based on three lines of inquiry: (i) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct; (ii) the impact of the breach on the accused’s Charter-protected interests; and (iii) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits: Tim, at para. 74; Grant, at para. 71.

90State conduct that violates the Charter exists on a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum rests “inadvertent or minor violations” which “minimally undermine public confidence in the rule of law”. At the other end of the spectrum exists breaches that display a “willful or reckless disregard of Charter rights [which] will inevitably have a negative effect on the public confidence in the rule of law, and risk bringing the administration of justice into disrepute”: Grant, at para. 71.

Analysis

91I will now address each of the issues in turn.

Issue 1: Did the police breach the Applicant’s [ss.8](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html) and [9](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html) [Charter](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html) rights?

(a) Evidence of Arbitrary Detention

92In Mann, at para. 34, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a court must assess the decision to detain considering all the circumstances and the extent to which an interference with an individual’s liberty is necessary to perform the officer’s duty. Specifically, “[t]he detention must be viewed as reasonably necessary on an objective view of the totality of the circumstances, informing the officer’s suspicion that there is a clear nexus between the individual to be detained and a recent or on-going criminal offence” (emphasis added).

93Thus, it is my task to ask: what is the recent or ongoing criminal offence that PC Deep construed as being the criminal offence for which he detained the Applicant?

94PC Deep claims that the criminal offence was flight from the police, as articulated in s. 320.17 of the Criminal Code. This provision reads: “[e]veryone commits an offence who operates a motor vehicle or vessel while being pursued by a peace officer who fails, without reasonable excuse, to stop the motor vehicle or vessel as soon as is reasonable in the circumstances.”

95Even if I accept all of PC Deep’s evidence at its best, I cannot find that the Lexus’ containment supported a detention for flight from police. No recognizable police vehicle pursued the Lexus. Even if the Applicant recognized that the police operated the unmarked vehicles and the officers were acting within the course of their duties, he did stop after reversing a mere few inches. In my view, the police confinement worked perfectly.

96I accept PC Deep’s testimony that the initial containment had nothing to do with the Applicant. The police intended to detain Mr. McCallum. They did not intend to detain the Applicant. This explains why the officers’ evidence surrounding the Applicant’s detention starts after Mr. McCallum’s arrest.

97I do not find that the Applicant’s initial detention violated s. 9 of the Charter. The Crown fairly concedes that the police detained the Applicant when they boxed his vehicle in. This detention was not arbitrary. It was entirely justified to effect the lawful arrest of Mr. McCallum.

98I believe that PC Deep considered all the reasons he mentioned for detention when he turned his attention to the Applicant. Most of these reasons had to do with Mr. McCallum: his criminal antecedents, associates, and violent outstanding charges. I also understand that in the cold light of the courtroom, the dynamic, volatile, and charged atmosphere surrounding a high-risk arrest can be forgotten. I accept that during such a high-risk scene, PC Deep did his best to ensure that he protected public safety. However, it is incumbent upon me, as stated by Iacobucci J. in Mann’s introductory paragraph, to “consider the delicate balance that must be struck in adequately protecting individual liberties and properly recognizing legitimate police functions.”

99Although I accept the reasoning behind PC Deep’s decision to detain the Applicant, he overreached. In doing so, he violated the Applicant’s right against an arbitrary detention.

100PC Deep and DC Rayner described the Applicant’s movements as an attempt to flee. This may be. However, the reality remains that these statements are mere speculation and conjecture. That is not how this analysis works. I must consider the Applicant’s actual actions through the objective lens impressed upon me by Mann.

101None of the Applicant’s actions justified the police’s belief that he engaged in any ongoing, attempted or future criminal activity.

102I accept that, from the officers’ perspective, it may have seemed as if the Lexus was about to flee. This reinforced their decision to do a containment stop. However, there is no evidence demonstrating how the Applicant would have responded if the officers approached the vehicle on foot wearing their uniforms in plain view, asking for Mr. McCallum to exit the vehicle.

103As it turns out, the police were correct in assuming that Mr. McCallum would be uncooperative. He continued walking away after police identified themselves. He did not listen to police commands and kept at least one hand concealed in the pocket of his sweatshirt. He continued to be uncooperative even after four officers pointed their firearms at him. Despite this volatile situation, the police effected a safe arrest with as little force required as possible in the circumstances.

104DC Rayner and PC Deep turned their attention to the Applicant in this heightened state. None of the officers testified about any nefarious or criminal suspicions between the Applicant and Mr. McCallum prior to the Applicant’s detention. The officers also did not suspect or believe that Mr. McCallum handed anything to the Applicant before exiting the vehicle – weapons or otherwise.

105Even PC Deep’s suspicion about the Applicant’s access to weapons is a mere hunch on the objective facts. Mr. McCallum did not conceal a weapon in the pocket of his sweatshirt, it was a tablet.

(b) Pre-Testimony Discussion Among Officers

106I must repeat the incident in which PC Bright spoke to DC Rayner and PC Deep after he was finished testifying. PC Bright knew that the other two officers were yet to testify. While this was not in breach of a witness exclusion order, he directly discussed testimony that could affect the outcome of this motion. PC Bright mentioned to the officers that some questions focused on his “fear of the unknown” regarding the Applicant after Mr. McCallum’s arrest.

107I find this whole event very troubling. PC Bright has over 13 years of experience with the London Police Service. Yet, he spoke to witnesses that he knew had not yet testified about a key element of police testimony that could justify the Applicant’s detention and subsequent search.

108I accept DC Rayner’s testimony that this comment did not impact his testimony. His evidence remained consistent between the preliminary hearing and this motion. He was an articulate and fair witness.

109I accept DC Rayner’s evidence on how quickly the Applicant turned off the Lexus. He testified that no longer feared for his safety when he approached the Lexus. He recalled the Applicant with his hands raised up. When he told the Applicant to turn off the vehicle, he complied immediately.

110DC Rayner’s account was clear and unembellished. He acknowledged the discussion outside the courtroom with PC Bright. He confirmed that PC Bright told him and PC Deep that defence counsel had asked about the “fear of the unknown.” Despite knowing that PC Bright had just testified that he feared the unknown, DC Rayner did not exaggerate. He admitted that he felt no threat from the Applicant and described him as cooperative. I accept that the Applicant was entirely cooperative with the police.

111I contrast this with PC Deep’s evidence. PC Deep testified that he did not recall what PC Bright said to him a mere hour earlier. I reviewed the cross-examination of both officers when confronted about their exchange with PC Bright. Counsel asked PC Deep what he remembered and said he could not recall PC Bright’s words “verbatim.” Counsel asked no further questions. Counsel did not lead him to the subject in the same way she did with DC Rayner. Nonetheless, I do understand that the lack of detail may reflect discomfort in quoting a colleague when given an open-ended, non-leading question, not deliberate evasion. Therefore, I cannot find that PC Deep was purposefully uncooperative.

112I do not accept PC Deep’s account of how long it took the Applicant to turn off the Lexus. PC Deep claimed that the Applicant stared at him, considering his options, before turning off the vehicle. Counsel appropriately objected to this. However, his offered opinion is telling. While DC Rayner testified that the Applicant was cooperative and compliant, PC Deep presented the Applicant as cunning. I do not accept the latter version.

113Both DC Rayner and PC Deep testified that they had a subjective belief that the Applicant attempted to evade containment by police. While this is what they both subjectively believed, I do not find that it was objectively reasonable.

114I accept all the officers’ evidence that this was a charged and potentially dangerous situation. I do not accept PC Deep’s description of the Applicant when he approached the car, but I do not find that PC Deep was being deliberately deceptive. My concern is with reliability, not honesty. PC Deep was genuinely concerned for public safety after drawing his firearm on Mr. McCallum. His decision to remove the Applicant from the Lexus after Mr. McCallum’s arrest was not arbitrary. It was justified to maintain public safety.

115The earlier detention of the Applicant, when three police cars contained the Lexus, was also justified given the need to arrest Mr. McCallum and in the totality of the circumstances. Directing the Applicant to shift the Lexus from drive to park was for the safety of the officers and the public. However, the continued detention after removing the Applicant from the vehicle and after conducting a safety pat-down does not meet the standard in Mann, at para. 45, that “reasonable grounds to suspect in all the circumstances that the individual is connected to a particular crime and that detention is necessary.”

116The continued detention of the Applicant after Mr. McCallum’s arrest was arbitrary. As the Crown concedes, any search after the safety pat-down was unlawful, as was the Applicant’s arrest and the subsequent search incident to the arrest.

(c) Comparison to Plummer

117The facts in this case differ sharply from Plummer. Police found nothing of concern on the Applicant. He had no weapons. He did not wear a bulletproof vest. Police were justified in fearing that Mr. McCallum had a weapon when they arrested him at gunpoint because he refused to remove his hands from his pocket. Even so, Mr. McCallum, the target of the original arrest, had no weapons.

118The Applicant’s firearms prohibition and conditional sentence for drug trafficking did not provide specific, detailed information to justify extending the safety search from his person to the inside of the vehicle or the bags at his feet. Unlike Plummer, there was no concrete basis for that intrusion. The Applicant was cooperative. He raised his hands when speaking to police outside the vehicle and immediately put the car in park at DC Rayner’s request. Suggesting an ongoing “fear of the unknown” about the Applicant and a belief that he might have a weapon in the bag is speculative. The Applicant did nothing to justify a belief that he posed a real danger to police or the public while detained.

119This case is far removed from Plummer. There, police had information that the accused’s brother had been shot in the same area, that he sought revenge, and that he might be armed and wearing a bulletproof vest. The accused acted suspiciously and was in fact wearing a bulletproof vest during the pat-down. The Court of Appeal held that, in those circumstances, safety concerns outweighed the privacy rights under the Charter. None of those heightened safety concerns existed with the Applicant.

Issue 2: Did the police breath the Applicant’s [s.10](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html) [Charter](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html) rights?

120I do not find that the police violated the Applicant’s rights under s. 10(a) of the Charter. The police detained the Applicant as soon as they confined his vehicle. At that moment, Mr. McCallum exited the vehicle and began walking away. All four officers focused on their initial subject, Mr. McCallum.

121Police did not immediately advise the Applicant of the reason for his detention because they were engaged in a high-risk, dynamic gunpoint arrest. When PC Deep turned his attention to the Applicant, he saw the car was in drive. This created a safety risk. PC Deep’s first words, directing the Applicant to put the car in park, were reasonable and necessary. Once the car was secure, PC Deep moved to the driver’s side and told the Applicant that he was under investigative detention and gave the reasons. This satisfies s. 10(a).

122I accept that there was a delay in providing the Applicant with his right to counsel under s. 10(b) after detention. All four officers described the sequence: the Lexus’ containment, directing the Applicant to put the car in park and turn it off, and then advising him of the reason for his detention and reading his rights and caution. This delay did not breach s. 10(b). There were real and pressing safety concerns between boxing in the Lexus and safely removing the Applicant from the vehicle. The vehicle was still running and in drive. PC Deep acted reasonably in waiting until the Applicant eliminated the risk of the vehicle lurching forward before advising the Applicant of his rights.

123The police called the Applicant’s counsel of choice, Aaron Prevost, and left a message at headquarters. When Mr. Prevost did not return the call, the Applicant spoke to duty counsel. Later, when PC Deep rearrested the Applicant for breaching his conditional sentence, the Applicant again asked to speak with Mr. Prevost. PC Deep instructed cell staff to try to reach Mr. Prevost again.

124I find no violation of the Applicant’s s. 10(b) rights.

Issue 3: Should the evidence be excluded as per [s. 24(2)](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html) of the [Charter](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html)?

125In assessing whether I should admit the evidence pursuant to s. 24(2), I must complete the analysis in Grant that contemplates the following factors:

(i) The seriousness of the breach;

(ii) The impact of the breach on the Applicant’s Charter rights; and

(iii) Society’s need to adjudicate a case on its merits.

126In Grant, the Supreme Court of Canada described the focus of s. 24(2) as follows:

[69] Section 24(2)’s focus is not only long-term, but prospective. The fact of the Charter breach means damage has already been done to the administration of justice. Section 24(2) starts from that proposition and seeks to ensure that evidence obtained through that breach does not do further damage to the repute of the justice system.

[70] Finally, s. 24(2)’s focus is societal. Section 24(2) is not aimed at punishing the police or providing compensation to the accused, but rather at systemic concerns. The s. 24(2) focus is on the broad impact of admission of the evidence on the long-term repute of the justice system.

(a) The Seriousness of the [Charter](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html)-Infringing Conduct

127I must assess the severity of the state conduct. The more serious or deliberate the violation, the greater the need for the court to disassociate from that conduct to maintain public confidence in the rule of law, The purpose at this stage is not to punish the police or to deter Charter breaches. The main concern is to preserve public confidence in the rule of law: Grant, at para. 73.

128The Applicant’s arbitrary detention after the safety pat-down was a serious breach of his s. 9 Charter rights. The subsequent search of the Lexus and the two bags on the driver’s side floor breached his s. 8 rights. I do not find any breach of his s. 10 rights upon his detention or arrest.

129The Applicant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle is lower than in a home. The fact that the Lexus was not registered to him further diminishes that expectation. However, the Applicant retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the two satchels inside the vehicle where the police found the evidence.

130The search of those bags disregarded the Applicant’s Charter rights. That factor weighs against inclusion at this stage of the analysis.

(b) Impact of the Breach on the [Charter](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html)-Protected Rights of the Applicant

131The impact on arbitrarily detaining the Applicant and searching his satchels in the vehicle is significant. The impact on his liberty, privacy and dignity is significant. The police detained and handcuffed the Applicant without legal justification. They searched his vehicle and belongings without authority. These were not technical nor trivial breaches.

132Where the evidence is not otherwise discoverable, the impact on the accused’s Charter protected interests is significant: R. v. Côté, 2011 SCC 46, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 215, at para. 72. The police did not consider obtaining a warrant to search the Lexus. They also lacked reasonable grounds to obtain one for the stated investigation of flight from police, as discussed above.

133On this second stage, the combined breaches of ss. 8 and 9 militate in favour of exclusion of the evidence.

(c) Society’s Interest in the Adjudication of the Case on its Merits

134The Crown argues that excluding highly reliable evidence, which is integral to the prosecution, may itself bring the administration of justice into disrepute. This is real evidence. Without it, the Crown has no case.

135Society has an interest in prosecuting a case on its merits. Drugs, especially opioids as found in the Appellant’s satchels, pose grave danger. Canada is in the midst of an opioid epidemic.

136The evidence of drugs, money, scales, and baggies is reliable. These factors favour admission because they advance the truth-seeking function of a trial.

137As the Supreme Court of Canada held, “the seriousness of the alleged offence may be a valid consideration, it has the potential to cut both ways. Failure to effectively prosecute a serious charge due to excluded evidence may have an immediate impact on how people view the justice system. Yet, as discussed, it is the long-term repute of the justice system that is s. 24(2)’s focus”: Grant, at para. 84.

138The Court continued at para. 84 by writing:

The short-term public clamour for a conviction in a particular case must not deafen the s. 24(2) judge to the longer-term repute of the administration of justice. Moreover, while the public has a heightened interest in seeing a determination on the merits where the offence charged is serious, it also has a vital interest in having a justice system that is above reproach, particularly where the penal stakes for the accused are high.

139The Applicant had a large quantity of drugs and money, along with scales and baggies. This is strong evidence of possession for the purpose of trafficking. This is a serious offence. However, the state’s infringement was also significant.

140This stage of the s. 24(2) analysis weighs slightly in favour of admission.

(d) Balancing the Grant Factors

141Having balanced all three lines of inquiry, I find that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The Appellant was arbitrarily detained. Had the only search been a safety pat-down during the high-risk arrest of Mr. McCallum, the analysis would differ. I would not have found a violation of s. 9 in that scenario.

142But that is not what happened. The Applicant was unlawfully detained, handcuffed, and seated on the curb beside the Lexus. He was cooperative and compliant. After the pat-down, no legitimate safety concerns remained. Searching his vehicle was a serious breach of his reasonable expectation of privacy and his s. 8 Charter rights. Even though excluding this evidence will gut the Crown’s case, the long-term repute of the justice system requires its exclusion.

Conclusion

143The evidence seized by the police is excluded from the trial.

“Justice Jennifer Moser”

Justice Jennifer Moser

Date: February 23, 2026,

CITATION: R. v. Ramroop, 2026 ONSC 1088

COURT FILE NO.: CR-25-111

DATE: 20260223

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

JUSTIN RAMROOP

Defendant/Applicant

Charter ruling