Gary Gordon Boyd

The defendant Kaufman LLP, former lawyers for the plaintiff, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the action against them.

The grounds for the motion included that the action was commenced outside the limitation period, the plaintiff lacked standing to claim damages, the claim was duplicative, and it constituted an impermissible collateral attack on Québec Superior Court orders.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim against Kaufman LLP was statute-barred, as it was commenced well beyond the two-year limitation period from when the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the alleged professional negligence.

Additionally, the court noted that the plaintiff had not incurred personal liability or compensable loss as a result of the alleged negligence.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against Kaufman LLP.

The defendant Kaufman LLP brought a motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff, Antranik Kechichian.

The plaintiff's claim alleged negligence and breach of contract by Kaufman LLP for failing to assign a commercial lease, leading to a default judgment against Optical Vision of Canada Ltd., a company in which the plaintiff had an ownership interest.

The court found that the plaintiff had no provable, compensable loss and that the relief sought was duplicative of ongoing proceedings in Québec.

Furthermore, the action was found to be statute-barred as the plaintiff was aware of the alleged issues more than two years before commencing the action.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against Kaufman LLP.

The moving party sought costs following a successful motion to be appointed as her husband's litigation guardian.

She sought substantial indemnity costs against two respondents due to their counsel's failure to communicate, and partial indemnity costs against the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) for opposing the motion.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs against the respondents, finding their counsel's conduct unprofessional but not warranting an elevated scale.

The court also awarded partial indemnity costs against the PGT, rejecting its argument for presumptive immunity as a statutory agency and finding it had pursued meritless arguments.

The moving party sought to be appointed as the litigation guardian for her husband, whose capacity was at issue in a proceeding challenging the validity of powers of attorney and wills.

The Public Guardian and Trustee opposed the appointment, arguing that section 3 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 rendered a litigation guardian unnecessary.

The court held that section 3 counsel and a litigation guardian serve complementary roles, and that appointing a litigation guardian was appropriate to safeguard the husband's legal interests.

The moving party was appointed as litigation guardian, as she had no disqualifying conflict of interest.

The defendants/plaintiffs by counterclaim (the Burdet Group) brought a motion for a timetable order to schedule a trial for their counterclaim and for an order to recalculate past arrears.

The plaintiff/defendant by counterclaim (CCC396) brought a cross-motion for security for costs.

The court granted the cross-motion, ordering the Burdet Group to post $836,415 in security for costs due to multiple unpaid costs awards and a history of vexatious litigation.

The Burdet Group's motions were dismissed, with the timetable request deemed premature until security is posted.

This appeal and cross-appeal arose from a fraudulent scheme involving the sale of used vehicles.

The trial judge found the appellant garage liable for conversion of five missing vehicles and awarded damages of $40,792.

The trial judge dismissed conversion claims regarding consigned vehicles, finding the parties acquired them in good faith without notice of defects in title.

The appellants challenged the findings regarding stolen vehicles, mitigation of damages, quantum of damages, and the failure to adjudicate certain counterclaims.

The respondents cross-appealed the mercantile agent finding and the costs award.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, with limited relief granted for a contribution and indemnity claim against one defendant.

The appellant massage therapist appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee revoking his certificate of registration for professional misconduct, including sexual abuse of a patient.

The appellant argued the investigation was procedurally unfair, there was undue delay, and the Committee erred in its credibility assessments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that any initial procedural unfairness was cured, there was no evidence of prejudice from delay, and the Committee's credibility findings were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The appellants were found liable for condominium arrears following a trial.

Their appeal to the Court of Appeal was unsuccessful, as was their subsequent motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The appellants then brought a motion in the Superior Court under Rule 59.06(2) to set aside the judgment and obtain judgment in their favour.

The motion judge dismissed the motion under Rule 2.1.02(1), fixing costs at $500.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding the Rule 59.06(2) motion to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appellants sought relief that exceeded what was permissible on such a motion, and the set-off issue argument they raised had already been made at trial.

This appeal concerns the management of Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 396 following a 35-day trial.

The trial judge found that the director engaged in oppressive conduct including self-dealing, lack of financial disclosure, charging personal legal fees to the corporation, failing to declare conflicts, refusing to produce court-ordered records, and implementing an invalid by-law.

The trial judge ordered termination of the condominium corporation, declared the director's oppressive conduct, held the director personally liable for costs, and awarded common expense arrears to the corporation.

The appellants challenged the oppression finding, personal liability, and termination order.

The respondents cross-appealed the timing of arrears payment and the cost award against them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upheld the oppression finding and termination order, confirmed personal liability for the director, and modified the cost award.

A 19-year-old first-time offender pleaded guilty to nine counts: six counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking in various Schedule I substances (cocaine, crack cocaine, MDA, MDMA, fentanyl, and heroin), one count of possession of proceeds of crime ($1,070), and two counts of possession of firearms without a licence.

Police discovered approximately $300,000 worth of drugs, two loaded firearms (a Tikka rifle and a 12-gauge shotgun), and various weapons in the accused's apartment.

The court imposed a sentence of four years and nine months (57 months), less 21 days of pre-trial custody credited at 1.5 days, resulting in 56 months to be served concurrently on the drug and proceeds counts, with 30 months concurrent on the firearms counts.

The court balanced serious aggravating factors (nature and quantity of drugs, loaded firearms, commercial enterprise) against significant mitigating factors (youth, lack of criminal record, guilty plea, strong family support, and rehabilitation prospects).

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a 2014 trial judgment regarding unpaid condominium fees, relying on an affidavit they claimed contained new facts.

The court found the motion to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 21.02(1).

The court noted that the burden under Rule 59.06(2) is high and the defendants failed to present any facts that arose after the trial or could not have been reasonably discovered prior.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The minority unit owners of a commercial condominium brought an action against the majority unit owner, who also served as a director and officer, alleging oppressive conduct under s. 135 of the Condominium Act, 1998.

The majority owner used his voting control to direct condominium contracts and payments to a related corporation, ETRE, without declaring his conflict of interest, and charged the condominium for personal litigation and construction costs.

The court found the majority owner's conduct to be oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, and in breach of his fiduciary duties.

Due to the structural fault in the condominium's voting rights and the ongoing deadlock, the court ordered the termination of the condominium corporation under s. 128 and appointed a receiver to sell the assets.

The court also resolved various financial claims, ordering the minority to pay common expense arrears while dismissing most of the majority owner's claims for penalty charges, promissory notes, and time charges.

The respondents brought a motion to consolidate an application with an action.

During cross-examinations on affidavits, the applicant refused to answer several questions, leading to this refusals motion.

The Master ordered the applicant to answer questions regarding the merits of the application and his understanding of contractual documents, finding that the parol evidence rule does not preclude such questions at the cross-examination stage.

However, the Master upheld the applicant's claim of solicitor-client privilege over documents in a mediation file, finding no blanket waiver of privilege.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for fraud and breach of contract related to a carpet supply and installation contract with a public housing corporation.

The trial judge found the appellants engaged in a deliberate scheme of falsifying invoices and supplying substandard materials, awarding compensatory damages, punitive damages, and full indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on liability, compensatory damages, and costs, confirming that a contractual stop-payment clause was not a penalty or liquidated damages provision.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the joint and several nature of the punitive damages award and the punitive damages awarded against the deceased employee's estate, leaving the principal appellant solely liable for the punitive damages.

The applicant, charged with drug and firearms offences, brought a Charter motion to exclude evidence seized from his residence and vehicle.

The court initially denied standing regarding the residence but allowed the applicant to reopen evidence, ultimately finding he had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The court found the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant for the residence lacked sufficient corroboration, resulting in a section 8 Charter breach.

However, the court dismissed the section 7, 8, and 9 claims regarding the vehicle search and arrest, finding them lawful.

Applying the Grant framework under section 24(2), the court admitted the evidence from the residence, concluding the police acted in good faith and the highly reliable evidence was essential to the truth-seeking function of the trial.

During a case conference concerning an anticipated motion for summary judgment, the moving parties had previously scheduled a hearing date but faced objections from the responding parties, who indicated they intended to bring cross-motions and anticipated a possible appeal.

At the conference convened to determine whether the motion would proceed, the moving parties advised the court that they would not proceed with the summary judgment motion in light of those objections.

The court also addressed trial management matters, confirming that the presiding judge for the conference was scheduled to act as the trial judge for the upcoming trial.

One responding party indicated it would seek instructions regarding that arrangement.

The defendants appealed a trial judgment regarding a 1994 promissory note, arguing the trial judge failed to consider a 1983 agreement, a cancellation clause, the appropriate interest rate, and the principle of proportionality in costs.

The plaintiff cross-appealed on interest and costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the note was clear on its face, the cancellation clause was inapplicable due to prior default, and the trial judge made no reversible error in exercising discretion over interest and costs.

At a case conference prior to a scheduled civil trial, the court addressed whether issues relating to condominium fee arrears owed by certain unit owner plaintiffs to the condominium corporation would fall within the scope of the upcoming trial.

The pleadings raised the validity and amount of arrears, including fees, penalties, charges, and interest for a lengthy historical period.

The parties confirmed that the trial judge would have jurisdiction to determine the validity and quantum of any arrears and to award judgment in favour of the condominium corporation against the relevant unit owners.

No party opposed inclusion of these issues in the trial.

The court directed that the identified matters form part of the trial issues to be determined.

Following a construction lien trial in which the plaintiff recovered the balance owing for stone installation and successfully defended a counterclaim alleging deficiencies, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiff sought full or substantial indemnity costs, arguing that the defendants engaged in unreasonable conduct by presenting inflated invoices contradicted by their own witness and by making misleading testimony.

The court held that the conduct was unreasonable but did not rise to the level warranting full or substantial indemnity costs.

Considering the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties’ settlement offers, the complexity of the construction litigation, and proportionality, the court awarded costs slightly above partial indemnity.

Costs were fixed at $50,000 plus HST and $3,000 in disbursements.

Following a prior judgment finding the defendants liable for a fraudulent carpet supply scheme, the court issued supplementary reasons clarifying how the plaintiff must elect judgment between an undisclosed principal and its agents for contract damages while allowing fraud-based damages to be enforced against all defendants.

The court explained the composition of the compensatory damages award and confirmed that only the contract-based component required an election of judgment.

In determining costs, the court considered the discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Given the defendants’ fraudulent conduct and the complexity and length of the litigation, the court concluded that full indemnity costs were justified.

The plaintiff was awarded $630,475.47 in costs jointly and severally against the defendants.