48 total
Request to re-open hearing denied as the letter relied upon to extend the limitation period was not discriminatory.
Following the conclusion of the hearing, the applicant requested to re-open the proceedings to advance allegations against the Ottawa Presbytery.
The parties agreed the allegations were out of time unless a May 2008 letter constituted the last in a series of discriminatory events.
The Tribunal found that the letter was merely a response to allegations made against the author personally and did not constitute an act of discrimination.
Consequently, the Tribunal declined to exercise its discretion to re-open the hearing.
Registrar's ex parte dismissal order set aside due to defendant's material non-disclosure of deadline extension.
The plaintiffs and the court-appointed Administrator brought motions to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing the action.
The defendant had obtained the dismissal order ex parte on December 31, 2012, relying on a prior endorsement that required the action to be set down by December 29, 2012.
However, the defendant failed to disclose to the Registrar that the court had subsequently extended the deadline to February 28, 2013.
The court found that the defendant's failure to disclose the extension constituted a material misstatement and that the Registrar lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the action.
The dismissal order was set aside, and substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the moving parties.
Application against employer dismissed for delay; applications against oversight bodies proceed as prima facie case established.
The applicant filed human rights applications alleging discrimination on the basis of sex in respect of employment and contracts against his former employer, Parkdale United Church, and its oversight bodies.
The respondents raised preliminary issues regarding delay, whether a prima facie case was established, and whether the matter was dealt with in another proceeding.
The Tribunal dismissed the application against Parkdale due to a delay of over two years that was not incurred in good faith.
However, the Tribunal found the applications against the oversight bodies were timely, established a prima facie case of discrimination, and were not barred by another proceeding under section 45.1 of the Code.
Appeal from refusal of adjournment dismissed as there was no basis to interfere with discretion.
The appellant appealed the motion judge's decision to refuse a motion for an adjournment.
The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal with no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed; statement of claim lacked sufficient facts to support bald allegation of negligent misrepresentation.
The appellant appealed an order striking out portions of its statement of claim against two defendants.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the amended statement of claim lacked sufficient facts to support the bald allegation of negligent misrepresentation.
Appeal allowed and Rule 21 order set aside due to factual disputes and confusion over corporate parties.
The appellant appealed an order made pursuant to a Rule 21 motion.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the order, finding that the matter was not suitable for a Rule 21 determination due to numerous factual disputes and overwhelming confusion regarding the identities of the corporate parties and the tenant.
Appeal on damages for lost chance dismissed; cross-appeal on costs granted to apply Rule 49.
The appellant was retained by the respondents to negotiate scientific research tax credits on a commission basis.
The respondents breached the contract by terminating the appellant without notice.
The trial judge awarded $45,000 in damages based on the lost chance of success, which the appellant appealed.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on damages, finding the trial judge's quantification reasonable.
However, the Court granted the respondents' cross-appeal on costs, holding that the trial judge erred by leaving the determination of a Rule 49 offer to the assessment officer, and awarded costs to the respondents from the date of the offer.
Final child support variation order against out-of-province respondent set aside; only provisional order permitted without attornment.
The appellant appealed an order refusing to set aside a final child support variation order made after he moved to British Columbia.
The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and extended the time to appeal the original variation order.
The majority held that under sections 17(1) and 18(2) of the Divorce Act, a final order cannot be made against an out-of-province respondent unless they attorn to the jurisdiction or consent; otherwise, only a provisional order can be made.
The matter was remitted for a rehearing.