Croft Michaelson

The accused was found guilty under the Canada Elections Act of preventing or endeavouring to prevent electors from voting during the 2011 federal election.

He participated in a scheme that sent thousands of automated telephone calls directing targeted non-supporters to false polling locations.

The Crown sought 18 to 20 months' imprisonment, while the defence sought a non-custodial sentence or a short, sharp sentence of 14 to 30 days.

The court emphasized the principles of denunciation and general deterrence, noting the severe impact of the conduct on the democratic process.

The accused was sentenced to 9 months' imprisonment followed by 12 months' probation.

The accused was convicted of preventing or endeavouring to prevent an elector from voting at the federal election held on May 2, 2011, contrary to the Canada Elections Act.

The accused, as communications director for the local Conservative candidate in Guelph, was a major and active participant in a scheme involving approximately 7,000 automated telephone calls directing targeted non-Conservative supporters to false polling locations.

The court imposed a sentence of 9 months imprisonment followed by 12 months probation, emphasizing that general deterrence and denunciation were the primary sentencing principles given the serious nature of interference with the democratic electoral process.

The appellant appealed a ruling under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act that denied disclosure of information sought by defence counsel on the basis of informer privilege.

The incident leading to the appellant's arrest for drug possession occurred in a small community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the requested information might tend to identify the informant.

During the 2011 federal election campaign in Guelph, Ontario, automated telephone calls were made to approximately 6,738 voters falsely indicating that their polling stations had been changed to another location.

The accused, Michael Sona, was the communications director for the Conservative Party candidate.

The Crown alleged that Sona was responsible for creating and placing these calls, or alternatively, that he was a party to the offence by aiding or abetting those who did.

The defence argued that while the circumstances raised suspicions, the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found Sona guilty, determining that although the evidence did not establish he personally uploaded the messages to the automated calling service, he was actively involved in creating the scheme and was a party to the offence through aiding and abetting.

In a terrorism prosecution involving allegations of conspiracy to derail a passenger train, the Crown moved for the appointment of amicus curiae because one accused insisted on representing himself while rejecting the legitimacy of Canadian law.

The court reviewed the law governing amicus appointments following the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ontario v. C.L.A. of Ontario, emphasizing that amicus must not function as defence counsel or undermine the accused’s right to self‑representation.

Given the seriousness and complexity of the terrorism charges, the anticipated evidentiary issues (including wiretap admissibility and editing), and the likelihood that the self‑represented accused would refuse to participate meaningfully in proceedings governed by Canadian law, the court found exceptional circumstances justifying the appointment.

Amicus was appointed with a limited role to assist the court on complex legal and evidentiary issues while respecting the accused’s autonomy.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered on the basis of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter in a drug prosecution arising from a residential grow operation.

The court held that the application judge mischaracterized part of the delay associated with a joint adjournment of a judicial pre-trial and part of the post-assignment period before trial, both of which should have been treated as inherent delay rather than Crown or institutional delay.

With those deductions, the net Crown and institutional delay fell at the low end of the Morin guidelines.

Given the seriousness of the charges, the societal interest in a trial on the merits, and the weak evidence of actual prejudice, the delay was not unreasonable.

The appellant telecommunications company challenged a general warrant and related assistance order requiring it to produce stored text messages of two subscribers on a prospective, daily basis over a two-week period.

The majority held the general warrant invalid, with two concurring opinions reaching that result by different routes.

One plurality held that the prospective daily production of future text messages constituted an interception of private communications requiring authorization under Part VI of the Criminal Code, making the general warrant unavailable under s. 487.01(1)(c).

The other concurring opinion held that even if not strictly an interception, the technique was substantively equivalent to one, precluding resort to the general warrant.

The dissent would have upheld the general warrant, finding the technique was disclosure of previously intercepted communications rather than an interception itself.

The respondent was charged with producing marihuana and successfully argued at trial that the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations (MMAR) violated s. 7 of the Charter because physicians were boycotting the scheme, rendering the medical exemption illusory.

The trial judge struck down the MMAR and stayed the charges.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in his factual findings and misapprehended the evidentiary record.

The Court held that the respondent failed to provide medical evidence that he or the patient witnesses qualified for an exemption, and there was no evidence of a systemic boycott by physicians.

The trial judge's orders were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

In a pair of extradition appeals, the Court held that surrender of Canadian citizens to the United States on terrorism-related charges did not unjustifiably infringe mobility rights under s. 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court reaffirmed that extradition generally constitutes a marginal limitation on the right to remain in Canada and that ministerial balancing under the established multi-factor framework attracts substantial deference.

It rejected arguments that weak foreign jurisdiction or feasible domestic prosecution should be near-dispositive limits on surrender.

The Court also held that procedural fairness did not require the Minister to obtain and disclose prosecutorial assessments about whether to proceed domestically.

The surrender decisions were found reasonable on the record, and both appeals were dismissed.

In this criminal appeal concerning terrorism convictions under Part II.1 of the Criminal Code, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of key terrorism provisions, the fairness of the trial after appellate restoration of the motive clause, the reasonableness of the verdicts, and the sentence imposed on appeal.

The Court held that the challenged participation provision was not overbroad under s. 7 and that the legislative scheme did not establish a breach of expressive freedom on the record before it.

It further held that re-insertion of the motive clause caused no trial unfairness, the armed conflict exception did not apply on the evidence, and the convictions were reasonable.

On sentence, the Court affirmed correction of errors in principle and upheld the substituted life term with consecutive terms and extended parole ineligibility.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the motion judge erred in her section 11(b) Charter analysis regarding unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in her balancing of the prejudice to the appellant against the societal interest in having a trial.

The court noted that because it was a documents case, the possibility of fading memories was less significant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, facing terrorism charges, elected to be tried in the provincial court.

The Director of Public Prosecutions subsequently preferred a direct indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code, moving the trial to the Superior Court.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash the indictment, arguing that s. 577 does not apply to an accused who elected a provincial court trial and that overriding his election violated his s. 7 Charter rights.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, holding that s. 577 broadly permits direct indictments regardless of the accused's election, and that there is no constitutional right to a trial by a judge alone in a specific court.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in cocaine in association with a criminal organization, arguing the transaction was a one-time occurrence unrelated to his membership in the Hells Angels.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the transaction was in association with the criminal organization, noting both participants were full patch members who met at a club function.

The court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the admission of expert testimony on motorcycle gangs, the appellant's claim of acting as an agent, and pre-trial custody credit.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences relating to the attempted exportation of restricted pressure transducers to Iran, including violations of the United Nations Act, Customs Act, and Criminal Code.

On appeal, he challenged the trial judge's interpretation of the technical specifications for the restricted goods and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly interpreted the specifications and reasonably concluded the appellant knowingly attempted to supply the goods to a person in Iran.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal in part, reducing the sentence on the UN offence because the trial judge erred in treating an unproven link to Iran's nuclear enrichment program as an aggravating factor.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in cocaine in association with a criminal organization.

The trial judge found that the appellant, a full patch member of the Hells Angels, acted as a middleman to facilitate drug transactions between a police agent and a supplier.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge reasonably inferred that membership in the organization assisted in the commission of the offence, satisfying the 'in association with' requirement.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice that struck down the section 38 scheme of the Canada Evidence Act as unconstitutional.

The scheme grants the Federal Court jurisdiction to determine questions of disclosure of information pertaining to international relations, national defence, or national security.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the scheme does not violate section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 or section 7 of the Charter.

The Court found that the scheme preserves the full authority and independence of the judge presiding over the criminal trial to do justice between the parties, including entering a stay of proceedings if necessary to protect the accused's right to a fair trial.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine.

Shortly before trial, the Crown disclosed evidence from two alleged accomplices.

The trial judge excluded the evidence under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to late disclosure.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that exclusion of evidence under s. 24(1) is only appropriate where late disclosure renders the trial process unfair and cannot be remedied by an adjournment and disclosure order, or where exclusion is necessary to maintain the integrity of the justice system.

The accused was charged with income tax evasion.

At his second trial, he argued that he was not obligated to pay taxes because the Income Tax Act did not apply to him as a 'natural person'.

The trial judge put this defence to the jury, and the accused was acquitted.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the accused's belief that the Act did not apply to him was a mistake of law that did not constitute a defence to tax evasion.

The trial judge erred in putting this unavailable defence to the jury.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellants, commercial fishers, challenged a communal fishing licence issued under a pilot sales program that granted members of three aboriginal bands the exclusive right to fish for salmon for 24 hours.

They argued the licence discriminated against them on the basis of race, violating their equality rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the program was protected by s. 15(2) of the Charter because it had an ameliorative purpose and targeted a disadvantaged group.

The Court established that if a program meets the criteria of s. 15(2), it does not violate the s. 15 equality guarantee.

The accused were investigated by the CRA for tax evasion and fraud after a referral from the RCMP.

The trial judge found that the CRA auditor was conducting a criminal investigation from the outset, violating section 8 of the Charter by using regulatory inspection powers.

The trial judge quashed the search warrants, excluded the evidence under section 24(2), and awarded costs to the accused.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the acquittals and ordering a new trial.

The majority held that the auditor's inquiries did not violate section 8, as their predominant purpose was not the determination of penal liability, making that evidence admissible.

The Court unanimously set aside the costs award, finding no exceptional circumstances or Crown misconduct.