Jean-François Laberge

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering rescission of an asset purchase agreement.

The trial judge found that the appellant made fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations regarding defects in the building that were known at the time of closing.

The Court of Appeal rejected the appellant's submissions that the trial judge made extricable legal errors in contract interpretation or that the interpretation was commercially unreasonable.

The court found no palpable and overriding errors or inadequacy of reasons.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision finding them liable under the oppression remedy.

The appellants conceded that Tam and the pharmacy were liable but argued that the motion judge erred in finding the landlord and RTM Resources liable.

The appellants contended that the statement of claim pleaded intent to defeat the claim, which could not be decided on a motion, and that the respondent failed to prove the defendants were affiliates.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that under the oppression remedy, effect rather than intent is determinative, and that the motion judge's findings sufficiently established that both entities were affiliates controlled by the same person.

On cross-appeal from a Superior Court judgment, the appellants challenged four discrete issues arising from a contractual dispute.

The Court of Appeal allowed the cross-appeal in part, finding that the respondents were entitled to restitution of interest paid relating to the Petting Zoo property, prejudgment interest on damages awarded for the Petting Zoo, and reimbursement of municipal property taxes paid on the property.

The Court upheld the motion judge's calculation of principal owed and dismissed the appeal on the main issues.

The appellants were awarded costs of the cross-appeal.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment granting rescission and damages with respect to one vacant property (Petting Zoo) and issuing a certificate of pending litigation with respect to another property (Lot 511).

The respondents had made payments totalling $168,727.74 between 2006 and 2013 towards the purchase of both properties, but the appellant retained title to both.

The appellant argued the respondents had defaulted on their payment obligations and forfeited their interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's own breach in failing to obtain severance of Lot 511 justified the respondents' cessation of payments and entitled them to the remedies granted.

This endorsement addresses three motions in a court-appointed receivership and subsequent bankruptcy of Casselman Plywood Hardware Building Centre Ltd. The motions included a receiver's request for approval and directions, counsel's motion to withdraw for the debtor, and a secured creditor's (Sexton Group Ltd.) motion to stay the bankruptcy proceeding.

The court approved the debtor's assignment into bankruptcy nunc pro tunc, permitted counsel to withdraw, and directed the receiver to continue evaluating secured claims, rather than transferring this responsibility to the trustee in bankruptcy.

The court emphasized that the receivership preceded the bankruptcy and the receiver was already in control of the assets.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike multiple paragraphs of the plaintiff’s statement of claim in an oppression action involving a minority shareholder.

The defendants argued the impugned paragraphs lacked full particulars, improperly pleaded evidence or opinion, and constituted an abuse of process by referencing allegedly frivolous legal proceedings.

The court held that most of the allegations sufficiently pleaded material facts and provided necessary narrative context.

However, several paragraphs were struck where they improperly pleaded evidence or opinion.

The court granted partial relief by striking limited portions of the pleading with leave to amend and dismissed the remainder of the motion.

Following a construction lien trial in which the plaintiff recovered the balance owing for stone installation and successfully defended a counterclaim alleging deficiencies, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiff sought full or substantial indemnity costs, arguing that the defendants engaged in unreasonable conduct by presenting inflated invoices contradicted by their own witness and by making misleading testimony.

The court held that the conduct was unreasonable but did not rise to the level warranting full or substantial indemnity costs.

Considering the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties’ settlement offers, the complexity of the construction litigation, and proportionality, the court awarded costs slightly above partial indemnity.

Costs were fixed at $50,000 plus HST and $3,000 in disbursements.

The plaintiff contractor, Rocksolid, brought an action for the unpaid balance of a contract to install masonry stonework on the defendants' new home.

The defendants counterclaimed for the cost of completing the work and repairing alleged deficiencies.

The court found that the defendants breached the contract by failing to supply sufficient stone, which delayed the project into the winter, and repudiated the contract by refusing to pay for the necessary heating costs and ordering the plaintiff off the jobsite.

The court also held that the defendants failed to mitigate their damages by denying the plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to correct the minor deficiencies.

The plaintiff was awarded $18,530.89 on a quantum meruit basis, and the counterclaim was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court costs award of $1,650, arguing the deputy judge erred by exceeding the 15 percent limit under s. 29 of the Courts of Justice Act without explicitly referencing the provision.

The Divisional Court held that leave to appeal was required because the costs award involved an exercise of discretion, and granted leave.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that although the deputy judge did not cite s. 29, his factual findings regarding the appellant's unreasonable behaviour and failure to accept a generous settlement offer fully supported the elevated costs award.